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I. Introduction
Tie-ins are agreements which condition contractual obligations be-
tween a seller and a buyer of one product on the execution of trans-
actions between the same parties acting in the same capacities on a
second product. Since 1917,1 all such agreements involving patented
products have been held to be per se illegal on the assumption that their
exclusive and/or inevitable function is to permit sellers to wield
"monopolistic leverage, ' 2 leverage that is intended to and inevitably
does "result in economic harm to competition in the tied product mar-
ket."3 This assumption and conclusion have been progressively ex-
tended first to cover tie-ins involving sellers of dominant products, 4
and most recently to cover tie-ins involving sellers who have merely a
competitive advantage when selling one of the goods in question to
the buyer concerned.5
In this article, I will determine whether and under what circum-
stances tie-ins violate the American antitrust laws. My analysis will be
divided into two parts. In Section II, I will examine the leverage theory
of tie-ins in its various forms. At the outset, I will demonstrate the
unsatisfactory character of the Court's attempt to account for the sup-
posed ability of tie-ins to injure tied-product competition by showing
that both premises of the Court's leverage theory are incorrect. Next, I
will disprove the conclusion of the exclusive leverage theory (that the
sole function of tie-ins is to injure tied-product competition) by demon-
strating that such agreements can perform twelve functions other than
reducing tied-product competition. Finally, I will undermine the con-
clusion of the inevitable leverage theory (that all tie-ins inevitably
reduce tied-product competition) by showing that the profitability of
tie-ins does not depend on their increasing their employer's returns by
injuring tied-product competition.
In Section III, I will analyze the standards established by the
1. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
2. This article will not be concerned with the possibility that some tying agreements
-viz., those that function inter alia by concealing illegal price discrimination, contract
or tax fraud, and/or maximum or minimum price regulation violations-may be void
under the common law of contracts as contra bones mores.
3. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). See also
cases cited in Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory (henceforth
Part I), 76 YALE LJ. 1397 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
5. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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American antitrust laws and the legality of tie-ins under them. As we
shall see, although these laws are far more ambiguous than has previ-
ously been realized, most tie-ins would undoubtedly be legal under any
plausible interpretation of the statute in question. In fact, under the
most plausible rendering of the Sherman and Clayton Acts very few
tie-ins would be found to be illegal for competition in the relevant
sense will rarely be reduced by a decision to allow all prospective sup-
pliers of a particular buyer to enter into such agreements with him re-
gardless of the functional type of tie-in most likely to be employed.
Finally, I will compare the results of this analysis with the conclusions
generated by the Court's leverage theory. As I have already indicated,
the Court's per se rule would not be justified under any plausible ren-
dering of the statutes in question. Moreover, those tying agreements
that actually violate the American antitrust laws are not distinguishable
as the Supreme Court contends by the fact that the tying producers they
involve enjoy some competitive superiority in their tying product deal-
ings with individual customers.
II. The Leverage Theory of Tie-ins
The Supreme Court's leverage theory of tie-ins purports to explain
why a seller who enjoys a position of competitive superiority6 when
6. In its most recent opinion, the majority of the Court explicitly states its belief that
general market dominance is not required for the generation of leverage. See Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-06 (1968); quoting United States
v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). Unfortunately, however, the Court's articulation of the
conditions under which it believes tie-ins to be capable of generating leverage is
ambiguous. The Court seems to stress the special "desirability" or "uniqueness"
of the product to the customer in question, but its subsequent discussion makes it dear
that the supposed capacity of tie-ins to generate leverage might also derive from the
seller's ability to provide a suitable tying product to this customer at relatively less
cost to himself than tying-product substitutes would cost his tying-product competitors.
Thus, in actuality, the Court seems to be arguing that tie-ins can and will generate
leverage whenever the seller enjoys a competitive advantage when competing for at least
some of the related buyer's patronage in the tying-product market. This advantage need
not extend to all of this buyer's tying-product needs. For example, if we assume (1) that
all tying-product producers face the same constant cost conditions and (2) that at equal
prices the buyer in question would purchase some of the tying product from the tying
seller and equal volumes from his various tying-product competitors-i.e., that the buyer
prefers variety; the tie-in would still, on the Court's theory, be capable of generating
leverage since the tying producer would enjoy an advantage when competing for part
of the tying product patronage of the buyer in question, even though he would not be
in a generally superior competitive position in the tying-product market. Thus, according
to the Court, the capacity of the tie-in to generate leverage might, for example, derive
(1) from the ability of the tying producer to provide a tying product which this customer
prefers to the alternatives (for at least some of his needs) at the same cost his tying-
product competitors must incur to provide these less preferred substitutes; or (2) from
his ability to supply the buyer in question a tying product which costs him less than his
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marketing one product (A) to a particular buyer sometimes finds it
profitable to condition his sale of A on the buyer's agreeing to enter
into a transaction with him on a second-or tied-product (B). Ac-
cording to the leverage theory, such tying conditions are inevitably
and perhaps exclusively employed to enable such sellers to use their
competitive superiority on the tying product to lever themselves into
monopolistic positions in the market for the tied product.7 Although
the Court has not recognized this fact, the correctness of its legal judg-
ment depends on more than the correctness of its economic leverage
theory. In particular, the correctness of the Court's legal conclusion
depends as well on the soundness of its implicit reading of the American
antitrust laws-that is, on its implicit assumption that the legality of a
particular tie-in is determined by the competitive impact of allowing
the seller it involves to enter into a tying agreement with a particular
buyer rather than by the competitive impact of allowing all of the
competitors for this buyer's patronage to enter into a tying agreement
with him. As we shall see, this difference will be crucial in many tie-in
cases. However, throughout Section II, I will analyze the Court's lever-
age theory on the assumption that it merits the legal significance the
Court attributes to it. In Section III, I will drop this assumption. More
specifically, after showing why the Clayton Act probably should be
interpreted to make the legality of a particular tie-in depend on the
competitive impact of allowing all competitors for a particular cus-
tomer's patronage to enter into such an agreement with him, I will
analyze when and how the general availability of such agreements would
be likely to have such an anti-competitive impact.
competitors' substitutes cost them but is equally satisfactory to the customer involved; or
even (8) from his ability to provide this buyer with a tying product the latter finds inferior
to its substitutes at a cost to himself sufficiently lower than the cost of these substitutes
to his competitors' to raise his prospective returns from making a sale at a comparatively
low enough price to attract the buyer's patronage above what his competitors could earn
by taking this sale away from him.
7. This interpretation of the leverage theory is not the only one suggested by the
Court's language in various opinions. At times the Court seems quite clearly to have been
concerned with tied-product competitors rather than with tied-product competition-
i.e., with the supposed tendency of tie-ins to place tied-product competitors at a dis-
advantage in their dealings with some prospective buyers for reasons unrelated to social
efficiency and not with the alleged ability of such agreements to injure tied-product
competition. In the text, however, I will continue to use the competitive impact rather
than the unfair competition version of the leverage theory, since only on that interpre-
tation would the theory's conclusion have the legal significance (under the Clayton and
Sherman Antitrust Acts) the Court has attributed to it. In Appendix B, I will investigate
whether tie-ins do tend to give their employers an unfair competitive advantage.
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A. On Generation and Other Gaps: A Critique of the Leverage Theory
Although the leverage theory concludes that tie-ins enable their em-
ployers to increase their market power in the tied-product market, its
explanation of the way in which these agreements produce this effect is
entirely unsatisfactory. As we saw, the Court traces this alleged ability
of a tie-in to the seller's competitive advantage in his dealings with the
buyer in question in the tying-product market-that is, to the fact that
the cost to the tying producer of providing a tying product of suitable
quality to this customer is relatively less than its counterpart for his
competitors; or more generally, to the fact that the returns the tying
producer could realize by obtaining this customer's patronage will ex-
ceed their counterparts for his tying-product competitors regardless of
the offer these competitors make.
According to the Court, the seller uses the tie-in to transfer and
extend this advantage to the tied-product market: instead of raising his
price sufficiently high to deprive his customers of any but a marginal
gain from dealing with him on the tying product, the tying seller re-
duces his price for the tying product and allows his customers to realize
part or all of the additional profits (in comparison with those of his
competitors) his superior position could have enabled him to earn on
the tying-product on condition that these buyers promise to purchase
some other product from him on certain specified terms. In effect, then,
according to the Court's account, the seller exchanges part or all of
the profits he could have earned as a result of his superior position in
the tying product market in dealings with these particular customers
for their promises of patronage at specified terms on the tied product-
that is, according to the Court, the seller has in effect offered these
buyers what amounts to a discount on the tied product below the latter's
nominal price under the tie-in. The value of this discount is equal to the
amount of surplus or profits the seller has (without necessity) allowed
buyers to retain on the tying good. Now, of course, this discount might
be predatory 8-that is, it might represent an attempt to drive out
tied-product competitors in the hope of establishing a monopolistic
position in this market. A tie-in entered into with this intent might
involve a straightforward § 2 violation, but the Court clearly is arguing
that its per se rule does not depend solely on this possibility. Thus, the
8. In general, predatory competition is undoubtedly far less common than many
suppose. See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. oF
LAw & EcoN. 137 (1958).
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Court states that a discount of a given size which would be legal if
given on the tied product itself, might be illegal if administered through
a tie-in.
[T]he offer of any.., tying product on advantageous terms...
may be viewed as a form of price competition in the tied product
.... [However, the seller can engage in such competition] without
extending his economic power, by simply reducing the price of
the product itself.9
How does the Court account for this alleged special capacity of tie-ins
to generate leverage that will injure competition in the tied-product
market? Although its argument is not always fully articulated, the
Court's "justification" for its conclusion in both its inevitable and ex-
clusive forms seems to be the following syllogism:
(1) Tie-ins involving a product on which and a buyer in relation to
whom the seller enjoys a competitive advantage always enable their
employers to increase their returns by extending to the tied-product
market any competitive superiority they may have in their relations
with the customers in question in the tying-product market;10 (2) any
such generation of leverage will necessarily injure tied-product com-
petition; therefore, (3) any such tie-in necessarily will injure tied-
product competition.' 1 Unfortunately, however, the Court does not
substantiate either of its argument's premises. It simply asserts the first
proposition and ignores the second. In fact, neither premise is correct.
Let's begin with the initial premise of the Court's argument-
viz., the proposition that tie-ins involving one or more goods which the
seller is in a position to distribute at a competitive advantage to the
buyer in question always enable such sellers to increase their returns by
extending their advantage to the other goods involved. By definition,
for a tie-in to extend a seller's competitive advantage from the tying (A)
9. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 894 U.S. 495, 508 (1969).
10. According to the minority in Fortner Enterprises, the leverage theory traditionally
promulgated by the Court required market dominance or power in the tying product and
asserted the ability of the tie-in to extend such power directly to the tied-product market.
Two of the refutations I will offer against the initial premise of the majority's theory
will also undermine this minority version. In particular, the minority version can be
refuted (1) by showing that it implies that any seller of one monopolized good and at
least one other good to a given buyer will always find a tie-in more profitable than
independent offers on the two products and (2) by offering a counter-example in which
a tie-in could produce no such result-indeed, by offering the same counter-example
I will use to refute the majority theory in the text.
11. I will continue to consider the competitive-impact version of the leverage theory.
The unfair-competition version would consist of premise (1) and the conclusion that any
tie-in (involving a tying product in whose distribution to the buyers involved the seller
enjoys a competitive advantage) must necessarily place tied-product competitors at a dis-
advantage that is unrelated to their social efficiency.
200
Vol. 80: 195, 1970
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory
to the tied (B) product, it must increase the returns he can earn by
selling the tied product to the buyer in question on terms of any given
attractiveness to the latter. In other words, (1) the returns the seller can
earn under a tie-in involving B of any given attractiveness to the buyer
in question minus (2) the returns he could realize under an independent
contract 12 on the tying-product A (on which he possessed a competitive
advantage) must exceed (3) the returns he could realize by selling the
tied-product B to the buyer in question on terms which would be
equally attractive as the tie-in concerned. Accordingly, a tie-in will not
be able to extend a seller's competitive advantage from the tying to the
tied product unless the "cost"'13 to the seller (X) of giving the buyer (Y)
a particular discount on the tied-product B below its nominal price14
under the tying agreement exceeds the "cost" he would have to incur
to give an equivalent discount on B independently. The Court's posi-
tion, therefore, must be that X's enjoying a competitive advantage in
his dealings with Y on A guarantees the ability of the tie-in to reduce
the "cost" of granting such a discount.
In order to see why this contention is incorrect, let's assume, for
example, (1) that X is a monopolist on some product A which he sells
to some buyer y,15 (2) that X also produces another good B which Y
might be interested in purchasing, and (3) that B is also produced by
other sellers who face the same costs as X so that on independent sales
of B to Y, X's position would be identical to that of his competitors.
According to the Court's initial premise, X should always be able to
obtain a competitive advantage on B in this situation by conditioning
his sale of A on Y's agreeing to purchase some or all of his requirements
of B from him as well-that is, according to the Court's initial premise,
the "cost" to X of granting Y a given discount below B's nominal price
through a tie-in in which A's price is reduced will always be less than
its counterpart for an equivalent discount granted directly on B.
Our question, then, is whether it will always "cost" a seller less to
give a given discount on a product on which he enjoys a competitive
12. Where profitable tie-ins could also be arranged with products other than B,
term (2) should be replaced with "the returns he could realize under the most profitable
tie-in he could arrange without employing B."
18. By "cost to the seller," I refer to the number of dollars by which the seller's
returns would be reduced if he gave Y the more favorable terms on A contained in the
tie-in despite the fact that he could have obtained Y's patronage on B at that product's
nominal price.
14. By "nominal price," I mean the unit price the buyer is actually charged for the
product under the tying agreement.
15. I have adopted this strong assumption to make the argument apply equally as
well to the market-dominance version of the leverage theory.
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advantage in his dealings with the buyer in question. In general, the
cost to any seller X of granting an individual customer Y an indepen-
dent unit-price discount expected to be worth any given amount to the
latter will be equal to that amount minus (1) the profits he would earn
if he could obtain the additional sales he makes at the lower price with-
out reducing the average revenue he receives on his original sales and
(2) the additional consumer surplus the buyer would realize if he were
required to pay the original price for his original purchases but allowed
to purchase extra units at the lower price. Thus, if a reduction in any
tied or tying product Q's price from $2.00 to $1.90 would raise X's sales
of Q to Y from 40 to 45 units, the value of the discount in question to
Y would be (1) $4.00 (the sum of the $.10 less he would have to pay X on
each of his original forty purchases of Q) plus (2) whatever consumer
surplus' 6 he would realize on the five additional units of Q he purchased
at the lower price-henceforth {. On the other hand, such a reduction
would cost X an amount equal to the difference between (3) the $4.00
less he received from Y on the latter's original forty unit purchases and
(4) the profits he would realize at the lower price on his additional unit
sales of Q to Y if he could reduce his price on these units without lower-
ing his average revenue on his original sales volume-henceforth, if we
let K stand for (3) = (1), the cost to X of granting a discount of any
K-b
given size (K + P) on a particular product will be equal to K +- 8
K-bP
(K + P), which will be directly related to K for any (K + P).
Accordingly, the Court's initial premise resolves into the assumption
that 8 will always be lower for goods on which the seller enjoys a
competitive advantage when dealing with the customer in question
than it will be for goods on which the seller does not enjoy such an ad-
vantage. I have already examined the general determinants of this ra-
seller surplus minus
tio-previously denoted the seer surplus plus 7 ratio-in greatbuyer surplus plus
16. By "consumer" or "buyer surplus", I refer to the amount of dollars the buyer
in question would have been willing to pay in addition to what he did pay to obtain
the goods he purchased. Accordingly, P equals the absolute difference between $9.50
(5 x $1.90) and the number of dollars Y would have been willing to pay for the
forty-first through forty-fifth units he purchased.
17. For the definition of "buyer surplus," see note 16 supra. "Seller surplus" equals the
difference between the seller's variable costs and the revenues he obtains from the trans.
actions in question. See also Part I at 1405.
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detail in Part I of this article.' For present purposes, it will be sufficient
to develop a counter-example to the Court's contention.
Let's assume (1) that Y's demand curve for A below the independent
price X would find most profitable for this product is completely inelas-
tic-that is, that X, who is a monopolist of A, faces a completely inelastic
demand curve below his independent profit-maximizing price, (2) that
Y's (full requirements) demand curve for B is somewhat elastic through-
out and (3) that the nominal price of B under X's optimal tie-in
involving both A and B exceeds B's marginal cost by more than any
contemplated price reduction on that product, In this situation, and in
many others with far more common characteristics,19 X could not re-
duce the cost of granting Y a given discount on B by tying its sale to A's
and reducing the latter's unit price despite the fact that he enjoys a
competitive advantage on the latter but not on the former product, for
K-8K - will always be higher on A than it will be on B. In particular,
+ P
it will always be equal to one on A and less than one on B. Thus, since
Y's demand for A is completely inelastic over the relevant range, re-
ducing the price of A will not increase Y's purchases; 8 and P will there-
fore both equal zero; and K on A will therefore equal one. AndK+P
since Y's demand for B is somewhat elastic over the relevant range,
reducing the price of B will increase Y's purchases of this product; 8 will
be positive since price is assumed to exceed marginal cost; P will be
non-negative since price is always less than or equal to the demand
K-b
price for goods actually purchased; and K will therefore be less
K+P
than one. Thus, the cost to X of granting a given discount to Y on B
by reducing that product's price will in the situation described be less
than its counterpart for a tied-price reduction on A. The Court's initial
premise must therefore be rejected: the fact that a tie-in involves a
product on which and a buyer in relation to whom the seller enjoys a
competitive advantage does not in itself guarantee the ability of the
agreement in question to improve the seller's competitive position in
the tied-product market.20
18. For a discussion of the determinants of these amounts, see Part I at 1416-23
and the text of this article following note 30 infra.
K-8
19. This conclusion will hold whenever - is higher on A than on B. This result
can obtain in a large variety of situations. See Part I at 1416-23 and p. 212 infra.
20. This conclusion assumes that the fact that a seller enjoys a competitive advantage
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This result should not come as a surprise. It accords with our
everyday experience that sellers who enjoy a competitive advantage on
some sales of one product to a particular customer frequently sell other
products to such buyers independent of any tie-ins, even where such
arrangements are not illegal. If we make the assumption that sellers
price to maximize profits, this fact is incompatible with the Court's
initial premise which asserts the inevitable profitability of employing
tie-ins in the situation described. 21
Admittedly, however, this refutation of the Court's initial premise
does not disprove its conclusion. If the leverage theory's second premise
were correct, the conclusion that tie-ins always reduce (tied-product)
competition would follow from the assumption that producers price
to maximize profits, for all tie-ins that are actually profitable will
improve their employer's competitive position in the tied-product mar-
ket since profitable tie-ins will always raise the returns their employer
can realize by selling the tied product to the buyer in question on terms
which enable the latter to realize any given amount of consumer sur-
plus. In fact, this result is simply a tautology: the statement that a tie-in
is profitable implies that (1) the returns the seller can realize under the
agreement in question exceed the sum of (2) the profits he could earn
on his optimal independent contract on the tying-product A plus (3) the
returns he could realize by selling the tied-product B to the buyer in
question on terms that would be equally attractive as the tie-in con-
cerned and hence that (1) minus (2), or the returns he could realize un-
der the tie-in on the tied-product B, exceeds (3), the returns the seller
would realize if his customer accepted an equally attractive independent
offer on B.
Accordingly, if the Court were correct in focusing on the competitive
impact of allowing the actual tying seller to enter into a tie-in with the
buyer in question rather than on the competitive impact of allowing all
prospective suppliers of this buyer to enter into such agreements with
him, the legality of tying agreements under the Clayton Act's competi-
tion test would indeed turn on the truth-value of the second premise
of the Court's leverage theory-viz., on the contention that individual
on a particular product does not guarantee the ability of a tie-in involving that product
to reduce the cost of giving a discount by performing the other functions I will discuss
in section II B. The validity of this assumption will become obvious in the course of
my treatment of that subject.
21. Admittedly, we normally assume only that sellers try to maximize profits. The fact
that sellers market two products separately to the same buyer would obviously not be
incompatible with the Court's initial premise on this assumption since some sellers might
simply not be aware of the profitability of tie-ins.
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tie-ins that improve the seller's competitive position in his tied-product
dealings with the buyer in question (i.e., all the tie-ins that are profit-
able) necessarily reduce tied-product competition. Unfortunately for
the Court's conclusion, this second premise is also incorrect.
An example should be sufficient to demonstrate this point. Thus, a
tie-in that improved its employer's tied-product position would clearly
intensify-not reduce-short and long-run competition for Y's patron-
age on B if it made it profitable for X to try to sell B to Y in a situation
in which X would not otherwise have found it in his interest to do so-
that is, in a situation in which X's position in independent dealings
with Y over B would have been so inferior that given the offers that
other producers of B or its substitutes would have made in his absence,
it would not have been profitable for him to seek Y's patronage on B if
he were constrained to make independent deals on this product. In fact,
where the sellers involved produce both goods in question, tie-ins may
also intensify long-run competition generally throughout the tied-prod-
uct market by making it profitable for certain sellers to remain in this
market in situations in which they would have otherwise found it more
profitable to withdraw. Examples could be multiplied, but the conclu-
sion should be clear: the Court's second premise must also be rejected,
even if we adopt the Court's focus on the competitive impact of the
individual tying agreement.
In short, the Court's leverage theory cannot withstand analysis. The
Court has simply failed to justify its conclusion that the inevitable (or
the exclusive) function of tie-ins is to reduce competition in the tied-
product market.
B. The Non-Leverage Functions of Tie-ins: A Critique of the
Exclusive Leverage Hypothesis22
As I have already indicated, the Supreme Court has in the past 23
asserted that the exclusive function of tie-ins is to permit the sellers they
involve to wield monopolistic leverage2 -- that is, to raise their profits
22. Much of the positive microeconomic analysis of this section was presented in
more detail in Part I. Some additional possibilities have been delineated, however, and
the relations among several of the arguments presented there have been clarified. Where
appropriate, I have simply included portions of Part I here, after making minor adjust-
ments for the different focus of the present argument.
23. Thus, according to the Court, "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond
the suppression of [tied-product] competition." Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
24. In practice, the Court seems to have limited this contention to tie-ins that involve
a dominant or unique product (or a product which the seller concerned distributes at a
competitive advantage to the buyer in question). In the text I will not distinguish
such tie-ins from tying agreements which do not involve products or sellers with the
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by reducing tied-product competition. In fact, in its most recent major-
ity opinion on tying agreements, the Court seems to have adopted a
position which is really indistinguishable from the exclusive leverage
hypothesis just delineated-viz., the position that all the non-leverage
functions of tie-ins could be performed equally well by less "suppres-
sive" devices.25 In this section, I will demonstrate the invalidity of this
claim by delineating twelve26 non-leverage functions that tie-ins can and
often do perform better than any alternative pricing system their em-
ployers could adopt.27 Since tying agreements that buyers have ar-
ranged will tend to perform different functions from those initiated by
sellers, I will divide tie-ins into two categories-seller-arranged and
buyer-arranged-and discuss the various functions with which we will
be concerned from the perspective of the related agreement's more
probable initiator. It should be emphasized at the outset that this
assumption is not in fact material. It has been adopted primarily for
expositional reasons-even the discussion of leverage requires a place
to stand-but also because some commentators have taken positions
which imply its legal relevance.
1. The Non-Leverage Functions of Seller-Arranged Tie-ins
Tying agreements that sellers are more likely to arrange are capable
of performing at least nine functions other than reducing competition
in the tied-product market. In particular, such agreements may (1) re-
characteristics in question. However, since there is obviously no reason why tie-ins that
do not involve products that are dominant or unique or sellers who have the relevant
competitive advantage should be less adept at performing the non-leverage functions
I will describe than those that do involve such products and/or sellers, a general demon-
stration that tie-ins can perform several non-leverage functions will apply as well to the
type of agreement to which the Court has in practice restricted its exclusive leverage
hypothesis. Although this fact is not germane to the present inquiry, it should be noted
that the functions described can also be performed by tying agreements that do not in-
volve products or sellers with some or all of the characteristics in question. Since this
proposition will prove useful at a subsequent point in the analysis, I wil attempt to
establish its validity in footnotes accompanying the discussion of each of the non-leverage
functions of tie-ins.
25. See Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
26. Admittedly, only nine of these functions are clearly distinct: the three functions
I have attributed to "buyer-aranged" tie-ins parallel three of the functions of what
I will call "seller-arranged" tie-ins.
27. Although in the vast majority of cases, tie-ins are initiated by sellers who condition
their sale of the product at a stipulated lump-sum and/or unit price on their customer's
agreeing to purchase another product from them as well on certain specified terms (or by
sellers who offer a package of products at a single, combined price), such agreements are
also sometimes arranged by buyers who condition their purchase of one product at some
stated price on their supplier's agreeing to sell them another product on terms that are
stipulated in the agreement. Although, as we shall see, tie-ins will often increase both the
seller's and the buyer's returns, usually (though perhaps not always) only one party to
the transaction will have enough information to conceive and arrange a suitable agree-
ment.
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duce the cost of implementing a policy of non-marginal cost pricing
on durable products or patented processes or ideas-that is, of meter
pricing; (2) reduce the extent to which any given amount of the
seller's non-marginal cost pricing lowers his returns (in comparison
with those of an efficient integrated producer) by reducing his unit sales
below the volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects his
marginal cost curve; (3) reduce the extent to which the seller's non-
marginal cost pricing lowers his returns (in comparison with those of
an efficient integrated producer) by reducing his customers' promo-
tional activities below what would be optimal for an integrated con-
cern; (4) reduce the costs the seller incurs as a result of the risk he and
his customer bear under their agreement; (5) reduce the information
costs the seller must incur to practice price discrimination with some
relevant degree of accuracy; (6) reduce the costs the seller must sustain
to prevent or allow some relevant amount of buyer arbitrage; (7) in-
crease the profitability of price competition, price discrimination and/
or price regulation violations by lowering the costs associated -with the
possibility that such activities may provoke prosecution, civil damage
suits, increased bargaining by non-favored customers, and/or compet-
itive retaliation-that is, by lowering the seller's certainty equivalent
prosecution, retaliation and bargaining (PRB) costs; (8) reduce the
costs of concealing to some relevant extent the seller's tax and contract
frauds; and (9) reduce the cost of preventing buyers from using some
relevant amount of inferior complements.
a. Reducing the Cost of Implementing a Policy of Non-Marginal Cost
Pricing on Durable Products or Patented Processes or Ideas
As we shall see, in certain circumstances tie-ins will be able to reduce
the cost of implementing a system of non-marginal cost pricing on
durable products or patented processes or ideas. Such pricing is usually
called meter pricing since it is frequently implemented by actual meters
attached to the machines in question. Although the ability of tie-ins to
reduce the cost of implementing such non-marginal cost or meter
pricing could obviously be demonstrated without analyzing the func-
tions of such pricing, I will begin this section with a general discussion
of meter or non-marginal cost pricing in order to correct the current
assumption that the sole function of such pricing is to produce price
discrimination.
(I) The Functions of Non-Marginal Cost Pricing
In two ways, non-marginal cost pricing will tend to reduce a seller's
returns below what he would realize if he could resell, use, or consume
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his own product as productively as his actual customers: first, by re-
ducing his sales of the good in question below the volume at which the
demand he faces intersects his marginal costs; and second, by reducing
his customers' promotional activities below what would be optimal for
an integrated concern (by reducing his customer's returns from a margi-
nal sale of his product below the profits that an efficient integrated con-
cern would realize on the transaction in question).
Nevertheless, almost every producer who faces a downward-sloping
demand curve will find it profitable to charge his customers more than
his marginal costs for their marginal purchases, for although the alterna-
tive to this policy-pure lump-sum pricing2 5-will not lower such a
seller's returns in either of the two ways just described, ceteris paribus,
it will reduce his profits below those of an efficient integrated concern
(1) by increasing the sum of the risk costs he and his customers must bear
in connection with their uncertainty about his customers' future de-
mand for his product,29 (2) by increasing the probable costs he will incur
as a result of his own or his customers' undue pessimism about their
demand for his product,80 and (3) by increasing the costs he must expect
to incur to prevent or allow buyer arbitrage.31
In general, the lower a seller's risk and risk aversion in comparison
to his customer's, the greater his ignorance about his customer's future
demand, the more pessimistic his customers about their future demands,
and the smaller the cost of transferring his product, the more profitable
non-marginal cost pricing will be. In fact, in some cases-particularly
28. An example of this would be charging a lump-sum fee plus a unit price equal to
the seller's expected marginal cost.
29. By reducing the dependence of his customers' payments on their actual demand,
lump-sum marginal cost pricing will shift this risk from the seller to his customers.
Since these customers (1) will often face greater risk in connection with this uncertainty
(since their demand will depend on their respective shares of the resales of the good in
question as well as on its total sales while the demand the seller faces will depend only
on the second of the two factors in question), (2) will often be less able to reduce the
risks in question through diversification, and (3) will often be more averse to taking risks
than their supplier, this shift will normally raise the sum of the risk costs of the seller
and his customers.
30. By reducing the dependence of his customers' payments on their actual (quantity)
demand, lump-sum marginal cost pricing will increase the losses the seller will sustain
if he or his customers underestimate their demand for his product. This effect of lump-
sum pricing will be manifest (I) in the seller's incurring higher market research costs in
order to reduce the probability that he will underestimate the demand in question, (2)
in his losing more profits whenever he is unduly pessimistic, (3) in his incurring higher
bargaining costs in order to persuade his customers that they are being unduly pessimistic
about their future demands, and (4) in his losing more profits whenever he fails to dissuade
his customers of their undue pessimism.
31. By raising the seller's average lump-sum plus unit price above his unit price, lump-
sum pricing will give his customers an incentive to engage in arbitrage by reducing the
price they pay for their marginal purchases below the average sum that others would have
to pay to purchase his product from him.
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when the sales to an individual customer (e.g., a final consumer) are
small-the seller may even find it profitable to save the cost of prevent-
ing arbitrage and arranging and executing a long-term contract by
eliminating his lump-sum fee altogether and engaging in conventional
single pricing.
In short, despite its tendency to reduce the seller's profits below those
of an efficient integrated concern (1) by lowering his unit sales below the
volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects his marginal cost
curve and (2) by reducing his customers' promotional activities below
what would be optimal for an integrated concern, non-marginal cost
pricing is almost always practiced by sellers in non-perfectly competitive
markets (1) to increase the dependence of their revenues in their
customers' actual demands (i.e., to reduce the sum of their own and
their customers' risk costs as well as the cost to them of their or their
customers' undue pessimism) and (2) to reduce their customers' incen-
tive to engage in arbitrage. 32
(2) Meter Pricing as Non-Marginal Cost Pricing
If we conceptualize an outright sale of a durable machine (or of the
right to use a patented process or idea) as the sale of a right to use the
machine at the seller's marginal cost (zero), the equivalence of such sales
32. In equilibrium, the short-run profit-maximizing firm will charge a lump-sum fee
if and only if the lump-sum which cannot be exceeded without sacrificing a more profitable
marginal unit price increase exceeds the cost of arranging and negotiating the related
long-term agreement by more than the profits the seller could earn by raising his unit
price to the conventional "profit-maximizing" level. As we have seen, in some cases, par-
ticularly when small repeated sales to final consumers are involved, this condition will
not be met-i.e., the seller will find it most profitable to abandon his lump-sum fee al-
together. When no lump-sum fee is charged, the short-run profit-maximizing seller will
normally charge his customer the price at which his conventional marginal revenue curve
(indicating marginal revenue from the buyer in question) intersects his marginal costs
curve from above (although a higher or lower price might be more profitable if it pre-
vented buyer arbitrage). In some cases, however, the seller will find it profitable to charge
a lump-sum fee in addition to his unit price. In such situations, the seller will find it
profitable to reduce his lump-sum fee (from the highest he could charge in addition to
his marginal cost unit price) to the point at which the certainty equivalent profits that
he expects to be generated by the unit price increases that a further marginal (say $ 1) re-
duction in his lump-sum charge would permit are just equal to S 1. If we assume for
simplicity that reseller promotion is not important for the product in question, the
certainty equivalent profits the seller will expect to realize by raising his unit price suf-
ficiently to reduce his customer's certainty equivalent expected returns by $ 1 will equal
(1) - over the relevant range of the demand curve in question times (S I + the
associated decrease in Y's risk costs) plus (2) the savings the seller achieves as a result of the
unit price increase's tendency to reduce the customer's incentive to engage in arbitrage,
minus (3) the associated increase in the seller's own risk costs. Since, ceteris paribus, it
will always cost the seller $ 1 to reduce his lump-sum fee $ 1, (1) + (2) + (3) will always
equal $1 in equilibrium for the short-run profit-maximizer who finds it profitable to
charge a lump-sum fee.
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with pure lump-sum pricing should be apparent. Similarly, if we con-
ceptualize meter pricing as the sale of a service (the service provided by
an intended use of the machine) whose marginal cost is zero, its equiva-
lence with non-marginal cost pricing becomes patent. Thus, meter
pricing performs the same functions for producers of durable products
or ideas that non-marginal cost pricing performs for manufacturers of
less durable commodities. In particular, by making Y1... N's payments
depend on how often they use his durable product or idea, meter pricing
may be able to reduce the losses X sustains through his own ignorance
and uncertainty as well as through his customers' pessimism, uncer-
tainty and practice of arbitrage. It should be noted that although meter
pricing may be more profitable when different customers have different
demands for the seller's product (since the amount the seller's ignorance
about these demands would otherwise cost him may tend to be greater
in such circumstances), meter pricing may also be profitable where no
such differences exist-that is, where the seller has only one customer
or where all his customers have the same demand for his product, in
short where meter pricing would not produce price discrimination.
(3) Tie-ins as Means of Reducing the Cost of Implementing Meter-
Pricing Systems
In many situations, non-marginal cost pricing systems can be im-
plemented on durable products simply by attaching a meter to the
machine X sells. But even in the best of circumstances, meters may be
tampered with and for many products (e.g., riveting machines) and most
patented or secret processes or ideas, meters will be unsuitable. When
they are, tie-ins may be more efficient than other metering devices such
as endproduct royalties. Thus, if X's machine is used in fixed propor-
tions with some other input B, X may find it profitable to convert this
input into a counting and rent-collecting device by requiring his cus-
tomers to purchase their full requirements of B from him as well at
some margin (equal to the effective meter rate, assuming one unit of B
is used each time the machine or idea is employed) above its prevailing
market price, for it will often be less expensive to determine whether
Yl . . . N are purchasing B from other suppliers than to determine
whether they have reported their sales accurately, particularly where
the tying seller can alter his variant of B to facilitate its identification.83
33. Where X's B can be readily identified, he will be able to detect Y's violations with-
out involving Y in the process at all simply by spot checking all of Y's final output. It
should be noted that the function discussed in this section can be performed by tie-ins
that do not involve a product that is dominant or unique or a good that the seller in
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b. Reducing the Extent to Which the Seller's Non-Marginal Cost
Pricing Lowers His Returns (in Comparison with Those of an
Efficient Integrated Concern) by Reducing His Unit Sales Below
the Volume at which the Demand Curve He Faces Intersects His
Marginal Cost Curve.
In appropriate circumstances, a given seller may be able to increase
his profits by using tie-ins to reduce the extent to which his non-
marginal cost pricing lowers his returns by reducing his sales below the
volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects his marginal cost
curve. In Part I, I analyzed this possibility by investigating the ability
of tie-ins to increase the rate at which unit price increases can be ex-
pected to convert buyer into seller surplus (the SS+/BS- ratio) on the
assumption that the ultimate sales of the goods involved were not re-
sponsive to reseller promotional activities. 4
question could distribute independently to the buyer involved at a competitive advantage.
Assume, for example, that X produces a standardized durable machine A; that his sales
of A represent an insignificant percentage of that product's total sales; and that the cost
to X of furnishin Y with A is not lower than the cost his competitors would have to
incur to perform the same function. In this situation, X may find it profitable to underbid
his competitors for Y's patronage on A-at least when this bid can be made through a
tie-in that will enable him to reduce the cost of meter pricing.
34. In what follows, the phrase (certainty equivalant) "expected seller surplus" will
connote (1) the seller's weighted average expected total revenue minus (2) the weighted
average variable costs he expects he will have to incur to produce, promote, and/or dis-
tribute the output minus (3) the costs he must bear as a result of his uncertainty about
his customer's demand for the product in question. As defined, a seller's (certainty equiva-
lent) expected seller surplus on his dealings with a particular customer will differ from his
certainty equivalent expected profits on these transactions by the amount of pricing costs he
expects to incur-i.e., (1) by the costs he and his customer must incur to devise their offers
and arrange the related agreement, (2) by the certainty equivalent costs he expects he will
have to incur to prevent or allow buyer arbitrage, (3) by the certainty equivalent costs
he expects he will have to incur to enforce or not enforce his customer's promise of
patronage, and (4) by the certainty equivalent costs he expects to bear in connection with
the possibility that the transaction in question may provide retaliation by competitors,
intensified bargaining by non-favored customers, and/or government or (treble) damage
suits by the relevant parties concerned. The phrase (certainty equivalent) "expected buyer
surplus" connotes (1) the total revenue or dollars worth of satisfaction the buyer expects
to obtain as a result of his use, resale, or consumption of the product in question minus
(2) the risk costs the buyer bears in connection with his uncertainty about his demand for
this good minus (3) the total variable costs he expects to incur in connection with the
product concerned (if we assume that the buyer does not intend to engage in arbitrage
or to break his promise of patronage). The sum of "expected seller surplus" and "expected
buyer surplus" was termed "expected transaction surplus" in Part I. As defined, "expected
transaction surplus" will equal the weighted average expected returns of an efficient
integrated concern if and only if marginal cost pricing is practiced. The tendency
of non-marginal cost pricing to reduce the seller's sales and returns below those of an
efficient integrated concern was therefore reflected in the analysis of Part I in its
tendency to reduce the transaction surplus generated by the dealings of the parties
in question with each other. Relatedly, since (BS -) = (SS +) + (TS -) for super-
marginal cost pricing, the ability of tie-ins to reduce the effect of this tendency was
manifest in our earlier analysis as an ability to reduce the ratio of (TS -) to (BS -) for
SS+
any given (BS-)-i.e., was manifest as an ability to increase the ratio of -j-- for any
gSmfgiven amount of super-maxginal cost pricing, for any given @BS -). See Part I at 1414-23.
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In suitable situations, tie-ins will be able to accomplish this result by
shifting the locus of the seller's non-marginal cost pricing from his tying
product to another good that is potentially more suitable for this
technique. In order to arrange such a tie-in, the seller in question (X)
will offer to sell his customers (Y1... N) his tying-product A on more
favorable terms than would otherwise be in his interest on condition
that they agree to purchase their full requirements of some other
product B from him as well for more than its prevailing market price.
Y1 ... N will normally be indifferent between such a tie-in and the
straight-forward offer of the tying product they would otherwise have
received, for they will anticipate gaining as much from the unit price
reduction they obtain on A as they expect to lose from the concomitant
increase in both B's unit price and the risk they must bear. Neverthe-
Ass+
less, such an arrangement may increase X's profits if the ASS+ ratio
ABS-
(the ratio of seller surplus gained to buyer surplus lost as a result of a given
change in unit price, the analogue for what we previously denoted
K-8 3
- )5 is higher over some relevant range of the demand curve he
faces when selling B to Y1 . . .N under full requirements contracts
D O N) 36  ASS- K- 6
(DDx1....3 than - (previously denoted ) over the rele-
ABS+ K +3
vant range of Y1 . . .N's normal demand curve for A (DDxAy1... N), for
where this condition prevails X will be able to realize more buyer sur-
plus by eliminating any given amount of his customers' surplus through
increasing the unit price of B (above the unit price that would have
been optimal for X under an independent [untied] full-requirements
contract on B)37 than he loses by giving Y1... N back the same amount
of surplus on A by lowering that product's unit price (below X's non-
tie-in optimal unit price for A)-that is, it will "cost" X less to give Y a
price reduction worth (K ± P) by reducing A's unit price below its
35. See text preceding note 17 supra.
36. DDRO represents the demand curve X faces when selling B to Y under a full-
XBY
requirements contract. For a graphic representation, see Part I at 1423.
, 37. In equilibrium, the profit-maximizing firm employing such a tie-in will lower A'sASS +
unit price and raise B's until AS for further increases in B's unit price just equals
A BS -A SS -AS-for further decreases in A's-assuming, of course, that such changes have an
ABS +
equal or perfectly offsetting effect on the sum of the seller's and buyer's pricing costs
and on the amount of transaction surplus destroyed by the tendency of non-marginal cost
pricing to reduce Y's promotional expenditure below what would be optimal for an
integrated firm.
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optimal untied level than by reducing B's unit price below its optimal
level under a full requirements tie-in.
In general, on DDXBO above the optimal price X could charge
ASS-
Y under an independent requirements contract on B will exceed ABS+
below X's optimal independent unit price for A to the extent that (1)
X's unit sales of B under this independent contract exceed his sales of
A under his optimal independent arrangement on this product, (2) the
slope of DDxBy above the price in question exceeds the slope of DDxAy
below its optimal untied unit price, (3) the difference between X's
optimal untied unit price for A and its related marginal cost exceeds its
counterpart for X's optimal feasible untied unit price for B, and (4) the
signed slope of MCBX (the marginal cost of B to X) to the left of X's
optimal untied unit sales of B exceeds its counterpart for MCAx (the
marginal cost of A to X) to the right of X's optimal untied unit sales of
this product.35
Ceteris paribus, ASS+ over the relevant portion of DDXBY and henceABS-
the gross gains generated by the tie-in will increase with the competitive-
ness of industry B, for the more competitive this market, the lower X's
optimal feasible unit price for this product under an independent re-
quirements contract and the lower this price, (1) the higher the as-
sociated unit sales of B, (2) the smaller the amount by which the price
exceeds X's marginal cost (when he produces B himself)39 and perhaps
ASS +
38. A for the relevant range of B will (1) be directly related to (a) the slope of
A BS -
DDRO between the prices in question and (b) X's unit sales of B under his optimal un-
XIY
tied full requirements contract on this product and will (2) be inversely related to (a) the
signed slope of MCBx over the range in question and (b) the gap between price and
marginal cost under X's optimal untied full requirements contract on B. Similarly,
ASS - for unit price reductions below X's optimal untied unit price for A will (1) be
A BS+
directly related to (a) the slope of DDXAY between the prices in question and (b) X's unit
sales of A to Y under his optimal untied contract on this product and will (2) be inversely
related to (a) the signed slope of MCAX to the right of the quantity in question and (b) the
gap between A's optimal untied unit price and X's corresponding marginal cost. See Part I
at 1414-23.
39. Tie-ins can perform the function I am now discussing even when X is a monopolist
ASS+
of B, for since X can charge lump-sum fees in addition to his unit price, - may well
A BS -
be positive above X's optimal untied unit price for B even if he is a monopolist on this
product. In Part I, I mistakenly reached the opposite conclusion by assuming implicitly
and erroneously that X would not charge any lump-sum fee on B. On this assumption, the
tie-in could not perform the function with which I am now concerned if X were a monop-
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as well (3) the steeper the slope of the relevant portion of o The
gross gains achieved by such a tie-in are likely to be particularly high
when product B-in addition to being produced under competitive
Ito
conditions-is resold in a tightly oligopolistic market, for since DDXB
will tend to be vertical over the relevant range in such a situation,
ASBS_ for unit price increases on B will very often approach or equalABS-
one (i.e., unit price increases will very often not reduce unit sales) over
a considerable range of the relevant portion of this demand curve in
these circumstances. 40 Obviously, however, tie-ins will also be able to
shift the locus of X's non-marginal cost pricing to a product on which
ASS-- is higher in situations that are less ideal than those we have just
ABS-
described. For example, as I showed in Part I, tie-ins will also be able to
reduce the extent to which a seller's non-marginal cost pricing lowers
his returns (in comparison with those of an efficient integrated concern)
by reducing his sales below the volume at which the demand curve he
faces intersects his marginal cost curve whenever the seller is in a posi-
tion to condition the sale of his product (A) at a reduced unit price on
his customer's agreeing to purchase at a higher price than he would
otherwise be willing to pay another good (B) which he uses in
variable proportions to A and which the seller would market (if he
would do so at all) at a lower percentage mark-up over his margin costs
than he would apply in an independent contract on A.
Thus, in many situations, tie-ins may be able to increase the
profitability of non-marginal cost pricing by reducing the amount of
transaction surplus it destroys through lowering the seller's sales below
ASS +
olist since AS will always equal zero at a monopolist's optimal unit price if he cannot
A BS -
charge any lump-sum fee (i.e., at the monopolist's conventional "profit-maximizing" price).
See Part I at 1414-15.
40. DDRO will equal MR (the marginal revenue curve Y faces when selling B to
XBY YBZ
final consumer Z) if the only marginal expenses Y incurs when distributing B are costs-of-
goods-sold. (The same argument will also apply if Y's non-cost-of-goods-sold marginal costs
are constant over the relevant range.) Since in a tight oligopoly, the demand curve
the seller faces (DD hZ in this case) may often be kinked at the prevailing market price,
MR = DDRO (on our assumptions) may very well be vertical or discontinuous whenYnZ XnY
B is sold in a tightly oligopolistic market. If it is, increases in the unit price X charges Y
for B will reduce neither his sales nor the transaction surplus they generate and
ASS -
will therefore equal one.
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the volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects his marginal
cost curve. 4
1
c. Reducing the Extent to Which the Seller's Non-Marginal Cost
Pricing Lowers His Sales and Returns (In Comparison with Those
of an Efficient Integrated Producer) by Reducing His Customers'
Promotional Activities Below What Would Be Optimal for an
Integrated Concern
So far, we have assumed that the type of tie-in with which we have
been concerned would not affect the reseller's profits by increasing Y's
incentive to promote the sale of A (by lowering its unit price to the
reseller) and decreasing his incentive to promote the sale of B. However,
to the extent that X cannot without cost counteract the tendency of his
super-marginal cost unit pricing to reduce his customers' promotional
expenditures below what would be optimal for an integrated firm,
42
this assumption will not be justified. Thus if X's profits on A are more
responsive to Y's promotional activities than are his profits on B, he may
be able to reduce the extent to which his non-marginal cost pricing lowers
his sales and profits below those of an efficient integrated concern (by
reducing his customers' sales efforts) by shifting its locus from A to
B. Since, as we have seen, tie-ins are most likely to perform function (2)
when B is produced in a competitive market-that is, when B is a stan-
dardized product-the function with which we are now concerned will
usually complement its immediate predecessor, for the demand for such
standardized products will tend to be less responsive to reseller promo-
tion than the demand for highly differentiated goods like A.43
41. See Part I at 1430-35. Once more, the performance of the function discussed in this
section does not depend on the presence of a dominant or unique product or a seller
with a competitive advantage in the independent distribution of one of the products in-
volved to the buyer in quesiton. Nothing I have said presupposes that X be dominant in
the market in which A is sold. Nor need X have a competitive advantage when selling A
to Y to obtain the latter's patronage on this product. Finally, the requirement that DXAY
be negatively sloped can be satisfied by a non-unique or undifferentiated product, regard-
less of whether Y is an ultimate or intermediate purchaser, below the price at which Y
could obtain some of his patronage.
42. In some cases, the seller may be able to counteract this tendency at a relatively low
cost-for example, by incurring the cost of arranging and enforcing (through inspections)
a requirement that his customers give his products a certain amount of shelf-space.
43. Here again the performance of the function discussed in this section does not
depend on the presence of a dominant or unique product or a seller with a competitive
advantage in the independent distribution of one of the goods involved. Obviously, the
condition that A's sales be more responsive to reseller promotion than B's does not require
A to be dominant or X to enjoy a competitive advantage in its distribution to Y. Ad-
mittedly, this condition will tend to be satisfied more often when A is a differentiated
product. However, the sales of even a standardized good produced by many sellers may
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d. Reducing the Costs the Seller Incurs in Connection with the Risk
He and His Customer Bear as a Result of Their Uncertainty
About the Latter's Demand for the Goods in Question
For several reasons,44 business owners tend to prefer more certain to
less certain returns. To the extent, therefore, that a firm is uncertain
about the returns it expects to realize, its certainty equivalent returns
(the sum of money for which it would trade its future uncertain profits)
will be less than its weighted (by the probability of each possible profit
outcome) average expected profits. Obviously, then, a seller's certainty
equivalent returns will be inversely related to any risk costs the trans-
action in question imposes on him. And since in the situations with
which we are concerned,45 the seller will always have to compensate his
customers for any risk costs they incur in connection with their dealings
with him, his certainty equivalent returns will also be inversely related
to the risk costs his customer incurs as a result of his uncertainty about
the demands in question. In fact, the amount by which such uncertainty
reduces the seller's certainty equivalent returns will be inversely related
to the sum of the costs it imposes on him and his customer.
In general, by lowering the price of A and raising the price of B, full
requirements tie-ins will (1) increase the seller's uncertainty about his
returns on B (by increasing his margin on this product), (2) decrease the
seller's uncertainty about his return on A, (3) increase the buyer's un-
certainty about his returns on A, and (4) decrease the buyer's uncer-
tainty about his returns on B. Normally, the net effect of these changes
will be to increase the sum of the buyer's and seller's risk costs-and
hence the amount by which his and his customer's uncertainty about the
relevant demands reduces the seller's certainty equivalent returns. 40
However, when DD~xA and DDX Br are expected to be inversely re-
lated-that is, when deviations from the seller's weighted average
expected sales of A are expected to be in the opposite direction from
their counterparts on B-full requirements tie-ins may increase the
be very responsive to reseller promotion in some situations-e.g., in situations in which
such a good has just been introduced into the market by the various sellers in question.
44. See p. 294 infra.
45. The seller will have to "pay" the buyer an additional dollar for each dollar of
risk costs the latter incurs unless (1) the cost of executing a lump-sum agreement and pre-
venting or allowing the associated arbitrage would have made it unprofitable for the seller
to reduce his customer's weighted average expected surplus even if he would not have
been prevented from doing so by the risk costs this buyer could bear under such an agree-
ment and (2) the amount of excess surplus the buyer would have expected to realize had
he not had to incur risk costs in connection with his uncertainty about the relevant
demands would be at least as great as the costs in question. Since we are concerned with
situations in which contracts will always be drawn, condition (1) will never be fulfilled.
46. See Appendix A infra.
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seller's returns ceteris paribus by reducing such uncertainty costs by
increasing the extent to which deviations from his weighted average ex-
pected profits on A and B are expected to cancel each other out. This
result will be particularly likely to obtain when the seller would not
have sold B independently of the tie-in since in such a case the agree-
ment will actually have created an offset for the seller (for all outcomes
in which the two demands are expected to be inversely related) when
none would have existed in its absence.47 Obviously, the same argument
will also apply when deviations from X's untied profits on B-though
positive-are expected to be significantly smaller than their counter-
parts on A. Although these reductions in X's own risk costs will normally
be somewhat offset by the effect of the tie-in on the risk costs Y bears in
connection with his uncertainty about the demands in question, the net
effect of these changes will usually be to reduce the extent to which X's
and Y's uncertainty lowers the former's certainty equivalent returns. 48
Thus, in some situations, sellers may employ tie-ins inter alia to reduce
the costs they incur as a result of their own and their customers' un-
certainty about the latter's demand for the goods in question.
4 9
e. Reducing the Information Costs the Seller Must Incur to Practice
Price Discrimination with Some Relevant Degree of Accuracy
Normally, a seller who wants to practice price discrimination will
have to determine what value each of his customers place on each of
the products in question. However, in some circumstances, tie-ins may
47. If the associated deviation from X's expected weighted average profits on B ex-
ceeds its counterpart under the tie-in for A by more than twice the associated untied
deviation on A, the tie-in may still increase the risk associated with the outcome in ques-
tion. However, this result will not obtain unless (2Q-1) %4 < %3; where Q equals the
ratio of X's untied margin on A to the reduction in the price of A associated with the tie-
in; %, equals the percentage deviation in A's sales associated with the outcome in ques-
tion; and %B equals the percentage deviation in B's sales associated with the outcome in
question. Since Q will always be greater than or equal to one-since otherwise A's tied
price would be below its marginal cost to X-tie-ins will probably tend to reduce the costs
uncertainty imposes on X in the situation described. For a more detailed analysis, see
Appendix A infra.
48. I have not in the text analyzed the effect of such tie-ins on the costs X must bear
as a result of their effect on the risk his customer sustains in connection with his own
uncertainty about the demands in question. When the relevant demands are inversely
related, the agreement's effect on Y's risks--like its effect on X's will depend on tile
percentage of anticipated outcomes for which it will bring the associated deviations closer
together. In general, the net effect of such changes will probably be to increase Y's risk
costs, but normally this will be more than outweighed by the fall in X's risk costs in the
type of situation described. For a more detailed analysis, see Appendix A inra.
49. The various conditions under which tie-ins can perform the function describedin this section can be met by agreements that do not involve dominant or unique products
or sellers who would enjoy a competitive advantage in the independent distribution ofne of the goods concer ed to the buyers in question.
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enable a seller to engage in price discrimination without identifying
which buyers place what value on his individual products. Thus, when-
ever a seller knows that customers who place a relatively high (average)
value on one or more products (or on the right to purchase one or more
products at a certain unit price) will tend to place a relatively low value
on some other good (or on the right to purchase at a stipulated unit
price some other good) they can also use-that is, whenever he knows
that the value that his customers place on some group of products taken
together (or on the right to purchase several products at stipulated
prices) is more homogeneous than the value they place on the individual
products (or rights) taken separately-he will be able to approximate the
effect of charging them different prices for the same product without
incurring the cost of making such discriminations by requiring them to
take this package of products (or rights) at the same price.
Although in its unadulterated state such a policy would result in the
seller's (1) charging some customers less for the package than they would
be willing to pay, (2) supplying some buyers with products they value at
less than his marginal costs,50 and (3) losing the patronage of some
customers who would have been willing to pay more than his marginal
costs but less than his optimal package price, its ability to reduce his
market research expenses might still make it more profitable than any
alternative.5' Of course, even when such uniform package pricing is not
profitable, a seller may find it to his advantage to engage in individual
discrimination on the package of products or rights in question rather
than on the individual products, for since discrimination on the package
can also be practiced without identifying what values the customers in
question place on individual products, package pricing may reduce the
information costs the seller incurs in his dealings in such situations as
well. Thus, tie-ins can be used to reduce the costs that sellers must incur
50. This problem will not arise in one common type of package-pricing tie-in-viz.,
the type in which a seller ties the sale of a particular product at a given price with an
offer to sell some "inferior good" at less than its normal market price, for buyers to whom
this inferior good is worth less than its cost to the seller will simply not accept the tied
offer. This type of tie-in will be profitable, for example, to the extent that (1I poor people
who place a lower-than-average money value on the seller's tying product place a higher-
than-average value on the right to purchase the "inferior good" at the discount in ques-
tion and (2) the seller cannot without cost determine who is and is not poor and/or
cannot openly engage in price discrimination in favor of the poor without losing good
will. The tied product in such arrangements is really the right to purchase the inferior
good at less than its market price. This right can be conveyed either in terms of an offer
or in the form of a coupon entitling the holder to a discount.
51. Such a policy may also be recommended by its greater ability to reduce the costs
the seller must expect to incur as a result of Robinson-Patman prosecution, competitive
retaliation, and/or increased bargaining by non-favored customers (by decreasing the
apparency of his discrimination).
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to practice price discrimination with some relevant degree of accuracy
whenever the values different customers place on individual products
or rights are less homogeneous than the value they place on a package of
the products in question. 2
f. Reducing the Cost of Preventing Some Relevant Amount of Buyer
Arbitrage
Whenever a seller (X) engages in lump-sum pricing or price dis-
crimination-that is, whenever a seller (without cost justification)
charges one of his customers a unit price that is less than the average
lump-sum fee plus unit price he wishes to charge another-he runs the
risk of having his profits reduced by buyer arbitrage. Thus, unless the
cost of transferring his product (A) is prohibitive, a seller who engages
in pure or mixed lump-sum pricing must confront the possibility that
customers who pay him a lump-sum fee may prevent him from collect-
ing such a fee from others by reselling some or all of the A they buy for
more than the additional charge they have to pay for their incremental
purchases 53 but less than the average (lump-sum plus unit) price these
other buyers would have to pay to purchase the same goods from X.
Similar problems will face any seller who wishes to engage in price
discrimination (inter alia by charging different customers different unit
prices) regardless of whether he charges his customers any lump-sum
fee at all. Thus, even when no lump-sum fee is exacted, the seller who
wishes to engage in such price discrimination takes the chance that
buyers who are charged the lower unit price may prevent him from
obtaining his higher profit-maximizing price from other customers by
reselling the goods they have purchased to the buyers in question. Ob-
52. In general, an individual seller (X) of a particular product (Al) will not be able
to discriminate against a particular buyer (Y) on this good unless (1) his product is
unique or (2) his costs are sufficiently below their counterparts for other producers of
this good for his discriminatory price to be less than the lowest price at which any
other producer could profitably supply Al to Y or (8) other producers of Al also dis-
criminate against Y on this product. When condition (2) or (8) is fulfilled, the function
described above will be able to be performed by a tie-in involving non-unique products.
When condition (1) or (8) is met or when X's competitive advantage over other sellers
of Al does not extend to producers of close substitutes of Al, this function may be
performed by a tie-in involving a seller who would not possess a competitive advantage
in any independent transactions with the buyer in question. Regardless of whether any
of the above conditions are met, the ability of a tie-in to reduce the information costs
a seller has to incur to practice price discrimination will not be related to his general
market position. Thus, in various circumstances, tie-ins that do not involve a unique
product or a seller who dominates one of the markets in question will be able to
reduce the information costs he must incur to practice price discrimination with some
relevant degree of accuracy.
58. Pure lump-sum pricing is equivalent to charging the buyer a declining unit price
whose height equals the height of his demand curve at the quantity in question.
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viously, ceteris paribus, sellers in either situation will find it profitable
to reduce the costs they must incur to prevent or allow their customers'
arbitrage.
Tie-ins can perform this function in two ways: (1) by shifting the
locus of the seller's non-marginal cost pricing to a product which is more
likely to be arbitraged, other things being equal, or (2) by forcing buy-
ers who wish to engage in arbitrage by reselling one of the seller's prod-
ucts to incur the cost of storing and/or retransferring another good ev-
ery time they practice arbitrage.54
By lowering the unit price of A and conditioning its sale on Y's
agreeing to pay a higher unit price for B than he would otherwise be
willing to pay, X can reduce this customer's incentive to resell B at the
cost of increasing his incentive to engage in arbitrage on A.5 5 Although,
as we shall see, the net effect of these changes for most full requirements
tie-ins that actually are executed will be to increase the extent to which
the possibility of arbitrage reduces X's returns below those of an efficient
integrated concern,5 6 there certainly will be situations in which the
opposite result obtains-that is, in which X finds it profitable to reduce
his arbitrage-related costs by arranging a tie-in which inter alia shifts
the locus of his non-marginal cost pricing to a product on which the
associated reduction in arbitrage-incentive is more valuable.
Ceteris paribus, sellers will find it profitable to increase the costs that
their customers must incur to engage in arbitrage. In some circum-
stances, tie-ins may enable a seller to achieve this result at little or no
cost to himself. Thus, if X's customers also use some other product B in
approximate proportion to A, X may be able to reduce their incentive
to engage in arbitrage by requiring them to purchase a proportionate
54. Once more, the function I have just described can be performed by tie-ins that
do not involve a unique product or a seller who either dominates one of the markets
in question and/or enjoys a competitive advantage when selling one of the goods con-
cerned to the buyer in question. As we have already seen, the requirement that the seller
be in a position to practice price discrimination against a particular buyer does not pre-
dude this result. Nor would the alternative requirement that the seller be in a position
to practice lump-sum pricing. The profitability of lump-sum pricing depends on nothing
more than the seller's facing a downward-sloping demand curve. Although the require-
ment implies that the function with which we are now concerned cannot be performed
in perfectly competitive industries, it does not preclude this function's being performed
by tie-ins that involve sellers who neither dominate the market in question nor are best
placed to serve the buyer in question since such sellers obviously can sell to such buyers
in markets that are not perfectly competitive. Nor does this requirement imply that the
tied product must be unique, for unless the market for A is perfectly competitive, DD,..,
will be downward-sloping in almost all cases below the price at which X can obtain
part of X's patronage on this good.
55. I ignore for simplicity the possibility that Y may wish to purchase A and/or B
from other customers of X even if he has paid his lump-sum fee.
56. This result follows from the fact that B's untied price will usually equal the
normal market price for the good in question.
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amount of B at its prevailing market price whenever they purchase A,
for although such a tie-in will not affect Y's returns when he purchases-
A for his own use, it will force him to incur the extra cost of reselling
and retransferring B whenever he participates in arbitrage on A. Since
X can simply order Y's normal source of supply to deliver the B in
question to his low-price or lump-sum customers, it will cost him vir-
tually nothing under this arrangement to reduce his customers' incentive
to engage in cross-selling A by an amount equal to the cost of retrans-
ferring or storing a proportionate volume of B.
g. Increasing the Profitability of Price Competition, Price Discrimina-
tion and/or Price Regulation Violations by Lowering the Costs
Associated with the Possibility that such Activities May Provoke
Prosecution, Civil Damage Suits, Increased Bargaining by Non-
Favored Customers, and/or Competitive Retaliation-i.e., by Low-
ering the Seller's Expected "PRB" Costs"
So far, I have ignored several types of costs that sellers may have to
incur in connection with their pricing of an individual product to a
given buyer or group of buyers. In particular, I have not yet considered
(1) the possibility that the price a seller charges one customer may affect
his relations with other buyers by inducing them to intensify their bar-
gaining and/or by inducing sellers of competitive goods to make
retaliatory price cuts or (2) the possibility that various pricing decisions
may result in the seller's being prosecuted and/or sued civilly (perhaps
for treble damages) for violating anti-predatory pricing or anti-price
discrimination statutes or maximum or minimum price regulations. In
practice, of course, the costs associated with such risks-which we will
57. Those tie-ins that reduce PRB costs by concealing actual price regulation violations
may be void as contra bones mores and prosecutable under various price regulation
statutes even if they do not violate the antitrust laws. However, different plaintiffs,
forums, and legal consequences will normally be associated with the adjudication of these
independent issues.
Like all the others I have discussed, this function can also be performed by tie-ins
that do not involve a unique product or a seller who either dominates one of the markets
in question or enjoys a competitive advantage in his dealings on one product with the
buyer in question. As we will see, tie-ins will probably be able to reduce a seller's PRIB
costs whenever he wishes to engage in price competition, to engage in price discrimination
(for and/or against a particular buyer), or to violate a maximum and/or minimum price
regulation in some relevant combination on two or more products he sells to a particular
buyer. (Indeed, tie-ins may even be able to perform this function if such behavior is
engaged in on only one product.) Sellers of non-unique products who fit the above
description may wish to engage in price competition, to discriminate in favor of a
particular buyer, and/or to violate a minimum price regulation. I have already shown
that such sellers may also be able to price discriminate against a particular buyer. See
note 52 supra. The same argument used to demonstrate this possibility will also apply
mutatis mutandis to maximum price regulation violations.
221
The Yale Law Journal
call PRB (prosecution retaliation, and bargaining) costs-may be sub-
stantial.
In various situations, sellers will be able to use tie-ins to reduce such
PRB costs (1) by decreasing the apparent extent of their price competi-
tion, price discrimination,58 and/or price regulation violations or (2) by
shifting the apparent locus of such pricing activities to products on
which the related PRB costs are expected to be lower. 9 In this section,
I will investigate the way and circumstances in which tie-ins may enable
a seller to reduce his expected PRB costs. 60 Although tie-ins that reduce
their employer's PRB costs may involve either specific quantities of both
goods in question or the buyer's full requirements of one of the goods
involved and as much as he wants of the other, I will assume throughout
that quantities are not specified."1
(1) Reducing the Certainty Equivalent PRB Costs the Seller Expects
to Incur by Concealing All or the Extent of His Price Discrimina-
tion, Price Competition, and/or Price Regulation Violations
In four different types of situations, a seiher will be able to reduce
his PRB costs by using a tie-in to conceal all or the extent of his price
discrimination, price competition, and/or price regulation violations-
viz., (1) when the seller is considering discrimination in favor of and
against the same customer on different products; (2) when the seller is
considering violating maximum and minimum price regulations on
different products in his dealings with the same customer; (3) when the
58. This effect will be equally important when the seller is not in fact discriminating
but believes that competitors, customers, and/or governmental authorities will mistakenly
conclude that he is and that it will be difficult and/or expensive to prove the non-
discriminatory character of his pricing (for example, by establishing a cost justification).
59. Whenever a tie-in reduces in either of the ways just mentioned the PRB costs
a seller expects to incur in connection with his price competition or price discrimination,
its impact will be increased by its tendency to raise the probability that non-favored
customers and competitors who detect the seller's price reductions will realize the limited
extent of such reductions and their restriction to buyers who are in a position to make
them more profitable for the seller in question than such discrimination would normally
be for such non-favored customers or competitors.
60. I treat this function of tie-ins separately both (1) because its performance is more
likely to make profitable tie-ins that would not otherwise be advantageous (since unlike,
for example, the ability of tying agreements to reduce the amount of transaction surplus
any given amount of the seller's non-marginal cost pricing will destroy by lowering the
buyer's incentive to promote the products in question, their ability to reduce the em-
ployer's PRB costs will not be directly related to their ability to reduce the amount of
transaction surplus any given amount of the seller's non-marginal cost pricing will destroy
by reducing his sales below the volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects
his marginal cost curve), and (2) because an analogous function of reciprocity may well
provide the rationale for many reciprocal trading agreements.
61. I will make this assumption both because full requirements tie-ins provide the
more general case and because such tie-ins are more suggestive of an analogous function
of reciprocity.
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seller is considering charging the same buyer more than his normal
(average lump-sum plus unit) price on one product but less than the
legal minimum (average lump-sum plus unit) price for another; and
(4) when the seller is considering charging the same buyer less than his
normal (average lump-sum plus unit) price for one product but more
than the legal maximum price for another. In what follows, I will dis-
cuss the way in which tie-ins can be used to lower the PRB costs X will
anticipate incurring in each of these situations.
(a) Reducing the Seller's Certainty Equivalent PRB Costs by Con-
cealing All or the Extent of His Discrimination Against and in
Favor of the Same Customer on Different Products
Sellers who engage in price discrimination 62 will have to bear various
types of PRB costs. In particular, by discriminating in favor of a partic-
ular customer the seller creates the risk (1) that his competitors will
retaliate,63 (2) that his nonfavored customers will intensify their bar-
gaining or bring civil damage suits against him, 64 and/or (3) that the
relevant antitrust enforcement authorities will prosecute him or sue him
civilly for violating some applicable price discrimination statute. Al-
though discrimination against a particular customer-for example, by
refusing him the concession below list prices normally offered others-
will never provoke retaliation, its discovery may result in the seller's
being prosecuted or sued civilly by the government or customer in
question. Sellers, therefore, will ceteris paribus find it profitable to con-
ceal all or the extent of their discrimination whenever possible. In some
situations, sellers may be able to use tie-ins to accomplish this result.
62. In the conventional situation in which no lump-sum fees are charged, a seller's
terms are said to be discriminatory if the unit price he charges differs from his normal
unit charge and no cost justification can be established for the difference in question.
In the text that follows, I will not assume that X charges Y no lump-sum fee for A
and B. Accordingly, terms will be said to be discriminatory if the weighted average
revenue (average lump-sum plus unit price) the seller expects to receive on each unit
he sells to the customer in question differs from the weighted average revenue he normally
expects to receive and the difference in question does not reflect the atypicality of the
cost of dealing with the buyer involved.
63. Retaliation is in fact related not to discrimination (i.e., to charging a particular
customer less than the seller's normal price) but to stealing a customer from a position of
competitive inferiority. However, although this relation is obviously not inevitable, offers
that enable sellers to undercut their competitive superiors normally are discriminatory
in the sense defined in note 62 supra.
64. In the text, I will assume that "non-favored" customers will tend to intensify
their bargaining if and only if they discover that their supplier has been willing to ac-
cept a lower per unit return from another customer than from themselves. In practice,
however, it is possible that buyers will also intensify their bargaining if they discover
that their supplier has accepted a lower percentage of his and some other customer's
joint returns-a result that will depend on the discriminatory character of the seller's
price only if all buyers place an equal average value on the units of the good in question.
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Let's suppose then that X is considering selling A to Y for more than
its normal expected average lump-sum plus unit price and selling Y
(his full requirements of) B for less than that product's normal expected
average lump-sum plus unit price-that is, that X is considering practic-
ing what we shall call inverse discrimination against Y on A and in
favor of Y on B. In any such situation, X will be able to conceal all
or the extent of his discriminatory pricing by agreeing to furnish Y with
all the A Y desires at a lower-that is, less or non-discriminatory-ex-
pected average lump-sum plus unit price than X would otherwise be
willing to accept on condition that Y agree to purchase his full require-
ments of B from X at a higher-that is, less or non-discriminatory-ex-
pected average lump-sum plus unit price than Y would otherwise be
willing to pay.
Such a tie-in will always reduce the seller's PRB costs, though its
effectiveness and manner of operation will depend on whether its terms
on A and B appear to be non-discriminatory or merely less discrimina-
tory than they are in fact. Thus, if the tie-in's terms on B appeared to
be non-discriminatory, the agreement would reduce the PRB costs X
should expect to incur in connection with his discrimination in Y's favor
on this product (1) by reducing the probability of X's being sued
civilly or prosecuted by the government for his discrimination on B as
well as the probability of his losing any such cases that are brought (a)
by making it appear both to the relevant antitrust authority and the
judge or jury that Y was in fact paying the normal price for these
products and (b) by making it impossible to prove X's discrimination
in Y's favor on B without demonstrating that X would otherwise have
discriminated against Y on A; (2) by reducing the probability of X's
being sued civilly by his nonfavored customers (or competitors) on B
(a) by posing the same problems of discovery and proof for them as it
does for the antitrust agencies themselves and (b) by reducing the
probability that they will be able to rely on the results of earlier suits
instituted by the government; (3) by reducing the probability that X's
non-favored customers on B will intensify their bargaining to any given
extent (a) by making it less likely that they will discover X's discrimina-
tion and (b) by suggesting the possibility that Y's other relations with
X may enable X to grant Y concessions at less cost to himself than would
otherwise be possible;65 and (4) by reducing the probability that X's
65. X might even inform such customers directly of the special facts-viz., his dis-
crimination against Y on A-that reduce the cost to him of discriminating in favor of
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competitors on B will retaliate to any given extent (a) by making it
less likely that they will discover X's discrimination and perhaps (b) by
suggesting to them that Y's other relations with X might enable him to
grant Y such concessions for less than similar reductions would cost
them.10
Indeed, tie-ins can also reduce the PRB costs the seller must expect
to incur in connection with his discrimination in favor of a particular
buyer by reducing without eliminating the apparent extent of such
discrimination. Thus, a tie-in which simply reduced the apparent
extent of X's discrimination in Y's favor on B would still lower the
associated certainty equivalent PRB costs (1) by reducing the probability
of prosecution or civil damage suits by making the discrimination seem
less important and (at least in theory) increasing the difficulty of demon-
strating the required probability of injury to competition, (2) by reduc-
ing the probable size of any fines that may be levied or damages awarded,
(3) by reducing the probable extent of retaliation by reducing the
apparent extent of X's competition and by making it appear that Y is
more of a "natural" customer of X than he actually is, and (4) by
reducing the extent to which non-favored customers increase their
bargaining by raising their focal points. 7 In precisely the same way tie-
Y on B. In so doing, X takes the risk that these customers will inform Y that he is
being discriminated against on A.
66. X might even inform such competitors directly of the special facts-viz., his dis-
crimination against Y on A-that reduce the cost of such discrimination to him. In so
doing, X takes the risk that his competitors on B will inform Y that he is being dis-
criminated against on A. Such information might, of course, result in Y's intensifying
his bargaining or suing for (treble) damages (if he can show an injury to competition)
and/or suggesting a related suit to the responsible enforcement body.
67. However, the tie-in will probably not reduce and may even increase the likelihood
that Y will discover that he is being discriminated against on A. Thus, the tie-in will
not reduce Y's ability to deduce the fact of X's discrimination against him on A from
knowledge of the other agreements in which X is involved unless A's other purchasers are
also required to purchase B as well at the price Y is charged under the tying agreement-
an arrangement which would probably not be profitable unless they would have been
willing to purchase B at this price in any case. If this condition is not met, Y will
obviously realize that unlike these buyers he obtained his "concession" below A's best
price only by promising to purchase another product on worse terms than he would
otherwise have demanded. In fact, as we have seen, to the extent that X tries to prevent
retaliation or increased bargaining by his competitors or non-favored customers on B
by telling them of the special circumstances that reduce the cost of his discrimination
in Y's favor on this product, the probability that Y will discover that he is being dis-
criminated against on A will be increased. The effect of the tie-in on the probability
that the relevant antitrust enforcement authorities will discover Xs discrimination against
Y on A is rather uncertain. On the one hand, to the extent that the tie-in increases
the likelihood that Y will discover his position, it increases the probability that he will
inform the relevant authorities of X's behavior toward him on A. On the other hand,
by making it appear that he is receiving the same "concession" as other customers,
it will reduce the probability that the antitrust authorities will discover X's discrimina-
tion on their own.
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ins can reduce the PRB costs X must expect to incur in connection with
his discrimination against Y on A.
Although the extent to which a seller will find it profitable to reduce
his PRB costs in this way will depend (1) on the degree to which he can
effect the necessary shifts in his pricing by reallocating his lump-sum
fees and (2) on the extent to which additional shifts-brought about
through changes in the locus of his non-marginal cost pricing-would
lower his profits in other ways, there can be little doubt that sellers who
wish to discriminate on one product against a buyer in whose favor they
wish to discriminate (in a full requirements contract) on a second
product will frequently find it profitable to employ tie-ins inter alia to
reduce the PRB costs associated with such inverse discrimination. In
fact, since tie-ins with apparently non-discriminatory terms may very
well reduce the seller's PRB costs discontinuously (in comparison with
agreements with less but still apparently discriminatory terms), sellers
in situations in which such costs are likely to be high may even find it
profitable to allow their customers to retain more surplus than they
would be willing to accept in order to preserve the apparently non-dis-
criminatory character of the agreements in question.
(b) Reducing the PRB Costs the Seller Expects to Incur in Connection
with His Maximum and Minimum Price Regulation Violations on
Sales of Different Products to the Same Customer8
In general, sellers who commit maximum and/or minimum price
regulation violations will have to reckon with incurring a significant
amount of PRB costs even if their behavior does not involve discrimina-
tion against and/or in favor of the buyer in question, for maximum
price regulation violators may be prosecuted or sued civilly by the
government or the buyer directly involved while minimum price regula-
tion violators may be prosecuted, sued civilly by the government or
producers of competitive goods, and/or retaliated against by the com-
petitors in question (where the illegally low price is also less than the
industry's norm). Accordingly, whenever a seller is considering charging
some buyer Y more than the legal maximum (average expected lump-
sum plus unit) price for some product A and less than the legal mini-
mum price for some product B, he may be able to use tie-ins in precisely
the same way we have just delineated to increase his returns by reducing
68. In order to isolate the present case, I will assume that the price regulation violator
will not incur any PRB costs in connection with his pricing's possible discriminatory
character.
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the certainty equivalent PRB costs entailed in his inverse price regula-
tion violations. Indeed, in certain respects, such agreements will tend to
be even more effective in these circumstances than when inverse price
discrimination is involved, for it will always be possible to arrange tie-
ins which are marginally acceptable to Y without charging openly
illegal prices.60 Such tie-ins will reduce the certainty equivalent PRB
costs created by inverse price regulation violations discriminators must
expect to incur-viz., (1) by reducing the probability that X will be sued
civilly or prosecuted by the government for his price violations on A
and B as well as the probability that he will lose any such cases that are
brought by making it appear to the relevant executive and judicial
decision-makers that X's prices to Y were within the legal limits and by
making it impossible to prove that X's actual (average lump-sum plus
unit) price on one product violated the legal limit in one direction with-
out proving that his price on the other would have violated its legal limit
in the opposite direction; (2) by reducing the probability that X's com-
petitors on B will sue him civilly by posing the same problems of discovery
and proof for them as it does for the antitrust agencies themselves; and
(3) by reducing the probability that X's competitors on B will retaliate
by making it less likely that they will discover his price reduction as well
as by suggesting to them that X's other relations with Y make it more
profitable for him to reduce his price to Y on B than it would be for
them.
(c) Reducing the PRB Costs the Seller Expects to Incur in Connection
with His (1) Minimum Price Regulation on One Product and Dis-
crimination Against the Buyer in Question on Another or (2) Maxi-
mum Price Regulation Violation on One Product and Discrimina-
tion in Favor of the Buyer in Question on the Other
The same argument that I have just delineated in connection with
inverse price discrimination and inverse price regulation violations will
apply as well when the seller wishes to charge the same customer more
than the legal maximum for one product and less than his regular price
69. Thus, if a tie-in in which A's price is set at the legal maximum and B's at the
legal minimum is just attractive enough for Y, these terms can be included in the
agreement. On the other hand, if such an offer is more attractive than necessary, B's
price can be raised above the legal minimum; and if it is insufficiently attractive, A's
price can be set below the legal maximum. Of course, in some situations-viz., when there
ASS +
are relevant discrepancies between - on DD and DD 110 resvectively-X may
A BS - XAY XBY
find it more profitable to charge Y prices under the tie-in which do violate the regu-
lations in question though by smaller amounts than his optimal independent prices for
the same goods.
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on another or less than the legal minimum for one product and more
than his normal price for another.
(2) Reducing the Certainty Equivalent PRB Costs the Seller Expects
to Incur by Transferring the Apparent Locus of His Price Regu-
lation Violation or Price Discrimination to a Product on Which the
Related PRB Costs Are Expected to Be Lower
So far, we have been concerned with tie-ins that reduce their em-
ployer's expected certainty equivalent PRB costs by concealing the
extent of his discrimination and price regulation violations. However,
tie-ins may also be able to reduce their employer's PRB costs when such
concealment is not possible-that is, when the seller wishes to dicrimi-
nate or violate a price regulation on only one product 0 -by transfer-
ring the locus of his discrimination or price regulation violation to a
product on which the related PRB costs are expected to be lower.
Earlier, I noted that the PRB costs associated with any given amount1
of price discrimination or any given size72 price regulation violation
will be determined by a large number of factors. Differences in these
factors will often raise the PRB costs associated with discrimination or
price regulation violations on one product (A) above their counterparts
for such activities on another (B). In the case of discrimination in favor
of a particular customer, for example, this result will obtain if (1) the
antitrust enforcement agencies concerned are more interested in the
market for A than for B, (2) discrimination in this customer's favor on
A is (or seems) more likely to injure competition than discrimination in
his favor on B, (3) X's competitors on A are more likely to retaliate than
are producers of substitutes of B, and/or (4) non-favored buyers of A are
in a better bargaining position than are non-favored buyers of B.73 Ac-
cordingly, if X were considering discriminating in Y's favor on A and sell-
ing B to Y at its normal (average lump-sum plus unit) price, he might find
it possible to transfer the apparent locus of his discrimination from A to
70. Tie-ins may even be able to conceal the seller's price discrimination or price
regulation violation in this case if the seller does not market the tied product independently
of the tying agreement. In such circumstances, the seller will be able to charge a higher
or lower than normal price for the tied product in the tying agreement without engaging
in discrimination. Such an agreement will usually be too transparent to deceive the seller's
competitors, non-favored customers, or governmental supervisors.
71. In the text, I will implicitly measure the amount of price discrimination by the
amount of buyer surplus involved.
72. In the text, I will implicitly measure the size of any price regulation violation by
the amount of buyer surplus involved.
73. Where price regulation violations are concerned, the most relevant factors will be
the assiduousness of the relevant enforcement agencies and the relative size of the penal-
ties incurred.
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B by conditioning his sale of B at a subnormal average lump-sum plus
unit price on Y's agreeing to purchase his full requirements of A from
him as well at a higher (average lump-sum plus unit) price than he
would otherwise have been willing to pay (presumably at that product's
normal average lump-sum plus unit price). Such an arrangement might
reduce the seller's PRB costs (1) by making it difficult for the govern-
ment and X's non-favored customers to prove (as well as to discover) the
actual locus of his discrimination, (2) by deceiving X's competitors and
non-favored customers on B, and/or (3) by suggesting to these parties
the possibility that X's ability to transfer the apparent locus of his
discrimination from B to A may make his discrimination on B in Y's
favor more profitable for him than such discrimination would other-
wise be either for him or for his competitors on the good in question.
In similar ways, tie-ins may also reduce the seller's expected certainty
equivalent PRB costs (1) by making his discrimination in favor of a
particular customer on A appear to be a minimum price regulation
violation on B, (2) by making his discrimination against a particular
customer on A appear to be an act of discrimination or maximum price
regulation violation against this buyer on B, (3) by making his maxi-
mum price regulation violation on A appear to be a maximum price
regulation violation or an act of discrimination against this buyer on B,
or (4) by making his minimum price regulation violation on A appear
to be a minimum price regulation violation or an act of discrimination in
favor of this buyer on B.
h. Concealing the Seller's Tax and/or Contract Fraud74
Tie-ins can perform an analogous function for sellers who wish to
commit contract or tax fraud. Thus, when the taxes, royalties, and/or
franchise fees due on X's profits on or revenues from A exceed their
counterparts for some other product B that his customers also use, X
may be able to reduce his apparent obligations by conditioning his sale
of A at a reduced price on Y's purchasing B from him as well for more
than its prevailing market price-that is, by using a tie-in to transfer the
apparent locus of his profits and sales from A to B. Of course, X could
use other methods of obscuring his actual sales of and profits on A,
but the tie-in may increase the probability that X's fraud will not be
detected by providing him with invoices to substantiate his bookkeep-
ing entries.75
74. See note 57 supra.
75. This argument does not require A or B to be unique or X either to dominate
229
The Yale Law Journal
i. Reducing the Cost of Preventing Customers from Using Some Rele-
vant Amount of Inferior Complements
In many situations, X's individual distributors will find it profitable
to use complements of A which reduce X's returns by injuring A's repu-
tation and lowering the returns of its other distributors, for since the
effect of the individual proprietor's decision on other outlets' sales is
external to him, he will not consider this consequence of his own
decisions. Indeed, in some cases, X's distributors may-out of ignorance
-even use complements that reduce their own as well as X's returns.
If X wants to prevent such decisions, he will have to require his outlets
to use complements of specified quality. Although X could simply send
his customers detailed specifications for the complements they use, he
will often find it more profitable to require his customers to purchase
all such complements (B) from him.
Such an agreement can reduce the extent to which X's customers use
inferior complements in two different ways. First, quality-control tie-ins
may make it easier for X to detect Y's use of inferior complements from
subsequent inspections by enabling him to label the B he supplies to
facilitate its identification. Second, since X will often be able to estimate
quite accurately Y's requirements of B from knowledge of his purchases
of A, his use of tie-ins will either or both raise the probability that he
will be able to detect Y's use of inferior complements from circum-
stantial evidence when Y does not try to camouflage his use of such
products by purchasing and retransferring what would be his full re-
quirements of B from X and/or force Y to incur the cost of retrans-
ferring the B he purchases from X in order to remove the circumstantial
evidence of his contractual violations. For the same reasons, quality-
control tie-ins will also increase X's ability to detect Y's use of unduly
superior complements, other things being equal.
In many situations, the related gains for X will be substantial. Since
the additional costs associated with the tie-in's employment-(l) the cost
of arranging for the supply of B (which may amount to the price of a
phone call), plus (2) the cost of labelling B more clearly, plus (3) the
cost of inspecting Y's performance under the tie-in, minus (4) the cost
establishing and communicating standards to Y, minus (5) the cost of
inspecting under a non-tie-in system-will often be very small, tie-ins
will often be able to increase the profitability of quality-control regard-
one of the markets in question or to enjoy a competitive advantage when selling A and/or
B toY.
230
Vol. 80: 195, 1970
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory
less of whether they influence the competitiveness of the tied-product
market.76
2. The Non-Leverage Functions of Buyer-Arranged Tie-ins
In general, buyers arrange tie-ins less often and for fewer purposes
than sellers. Thus, although monopsonistic buyers may sometimes ar-
range tie-ins to enable themselves to prevent seller arbitrage or practice
price discrimination without identifying relevant differences in their
suppliers' supply curves, most of the relatively small number of the
tie-ins buyers are likely to arrange are probably devised to conceal the
buyer's tax or contract fraud.
a. Reducing the Cost of Preventing Some Relevant Amount of Seller
Arbitrage
In an extremely small number of cases, monopsonistic buyers may
employ tie-ins to reduce their suppliers' incentive to engage in arbi-
trage. Let's assume (1) that monopsonist Y buys product A from pro-
ducers X1 and X2; (2) that Y knows that Xl's supply curve is more
elastic than X2's at his most profitable uniform price-that is, that Y
knows that if arbitrage were impossible and perhaps even if it were not,
he would find it profitable to pay X1 a higher unit price for A than X2;
(3) that Y can also make use of some other product B which X1 pro-
duces in approximate proportion to his production of A, most likely
because B is produced (perhaps among other methods) as a by-product
of A; and (4) that the cost of transferring B to Y from X2 or some other
producer via Xl exceeds the cost of moving B to Y directly from these
sellers. To the extent that the differences in the relevant transfer costs
for B are significant, Y may be able to prevent arbitrage in such a
situation by conditioning his purchase of A from XI on this producer's
supplying him directly with B at its prevailing price in amounts equal
to the quantity of this product that X1 would produce if he manufac-
tured all the A he sells to Y himself. When Y is able to devise a relatively
inexpensive method of detecting whether the B he receives has passed
directly through Xl's hands,77 such a tie-in will be a relatively inex-
pensive means of decreasing the profitability of arbitrage by an amount
equal to the cost of making the additional transfer of B.
However, although some buyers may use tie-ins for this purpose, the
76. This argument does not irequire A to be unique or X either to dominate the
market for A or to enjoy a competitive advantage when selling A to Y.
77. In general, it is probably less expensive to determine that a product has passed
through a given supplier's hands than to determine that it has not.
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importance of this function should not be exaggerated. Each of the
conditions discussed must be fulfilled for such a tie-in to be profitable.
Thus, unless differences in transfer costs are sizeable, the tie-in will
not have a deterrent effect, and unless Xl can furnish Y with the B he
must supply in conjunction with his sales of the A he produces himself
without incurring additional costs-that is, unless XI produces B
in approximate proportions to A-any gains from reduced arbitage will
be offset by the effects of the associated fall in Xl's own supply curve.
Since pure monopsony of this kind is itself quite rare, these additional
conditions make it highly improbable that buyers often use tie-ins to
reduce seller arbitrage. Still, a limited number of such agreements may
very well be explicable in these terms.78
b. Decreasing the Information Costs the Buyer Must Incur to Practice
Price Discrimination with any Given Degree of Accuracf 9
It is also possible that buyers with monopsonistic power may on some
occasions use tie-ins to enable themselves to practice price discrimina-
tion without incurring the cost of identifying relevant differences in
their suppliers' individual supply curves. If such a monopolist cannot
determine the cost of individual products to each of his suppliers
without incurring considerable expenses but knows that sellers who
would be willing to supply him with one product at a relatively low
price would demand a relatively high price for another product he uses,
he will be able to duplicate the effects of paying different suppliers
different prices for the same individual products by offering to pay them
all the same price for the two products taken together. So long as (1)
the buyer in question could not fill his requirements of either product
with the output of its low-cost producers and (2) differences in the total
supply prices of different producers are not too great, such package
buying may be more profitable than normal price discrimination based
on the results of expensive market research-particularly when jointness
and high transfer costs enable such tie-ins to prevent seller arbi-
trage as well. Moreover, even when uniform package buying is not
profitable, a buyer may find it more profitable to discriminate on a
package of products than on each individually. Thus, a buyer may
employ tie-ins for this purpose if he faces a situation in which (1) he
78. Once more, this function can be performed by tie-ins that do not involve a
unique product or a dominant or best-positioned seller. In fact, tie-ins can prevent seller
arbitrage only when the product is not unique and the seller is not dominant.
79. Once more, this function can be performed by tie-ins that do not involve a
unique product or a dominant or best-positioned seller.
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needs two products in quantities that exceed the amount that could
be supplied by their low-cost producers among suppliers of both goods,
(2) where the two products in question have joint costs so that the
highest cost of any one product to a producer of both is still below its
cost to most or all of the manufacturers who do not also produce the
other, and (3) when locations, productive processes, or most likely
managerial talents (since these would be most expensive to identify)
that are relatively advantageous for one product are relatively disadvan-
tageous for the other. Admittedly these conditions will not be met very
often, but some buyers undoubtedly do arrange tie-ins to enable them-
selves to reduce the information costs they have to incur to practice
price discrimination with any degree of accuracy.
c. Concealing the Buyer's Tax or Contract Fraud
In precisely the same way that tie-ins can enable a seller to reduce his
apparent tax or contract obligations, they may make it possible for
buyers to accomplish the same objective. Thus, if the marginal tax or
royalty rates applicable to some buyer Y's sales of or profits on some
product A (or the product in which it is incorporated) exceed their
counterpart for some product B, Y may be able to conceal his actual
obligations by offering to purchase A for more than he would otherwise
have to pay on condition that the supplier also furnish him with B or
one of its components for less than its prevailing market price (or by
offering to purchase B or one of its components for more than its pre-
vailing market price on condition that his supplier also furnish him
with A for less than the price he would otherwise have had to pay).
Clearly, the information necessary to realize the profitability of such an
arrangement will also be in Y's possession. Of course, Y could use
other methods of obscuring his actual sales of and/or profits on A, but
since the tie-in may increase the probability that his fraud will not be
detected by providing him with invoices to substantiate his bookkeep-
ing entries, he will be quite likely to propose tying agreements for this
purpose.80
In short, the assertion that the sole function of tie-ins is to exert
leverage in the tied-product market is simply incorrect. Regardless of
whether they involve a dominant or unique product or a product which
the seller in question markets at a competitive advantage to the buyer
80. The uniqueness of the product or the dominance or relative position of the seller
is irrelevant to the ability of a tie-in to perform this function.
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involved, individual seller-arranged and buyer-arranged tie-ins can per-
form several functions other than reducing competition in the tied-
product market which in various circumstances cannot be performed as
well by any other pricing system.
C. The Profitability and Possibility of Non-Leverage Tie-ins: A
Critique of the Inevitable Leverage Hypothesis
Demonstrating that tie-ins can perform non-leverage functions would
not affect their legal status if (1) the legality of each individual tie-in
depended on its individual impact rather than on the competitive
impact of allowing all potential suppliers of the buyer in question to
enter into tie-ins with him and (2) such individual agreements always
increased their employer's returns inter alia by reducing tied-product
competition. In this section, I will consider the inevitable leverage
theory that tie-ins always have an anti-competitive effect. I will divide
the analysis into two parts. In the first, I will show that the inevitable
leverage theory cannot be established through a res ipsa loquitur argu-
ment derived from the proposition that the profitability of tying agree-
ments depends on their reducing tied-product competition. In the
second, I will use the previous analysis of the exclusive leverage theory
to show that there are very good reasons to suppose that tying agree-
ments will not inevitably reduce tied-product competition, regardless
of whether they involve a dominant or unique product or a product on
which the seller merely enjoys a competitive advantage in his dealings
with individual buyers.
1. A Demonstration that the Profitability of Tie-ins Does Not Depend
on Their Exerting Leverage or Their Reducing (Tied-Product)
Competition
Since we normally assume that sellers price to maximize their profits,
the inevitable leverage hypothesis could be established by a kind of
res ipsa loquitur argument for any type of tie-in whose profitability
could be shown to depend on its reducing tied-product competition.
Hence, it may be useful to begin the analysis of this hypothesis by
demonstrating that each of the various types of tie-ins that can be
distinguished on functional or other grounds81 can be profitable without
reducing tied-product competition. In what follows, four general func-
81. In developing its inevitable leverage hypothesis, the Court has distinguished be-
tween tie-ins that do and do not involve a dominant or unique product and/or a seller
who could have enjoyed a competitive advantage in independent transactions with the
buyer in question on at least one of the products involved.
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tional types of tie-ins are distinguished:8 2 (1) package-pricing tie-ins, (2)
pure qualitycontrol tie-ins, (3) meter-pricing tie-ins, and (4) non-mar-
ginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins. As we shall see, each of these types of
tying agreements will frequently be able to increase a seller's profits
without raising his returns by reducing tied-product competition.
a. The Profitability of Non-Leverage Package-Pricing Tie-ins
Package-pricing tie-ins are agreements in which a seller promises to
provide a specified quantity or package of different products at a single
total price 83 or an unlimited number of such packages at a specified
price. Package-pricing tie-ins that sellers are more likely to arrange can
enable sellers (1) to reduce the information costs they incur in prac-
ticing price discrimination with any given degree of accuracy (when the
seller knows that customers who place a relatively high value on one of
his products will place a relatively low value-which is almost never
significantly below his marginal costs-on one or more other products);
(2) to reduce the costs they incur to prevent or allow buyer arbitrage
(when the buyer in question uses the product concerned in fixed
proportions and storage or transference costs are relatively high); (3) to
reduce the PRB costs they incur in connection with price discrimina-
tion and/or price regulation violations on the products in question;
and/or (4) to reduce the taxes or royalties they have to pay on their
profits or sales.
Even when a package-pricing tie-in performs only one of these
functions, the savings achieved will often exceed the associated costs,
for since specific quantities of both products are involved, the tying
seller will have no full requirements promise to enforce. The only
expense the tie-in creates will be the cost of instructing another supplier
to deliver the tied product to the buyer in those cases in which the latter
would not otherwise have purchased this good from the seller in ques-
tion. In practice, however, package-pricing tie-ins will often perform
more than one of the functions described above. Thus, package-pricing
tie-ins that reduce the information costs the seller must incur to prac-
tice price discrimination with any degree of accuracy may also be able
to reduce his certainty equivalent PRB costs as well.
Buyers are more likely to arrange tie-ins that operate (1) by reducing
the information costs they must sustain to practice price discrimination
82. Although the functions of each type of tie-in may sometimes overlap, each is
normally employed for significantly different reasons.
83. The total price may or may not be broken down into "component" parts.
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with any degree of accuracy, (2) by reducing the costs they must incur to
prevent or allow seller arbitrage, and/or (3) by reducing the visibility
of their tax or contract frauds. Although buyers may sometimes use
non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins to perform the third of these
functions, most buyer-initiated tie-ins undoubtedly involve a single
or unlimited number of packages of goods and all are at least function-
ally analogous to the package-pricing tie-ins already discussed. Obvi-
ously, the same arguments that established the potential profitability of
non-leverage package-pricing tie-ins will also apply when package-
buying tie-ins are concerned.
b. The Profitability of Non-Leverage Pure Quality-Control Tie-ins
As we have seen, a seller will frequently find it profitable to control
the quality of goods his customers use in conjunction with his own
products, for buyers will sometimes find it profitable to use or overesti-
mate the profitability of using inferior complements that reduce their
supplier's long-run returns. Of course, some degree of quality-control
can always be achieved without using tie-ins-for example, by specifying
the character of complementary goods and inspecting performance-but
tie-ins will often increase the profitability of quality control by reducing
the cost of obtaining some relevant degree of compliance.
Thus, by obligating a buyer (Y) of some product (A) to purchase at
its normal price from a particular source his full requirements of a
complementary good (B) of suitable quality, pure quality-control tie-ins
will often increase the profitability of quality control (1) by enabling
the seller (X) at virtually no cost to himself to make it more costly for Y
to keep secret the fact that he has purchased less than what would be his
full requirements of acceptable complements by forcing Y to take
delivery and to retransfer an acceptable complement each time he uses
an unacceptable one (Y could otherwise obtain receipts for acceptable
complements without actually taking delivery of them) and/or (2) by
enabling X to reduce the cost of his detecting violations through actual
inspections by giving him an opportunity to label and make more iden.
tifiable the complements provided.
Since, then, quality control will often be profitable without tie-ins
and tie-ins will often increase the profitability of quality control, the
profitability of pure quality-control tie-ins cannot be said to rest on their
reducing competition in the tied-product market.
c. The Profitability of Non-Leverage Meter-Pricing Tie-ins
Meter-pricing tie-ins are agreements in which a seller conditions his
sale of a durable product or of the right to use his patented or secret
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process or idea on his customers' agreeing to purchase from him as well
for more than its normal price their full requirements of some other
good which must be used in fixed amounts each time the tying product
or idea is employed. As I have already suggested, sellers would fre-
quently be able to increase their returns by using such tie-ins to
implement non-marginal-cost unit-pricing systems-quite apart from
any effect such agreements might (but as we shall see in Section III usu-
ally do not in fact) have on competition in the tied-product market. Such
tie-ins will often be able to increase the profitability of meter pricing
which would in any case be profitable (or which would in any case not
generate losses that exceeded the gains associated with the tying agree-
ment's adoption). Especially when the tied product can be labelled in
ways that make it easy to identify, tie-ins will frequently be the most
profitable means of implementing meter-pricing policies, since the cost
of discovering and redressing violations of the buyer's promise of
patronage on the tied product will often be lower than the cost of
metering through end-product royalties-viz., the cost of determining
whether the buyer has reported his sales accurately-or through actual
metering devices-viz., the cost of the meter with its anti-tampering
components, the related installation costs, and subsequent inspection
costs. Indeed, for several products and all patented or secret processes
or ideas, actual meters will be totally impracticable.
Clearly, the gains from employing tie-ins for this purpose will often
outweigh any losses that meter pricing might otherwise produce, for
such pricing would in many cases be profitable even if tie-ins could not
be employed and even if (as it does not in fact) such pricing would not
reduce the competitiveness of the tied-product market. Thus, the
profitability of meter-pricing tie-ins does not depend on their reducing
competition in the seller's tied-product market.
d. The Profitability of Non-Leverage Non-Marginal-Cost Price-Shifting
Tie-ins
Non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins are agreements in which a
seller reduces the unit price he charges his customers for one product (A)
on condition that the latter promise to purchase from him at a higher
unit price than they would otherwise be willing to pay their full require-
ments of a second (or second and third) product (B) which is not used
in fixed proportions with the first. Such agreement can perform all of
the functions we have just described except implementing a meter-
pricing system. However, tie-ins of this type normally operate primarily
by decreasing the amount of transaction surplus any given amount of
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the seller's non-marginal cost pricing destroys (1) by reducing his unit
sales below the volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects
his marginal cost curve and (2) by reducing his customers' promotional
activities below what would be optimal for an integrated concern.
Sellers who employ the type of tie-in with which we are now con-
cerned might not otherwise find it advantageous to enter into either or
both a supply contract on A and/or a full-requirements contract on B
for the period in question. Accordingly, the profitability of such tie-ins
cannot be determined by comparing the returns their employer will
realize under the agreements in question with the profits he would earn
under his optimal independent supply and full-requirements contracts
on A and B respectively, for the gains associated with a switch from such
independent contracts to the tying agreement may be more or less offset
by the amount that such independent contracts would reduce their
employer's returns.
However, let's begin our analysis of the potential profitability of
non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins that ex hypothesis do not affect
tied-product competition by examining how X's profits would be af-
fected if he shifted from his optimal independent supply and full-re-
quirements contracts on A and B respectively to a tying agreement of
the type we have just described. In order to simplify the presentation,
we will also assume (1) that such a switch will not make it profitable for
X to change the amount of buyer surplus he removes through non-mar-
ginal cost pricing 4 and (2) that the tie-in in question does not affect X's
profits by controlling the quality of related inputs, by reducing his PRB
costs, by reducing the information costs he has to incur to practice price
discrimination with some relevant degree of accuracy, or by enabling
him to practice tax or contract fraud.
On these assumptions, X's profits under his optimal tie-in would
equal the sum of his returns on an independent supply contract on A
and an independent full-requirements contract on B plus (1) the
amount by which the tie-in would reduce the sum of transaction surplus
X's non-marginal cost pricing destroys by lowering his sales below the
volume at which the demand curve he faces intersects his marginal cost
curve if the agreement in question affected neither reseller promotion
nor (as we are assuming) the absolute amount of non-marginal cost pric-
84. In the text that follows, I will adopt the convention of measuring the various
types of surplus with which I will be concerned along the demand curves that X
would face if he and Y promoted the products in question to the extent they would
under the former's optimal independent contracts on A and B. Unless otherwise stated,
DD and DDRC will refer to these demand curves as well.
XAY I XBY
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ing practiced,8 5 plus (2) the amount of seller surplus the tie-in would
preserve from being destroyed by the tendency of X's non-marginal cost
pricing to reduce reseller promotion, plus or minus (3) the amount by
which X would be able to increase or would have to reduce his lump-
sum fee"0 as a result of the tie-ins tendency to decrease or increase (a)
the profits Y realizes by promoting the products in question and (b) the
risk costs Y sustains,87 plus or minus (4) the amount by which such a
tie-in would decrease or increase the risk costs X sustains, s8 minus (5)
the amount by which such a tie-in would increase the cost to X of
allowing or not allowing Y to engage in arbitrage by reselling A to
other potential customers, minus (6) the cost to X under the tie-in of
enforcing or not enforcing Y's promise to purchase his full requirements
of B from X, minus (7) the amount the tie-in reduces the protection X's
non-marginal cost pricing gives X against his and Y's pessimism.
In practice, the type of switch with which we are concerned
will usually make it profitable for X to increase the amount of buyer
surplus he removes through non-marginal cost pricing and will often
perform other functions from those we have just considered. In general,
then, X's certainty-equivalent profits under his optimal tie-in will equal
his certainty-equivalent returns from his optimal independent supply
and full-requirements contracts on A and B respectively plus or minus
the net sum of (1)-(7), plus (8) the amount of additional returns X
can realize under the tie-in by increasing the amount of buyer surplus
he removes through non-marginal cost pricing, plus (9) the amount by
which the tie-in (a) increases the profitability of the discrimination or
price regulation violations he could have practiced under independent
contracts by reducing the associated PRB and/or information costs and
(b) increases his returns by making it profitable for him to engage in
additional discrimination or price regulation violations for the reasons
just advanced, plus (10) the amount by which the tie-in increases his
85. The amount of transaction surplus preserved in this connection will be equal to
SS-(BS + ) for the related decrease in B's unit price and the difference between - on
5+ BS +
DD for the price change in auestion and + on DDRO for the associated de-
XAY BS - XBY
crease in B's unit price.
86. I assume either (1) that X would not find it profitable to allow Y to retain any
excess surplus under independent contracts on A and B or (2) that the ability of the
tie-in to reduce the PRB and information costs X must sustain to engage in price dis-
crimination of price regulation violations does not make it profitable for him to reduce
Y's surplus-i.e., that the switch with which I am concerned will not change Y's certainty
equivalent surplus.
87. See Appendix A infra.
88. Id.
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returns by reducing the likelihood that his tax or contract fraud will be
detected. Since, as we have seen, X might not find it profitable to enter
into independent supply and requirements contracts on A and B cover-
ing the same period as his optimal tie-in, (1) any losses he would have to
sustain to arrange such independent contracts would have to be sub-
tracted from the net sum of (1)-(10) in order to determine the effect of
such a tie-in on its employer's profits.
Obviously, the relative size of the various items listed above will vary
from situation to situation. However, in general, (1) will be smaller
for X than it would be for someone who did not also sell A to Y since
these other relations will always enable X to take advantage of economies
of scale in contracting and may also result in the full-requirements
contract's achieving some valuable quality control as well. In any case,
the losses that X would have to sustain to enter into such independent
contracts will usually be quite small. In contrast, in suitable circum-
stances, such tie-ins may enable the seller to make substantial gains in
other respects. For example, when manufacturers of a highly differen-
tiated product (A) sell to individual retailers who operate in small local
markets and distribute one or more standardized goods (BI ... N) in
addition to the manufacturer's own product, tie-ins of the type we have
been considering may be able to reduce substantially the amount of
transaction surplus the seller's non-marginal cost pricing will destroy-
that is, items (1) and (2) will be both substantial and positive. Thus, (1)
since such standardized goods will often be produced under competi-
tive conditions but distributed in local markets by tight oligopolies,
SS-- will frequently be much higher along the relevant portion of
BS-
DRo SS-
DDXB1Y than will - along the relevant portion of DDxAY and (2)
BS+
since the sales of such standardized goods will often be less responsive to
reseller promotion than will the sales of the manufacturer's highly differ-
entiated good, more transaction surplus will be gained by increasing the
reseller's incentive to promote the former than by decreasing his incen-
tive to promote the latter. As we saw in Part I, item (1) is also likely to
be substantial and positive when A and B are related inputs used in
variable proportions with each other. Thus, there can be no doubt
that in many situations non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins will be
able to increase their employer's returns without raising his profits by
reducing tied-product competition.
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In short, all functional types of tie-ins can raise their employers'
returns without increasing their profits by reducing tied-product com-
petition. Clearly, then, the inevitable leverage hypothesis cannot be
established by a kind of res ipsa loquitur argument derived from the
assertion that the profitability of such agreements depends on their
raising their employers' returns by reducing (tied-product) competition.
2. A Demonstration that Tie-ins Can Be Profitable (for Non-Leverage
Reasons) Without Concomitantly Reducing (Tied-Product) Com-
petition
I have now shown (1) that both seller and buyer-arranged tie-ins can
perform several functions other than reducing competition in the tied-
product market and (2) that the profitability of none of the various
types of tie-ins described depends on their increasing their employers'
returns by reducing tied-product or any other type of competition. Of
course, advocates of an inevitable leverage hypothesis could admit both
of these facts and still maintain that in practice all tie-ins always reduce
tied-product competition. However, although alternative explanations
of phenomena can never refute hypotheses concerning them, plausible
accounts do shift the burden of persuasion. As we have seen, the Court's
arguments cannot bear any such burden. In fact, regardless of whether
we continue our present focus on (1) the effect of the individual tie-in
actually executed or shift our focus to (2) the impact of allowing all
competitors for the patronage of the buyer in question (Y) to enter
into tie-ins with him, the inevitable leverage hypothesis must be re-
jected-even if it is restricted (as the Court at least claims to have
done) to situations in which the tie-in actually executed involves a seller
(X) who would have a competitive advantage when marketing at least
one of the products (A or B) concerned to the buyer in question (if nei-
ther he nor his opponents could offer this buyer a tie-in agreement).
As we have seen, on our current interpretation, the Court's restricted
inevitable leverage hypothesis asserts that every profitable individual
tie-in executed by a seller who would have been best-placed to make an
independent sale to Y of at least one of the products concerned must
reduce the intensity of (price-variable-input tied-product) competition
for that buyer's patronage. Unfortunately, even this restricted version
of the inevitable leverage hypothesis must be rejected: indeed, even if
we grant that (price-variable-input) competition will be decreased by
any event that increases the competitive advantage that some seller has
when dealing with a particular buyer (i.e., even if we agree to measure
the intensity of such competition for any buyer Y's patronage according
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to the profits his best-placed supplier could have earned by obtaining
his patronage on terms equally attractive to Y as those he actually re-
ceived), 9 a profitable tie-in executed by a seller who would have been
best-placed to sell A and/or B independently to Y may not reduce such
competition, for such sellers would often not have been best-placed if
they had been forbidden to use tie-ins while one or more of their
competitors had been allowed to arrange such agreements.
Thus, even if X would be best-placed to sell both A and B inde-
pendently if neither he nor his competitors could use a tie-in, he might
very well have to operate from a position of competitive inferiority if
he were forbidden to use tie-ins in a situation in which at least some
of his competitors for Y's patronage were allowed to arrange profitable
tying agreements. In fact, although we are now assuming that X would
have an advantage on independent sales of both A and B to Y, X might
even be in a competitively inferior position if he (and at least some of
his competitors) were allowed to enter into tie-ins with Y, for such an
agreement may be less advantageous for him than for one or more of
the other suppliers in question.
Clearly, then, a decision to allow a firm in X's position to tie his
sale of A and B to Y will not always decrease competition for Y's patron-
age by increasing the competitive advantage of the firm(s) best placed
to serve him. This result should be obvious for those cases in which X
would not be best placed even if he could use a tie-in, for in such
situations the tie-in can only have increased competition by making it
more likely that X would undercut Y's best-placed supplier. Indeed,
competition could even have been increased by a tie-in that did leave
X best placed to supply Y, for X's margin over his nearest competitor(s)
when he is allowed to employ a tie-in might still be smaller than its
counterpart for the firm that would have been best placed had X been
forbidden to execute such an agreement with Y. Accordingly, even if
we adopt the Court's most recent version of its hypothesis-that is, its
restriction of its hypothesis to tie-ins involving sellers who would have
been best placed to sell independently at least one of the goods involved
to the buyer concerned-the inevitable leverage hypothesis must be
rejected in its application to the individual tie-in actually executed.
Nor will this hypothesis fare any better if its focus is shifted to the
impact of allowing all suppliers of a particular buyer to offer him tying
agreements (even if it is restricted to those cases in which the actual
tying seller would have been best placed to supply this buyer with at
'89. I will in fact adopt this standard in the text that follows.
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least one of the products involved on an independent basis). In fact,
the argument against the inevitable leverage hypothesis holds a fortiori
in this case, for the availability of tying agreements to the actual tying
seller (X) and his competitors may even have deteriorated X's position
since such agreements may have been more profitable for them than for
him.
In short, our analysis suggests that there are no good reasons for
believing the inevitable leverage hypothesis to be true and very good
reasons for believing it to be false. Thus, whether or not it is restricted
to tie-ins that involve a unique tying product, a seller who dominates
the tying-product market, and/or a seller who enjoys a competitive ad-
vantage when marketing the tying product to the buyer in question,
both premises and all variants of the conclusion of the leverage theory
simply cannot bear analysis. The legality of such agreements must there-
fore be re-examined.
III. Tie-ins and the American Antitrust Laws
A. The Relevant Standard of Legality
1. The General Focus: Competitive Impact
In what follows, I am going to analyze the legality of tie-ins under the
relevant American antitrust laws-viz., § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 1
of the Sherman Act-assuming that the statutes in question obligate the
courts to focus on the competitive impact of such agreements. Section 3
of the Clayton Antitrust Act refers to "competition" explicitly and there
is considerable evidence that the framers of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act intended to make competitive impact crucial there as well. As you
will notice, I will usually not discuss the Court's position on the various
interpretive issues with which this section on the relevant standard of
legality is concerned. For the most part, such omissions reflect the fact
that the Court has not taken any position on these issues, being unaware
of both the inconsistencies among the various tests it says it employs and
the various sorts of ambiguities the statutes themselves contain.
I want to make it clear at the outset that my decision to focus on the
competitive effect of tie-ins does not rest on any assumption that the
competitive impact test is the best that could be chosen for the regula-
tion of such agreements or indeed of any of the other types of contracts,
combinations, or activities governed by the American antitrust laws-
that is, I want to make it clear at the outset that I do not believe that the
social desirability of any tie-in (or merger for that matter) depends on
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whether its execution will reduce competition in one or more of its
aspects. I also want to make it clear that I realize that the Court seems
at times to be applying a different sort of test in tie-in cases-viz., a test
that would make the legality of such agreements depend primarily on
whether they give the sellers they involve an "unfair" competitive
advantage (i.e., on whether they improve these sellers' competitive
positions in their [tied-product] dealings with the buyers involved with-
out improving their social efficiency).90 It should be noted that although
the Court may not realize this fact, such an "unfair" competition test
would produce substantially different results from a test that focused on
the competitive effect of the agreements in question.
I should like to emphasize as well that my selection of the competitive
effect focus is also not based on any belief in its social superiority to the
"unfair" competition test just described. In fact, if I could put aside my
virtually conclusive doubts about the desirability of regulating tie-ins
at all, I would probably find such an "unfair" competition test the more
desirable of the two, if it were properly applied.91 In short, I am em-
ploying a competitive effect criterion because I think the statutes
obligate the courts to employ such a test and not because I would sup-
port its being adopted by a legislature.92 For those who disagree (1)
with my assumption about the intent of the framers, (2) with my im-
plied standards for statutory interpretation, and/or (3) with my evalua-
tion of the desirability of the courts' exceeding their authorization in
the cases at hand, as well as for those who are merely curious, an
analysis of the permissibility of tie-ins under the type of unfair com-
petition test I have just described has been included in Appendix B.
2. The Rubric's Content
Obviously, the focus I have just adopted is not sufficiently specific-
that is, I have not yet established what sort of a reduction in what sort
of competition the statute proscribes. Since the Clayton Act seems to be
far more specific, I will try to establish these conditions by focusing
on its language rather than on the Sherman Act's reference to "con-
tracts... in restraint of trade." Unfortunately, even the Clayton Act's
test-lessening competition in any line of commerce in any section of
90. The permissibility of tie-ins under such an "unfair competition" test is analyzed
in Appendix B infra.
91. The rationale for this conclusion is delineated in Appendix C infra.
92. I should probably add that I also think that the difference between the "welfare"
effects of the two tests is probably too small for me to believe that a court ought to exceed
its authorization in such cases.
244
Vol. 80: 195, 1970
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory
the country-does not give us much help in this regard. Indeed, in a
significant proportion of those cases in which tie-ins may reduce some
aspect of competition, there will be no non-arbitrary way of determin-
ing whether a particular tie-in that has changed conditions in some
known manner has violated the Clayton Act's terms. In part, this
difficulty arises from the fact that the statute would produce results that
are unfair, inconsistent with other legislation, and economically un-
desirable if it were interpreted literally so as to authorize the Court to
investigate the impact of allowing the individual seller engaged in
the tie-in under investigation to enter into such an agreement with the
buyer in question rather than to investigate the impact of allowing
all prospective suppliers of this customer to enter into such an agree-
ment with him; in part, from the fact that the concepts of variable-
input competition, investment competition, and overall competition or
competition on balance for a buyer's patronage are themselves opera-
tionally ambiguous; and in part, from the Clayton Act's failure to
specify the respect in which competition must not be reduced.
According to its literal terms, the Clayton Act would seem to autho-
rize the courts to adjudicate the legality of individual tie-ins by determin-
ing whether competition would be decreased by a decision allowing the
seller they involve (X) to enter into such an agreement with the buyer
concerned (Y). In practice, such an authorization would obligate the
courts to grant or deny the right to employ tie-ins to offset or undercut
the legitimately obtained and otherwise unimpeachable advantages of
established firms to deal with particular buyers-that is, would obligate
the courts to use tie-ins to operate a parimutual system 93 handicapping
their potential employers, for since-as we shall see-the intensity of
price-variable input competition for a particular buyer's patronage will
be inversely related to the size of the competitive advantage of the
seller who is best placed to deal with him, the competitive impact of
an individual seller's tie-in (examined in isolation) will depend on his
original comipetitive position. Accordingly, even if giving all potential
suppliers of a particular buyer the right to arrange tie-ins with the
customer in question would not increase the competitive advantage of
the best-placed seller over any of his competitors (even where, for
example, such agreements would be equally profitable to him and his
competitors), the best-placed seller's tie-in could still violate the literal
terms of the statute while his competitors' would not, for his would
reduce competition for the patronage of the particular buyer involved
93. The phrase is Professor Baxter's.
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by raising his competitive advantage while theirs would increase com-
petition by lowering his advantage. Clearly, however, such a policy
would be both unfair and likely to misallocate resources (since it would
reduce the probability that the firm that is socially best placed to supply
Y would actually obtain his patronage). In any case, such a policy would
be at least somewhat inconsistent with another provision of the Clayton
Act that also relates to tying agreements-Section 2, which regulates
price discrimination, for this section would seem to allow a firm that
enjoyed a competitive advantage to use a tie-in to increase the profit-
ability of price discrimination so long as the discrimination resulted
from a good faith attempt to meet the offers of other competitors who
would presumably also be employing tying agreements. For these
reasons, then, I will proceed on the assumption that when the Clayton
Act speaks of "the effect of a tie-in on competition," it is really referring
to the effect of allowing all prospective suppliers of a particular buyer
to enter into a tying agreement with him. Correlatively, when investi-
gating competitive impact, I will focus on the consequences of allowing
all competitors for a particular buyer's patronage to enter into tying
agreements with him.
Unfortunately, however, even if we had no doubts about the focus or
coverage of the decision whose competitive impact we were to investi-
gate, the legality of many tie-ins could not be resolved on the basis of
information concerning their positive effects. As we have already noted,
at least in part, this conclusion can be attributed to the fact that the
intensity of each type of competition could be measured in ways that
differ sufficiently from each other so that the actual definition selected
would in some cases determine whether a given event had increased or
decreased the intensity of competition as defined. However, since I in-
tend to examine this problem elsewhere in some detail, I will assume
here that allowing all competitors for a particular buyer's patronage to
enter into tying agreements with him will always affect the intensity
of each type of competition unambiguously. In particular, in the text
that follows, I will assume (1) that whenever the availability of tie-ins
increases the short-run94 profits the best-placed seller or sellers of some
good or goods could or would earn by matching the offer some buyer
actually would accept95 under the conditions in question, such agree-
94. By "short-run," I refer to the period before industry investment adjusts.
95. For example, this will occur whenever the short-run profits the best-placed seller
for arranging a tie-in with Y on A and B could or would earn by inducing Y to accept
a tie-in equally attractive as the agreement Y would actually make if tie-ins were allowed
(or more generally raises the sum of these profits and those that would be realized by
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ments can be unambiguously said to have decreased the intensity of
price-variable-input competition and (2) that whenever the availability
of tie-ins increases the long-run rate of return realized by the firms
participating in the industry in question, such agreements can be
unambiguously said to have decreased investment competition.
Unfortunately, however, even on this assumption, several ambiguities
remain. As I have already noted, § 3 of the Clayton Act proscribes all
tie-ins that seem reasonably likely to lessen competition96 in any line of
commerce in any section of the country. To see why and how this cri-
terion would still be ambiguous even on our assumptions, I need
only delineate the different ways in which the availability of tie-ins
could reduce competition in one respect without reducing it in some
other. For our purposes, it will be useful to distinguish at least seven
different aspects of competition: (1) price-variable input or investment
competition for the patronage of one buyer; (2) competition "on
balance" for the patronage of one buyer; (3) competition on balance
within a given geographic segment of some market; (4) competition
throughout a given geographic segment of some market; (5) competition
on balance within some market; (6) competition throughout a given
market; or (7) competition on balance in the economy as a whole.
Significantly, regardless of the way in which the various balances in
question are struck, a tie-in could reduce any aspect of competition
placed higher in this list without reducing any placed lower. Thus, since
the availability of tie-ins could decrease price-variable input competi-
tion and increase investment competition for the patronage of some
the firm that would supply #1 and hence Y with B under the tie-in where the #1 in
question does not produce this good himself) exceed the sum of the profits the best-placed
firm or firms for making independent sales of A and B to Y could or would earn by
matching the offers Y actually would accept if tie-ins were prohibited.
96. In economics, the term "competition" refers to the process of rivalry between two
or more business enterprises to secure the patronage of one or more prospective buyers.
In the most general case, sellers will be able to compete for the patronage of a particular
buyer in three different ways: (1) by lowering their lump-sum fees and/or their unit prices
-i.e., by engaging in price competition; (2) by increasing the quantity and/or quality of
their variable inputs-i.e., by engaging in variable input competition; and (3) by in-
creasing the quantity and/or quality of the fixed inputs they use when selling their
products-i.e., by engaging in fixed input or investment competition (a) by increasing
their capacity (and hence average speed of service where demand fluctuates through time),
(b) by increasing the number and/or improving the location of their distributive outlets
(and hence reducing the average time their customers have to travel to purchase their
goods or services), (c) by increasing the physical attractiveness of their distributive outlets
at the cost of raising their fixed investment per unit of distributive capacity, and/or
(d) by increasing the number or attractiveness of their product variants at the cost of
raising their average research, design, and/or fixed promotion costs. For most analytic
purposes, it is useful to combine the first two types of competition described above.
In what follows, I will adopt this practice and refer to price-variable input competition
on the one hand and investment competition on the other.
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buyer or vice versa, 7 allowing such agreements could reduce (1) with-
out reducing even (2) much less (3) through (7) and since the
availability of tie-ins could reduce competition for the patron-
age of some buyers in a given market and increase the intensity of
competition for the patronage of other buyers in the same or in a
different market,98 a decision to permit such agreements could reduce
(2) without reducing (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7); (3), without reducing
(4), (5), (6) or (7); (4), without reducing (5), (6), or (7); (5), without
reducing (6) or (7); or (6) without reducing (7). Accordingly, in at least
some cases, the legality of entering into tie-ins with a particular buyer or
buyers will depend on which of these seven aspects of competition is
decided to be crucial under the statute. Unfortunately, the statute itself
is not very helpful in this regard. Under the most literal interpretation
of the statute's language, (3) [or (4) if "in" is thought to imply
"throughout"] would probably be the critical aspect but this result
seems inconsistent with what I take to be the concern underlying the
antitrust laws in general and the other relevant statute (the Sherman
Act) dealing with tie-ins in particular-that is, that tie-ins and other
agreements and practices might reduce the competitiveness of the
economy. On this basis, (7) would seem to be crucial: the use of tie-ins
would be proscribed only if their availability reduced the competitive-
ness of the whole economy on balance. But clearly this result does not
follow from the language of § 3. Admittedly, several of the distinctions
I have just delineated may not be very important empirically. As we
shall see, however, at least one may very well be crucial in many cases.
In particular, since the anti-competitive impact that a decision allowing
tie-ins to be used with a particular buyer or buyers could have will
usually be restricted to the rivalry for a limited number of buyers'
patronage, the legality of such agreements may depend on whether
§ 3s proscription relates to tie-ins that reduce competition throughout
97. For example, a tie-in (or the use of tie-ins by the established firms in a particular
market) might increase price-variable input competition by reducing the competitive ad-
vantage of the best-placed firms to deal with particular customers (when such agreements
tend-for no related reason-to be more profitable for second-best placed firms than for
best-placed firms) and simultaneously reduce investment competition by raising barriers
to entry (because tie-ins happen to be more profitable for the established firms than for
potential entrants into the market in question). For a fuller explanation of these pos.
sibilities, see section III B. 1. infra.
98. Thus, a tie-in that produced a change in the firm that was best placed to deal
with a particular customer might increase competition for his patronage (if the advantage
of the new best-placed firm were smaller than the advantage previously enjoyed by the
firm he replaced) while reducing competition for the patronage of some other buyer
in the same market (if the displaced firm had previously been second best placed in
regard to the latter and the shift in position induced the displaced firm to leave the
market in question).
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a given market (whatever that means) rather than to tie-ins that reduce
competition on balance to any extent in a given market (whatever that
means).
Only one problem remains to be discussed. Unlike its predecessors,
this difficulty has been noted before by both the commentators and the
courts-though solely in the context of § 7's anti-merger provision. Ac-
cording to its literal text, § 3 proscribes all tie-ins that reduce competi-
tion in its relevant aspect (1) regardless of whether this reduction is
caused by the tie-in's ability to increase the social efficiency of its em-
ployer and (2) presumably regardless of whether this improvement in
social efficiency (and/or associated reduction in private costs) outweighs
the tie-in's anti-competitive impact so that the tie-in is itself more at-
tractive to the buyer involved than the untied offer it replaced. Since,
as we have seen (and as I discuss in more detail in Appendix B),
many tie-ins operate primarily by improving their employer's social
efficiency, the literalness with which § 3 is interpreted may determine
the legality of a significant proportion of the few cases in which the
availability of such agreements may reduce the intensity of competition.
In § 7 cases, the Court has adopted the literal interpretation of the text
just described, justifying its action with the argument that Congress
foresaw the possibility that economies of scale might not be obtained
without sacrificing competition and decided to opt for the latter in
cases of conflict.90 In fact, nothing indicates that Congress ever foresaw
this possibility, but even if we grant the Court's conclusion in § 7 cases,
§ 3 cases may still be distinguishable on two grounds, each of which
relates to the fact that the social economies that tie-ins generate are not
economies of scale-viz., (1) on the ground that a less anti-competitive
but equally efficient means of achieving the same economies is more
likely to be available in § 7 horizontal'00 merger cases (internal expan-
sion'01) than in § 3 tie-in cases and (2) on the ground that since the
99. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294, 316 (1962), citing inter alia
at n.28 Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
100. This argument applies most readily to horizontal mergers since unlike their
vertical and conglomerate counterparts, they would often be anti-competitive even if no
social efficiency resulted. Although it is true that the Court made its pronouncements on
efficiency in a vertical integration case, it was dearly operating on the largely mistaken
assumption that vertical integration was also likely to be anti-competitive for reasons
unrelated to social efficiency.
101. This alternative is likely to be especially viable when demand is increasing.
The fact that the merging firm has chosen to achieve the economies in question through
merger rather than through internal expansion does not suggest that the social economies
could not have been achieved equally efficiently by the latter method since, as I havejust noted, the merger would produce additional private benefits by concentrating the
market still further.
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social economies produced by tie-ins are not usually scale economies
they are less likely to reduce competition in the long run. In short,
there are good reasons for treating § 3 differently from § 7 in this regard
-that is, for adopting a non-literal interpretation of § 3. However,
as I have already indicated, in what follows, I will analyze the legality of
tie-ins on the assumption that the intensity of price-variable input
competition should be measured according to the best-placed seller's
matching profits-even where an increase in such profits is not ac-
companied by a decrease in the buyer's real income and/or is caused
by an increase in the seller's social efficiency. 102
B. The Impact of the General Availability or Tie-ins on the Intensity
of Competition for the Patronage of One of More Individual Buyers
Of course, the analysis I have just completed would not be necessary
if making tie-ins available to all competitors for a particular buyer's
patronage could never reduce the extent of business rivalry for his or
someone else's business. In fact, however, although allowing tie-ins will
usually not reduce competition in any respect,103 the general availability
of such agreements may have such an effect in a number of specific
situations. In this section, I will first describe the general processes by
which the availability of tie-ins of all descriptions can reduce the in-
tensity of price-variable input and/or investment competition for the
patronage of one or more buyers. I will then analyze the possible anti-
competitive consequences of allowing all prospective suppliers of a
particular buyer to employ the various functional types of tie-ins we
have already delineated.
102. One other problem deserves some consideration. The competitive effect of an
individual tie-in will usually be limited to the rivalry for the patronage of one or a very
limited number of customers. If each individual tie-in is judged separately, none might
therefore violate the statute if some de minimus criterion were applied even if all of
the tie-ins executed by the sellers in question would affect competition for a large enough
volume of sales to violate the statute's (assumed) terms. Accordingly, in the text that
follows, I will assume that a group of sellers' tie-ins--like an individual seller's mergers-
can be analyzed collectively under the relevant antitrust acts. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318, n.32 (1962).
103. I continue to assume that the antitrust laws do not authorize the courts to offset
legal competitive advantages by denying the right to use tie-ins to some competitors while
granting it to others in situations in which such agreements would not be more profitable
for the former than for the latter. If a contrary assumption were made, all profitable
tie-ins arranged with buyers in relation to whom the seller in question enjoys a com-
petitive advantage would probably tend to decrease the intensity of price-variable input
competition for the patronage of the buyer concerned.
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1. The Competitive04 Impact of Allowing Tie-ins to Be Executed
with a Particular Buyer: A General Analysis of Processes and Cir-
cumstances
a. The General Availability of Tie-ins and Price-Variable-Input
Competition
As we shall see, allowing all prospective suppliers of a particular
buyer (or buyers) to employ tie-ins may reduce the intensity of price-
variable input competition either directly by changing the relative
positions of one or more established firms in their dealings with
particular customers or indirectly by reducing the intensity of invest-
ment competition in some individual market-that is, or indirectly, con-
comitant to their reducing the number of product variants or the speed
of service offered consumers and perhaps the number of sellers operating
in some market as well. Since the possible impact of allowing sellers to
employ tie-ins on the intensity of investment competition will be ex-
plored in its own right in a subsequent section, I will confine myself
here to investigating the circumstances and ways in which the general
availability of such agreements can reduce price-variable input competi-
tion directly and in the short run by improving the competitive position
of the best-placed firm to deal with a particular customer.
For expositional reasons, I will deal in the first instance with the case
in which allowing all prospective suppliers to enter into a tie-in with a
particular buyer will improve the competitive position of the firm that
is best placed (henceforth #1) to deal with this customer (henceforth
Y1) by increasing his competitive advantage over some effective estab-
lished competitor for that buyer's patronage-that is, over some com-
petitor who seems likely either (a) to induce #1 to offer YI a more attrac-
tive price-variable input combination by posing a threat of undercutting
and/or (b) to actually undercut the offer of the best-placed firm in
question-without decreasing his advantage over any other of his com-
petitive inferiors. I will divide this subsection into two parts. In the
first, I will demonstrate that the intensity of price-variable input com-
petition will be reduced by any event that increases #1's competitive
advantage over some competitive inferior (#y) and in the second, I
will show that a decision allowing tie-ins to be executed with a partic-
ular buyer or buyers may in some situations increase the competitive
advantage of some such #1.
104. I continue to assume that tie-ins that reduce competition in any respect can be
classified as "anti-competitive" under § 3.
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(1) The Intensity of Price-Variable-Input Competition and the Ab-
solute Advantage of the Best-Placed Firm Over Any Competitor
of Given Rank
In general, the actual margin that #1 will try to obtain will be in-
versely related to the probability that any given offer will induce one
or more of his competitors (#2 .. .N) to try to undercut him. Each such
competitor will decide whether or not to undercut by comparing the
immediate profits he can realize by beating #1's offer to the customer in
question with the certainty equivalent long-run costs #1's concomitant
retaliation will impose on him. Accordingly, the general availability of
tie-ins may reduce the competitive influence of established competitors
either by lowering the immediate returns they will realize by stealing a
customer from #1 and/or by increasing the retaliation costs some mem-
ber of the set #2.. .N will have to reckon with sustaining if he does try
to steal one of #1's customers.
In practice, whenever making tie-ins available to all possible suppliers
of a particular customer will increase the best-placed firm's'0 5 competi-
tive advantage over one or more of his competitors for some buyer's
(henceforth Yl's) patronage, a decision legalizing such agreements will
tend to reduce this competitor's contribution to competition in both
these ways. First and most obviously, such a decision will reduce com-
petition by lowering the immediate profits the disadvantaged competitor
(#y) can earn by undercutting any offer of given profitability to Xl-
that is, by reducing the probability that any offer of given profitability he
makes to Y1 will be undercut (by #y).10 6 Second, though perhaps less
obviously, such a decision will also reduce competition by increasing
the retaliation costs #y (and in some circumtances all or some other
members of set #2. . .N as well) 07 will have to reckon with sustaining
whenever he (or they) do undercut #1's offer to YI. Indeed, in some
circumstances, allowing tie-ins to be executed by all such suppliers may
105. The firm in question need not be best placed with regard to any other customers
than the one with which we are specifically concerned.
106. The importance of this tendency will be directly related to the amount by which
the tie-in has increased #1's advantage over #y and inversely related to the number of
firms who are at a smaller disadvantage than #y on Yl (since the smaller this number,
the greater the probability that #y would undercut #I's offer to Y1 in circumstances
in which no other member of set #2... N would have done so-i.e., the greater the
extent to which the tie-in would reduce the risk that any given offer of #1's would be
undercut).
107. This increase in #1's incentive to retaliate against #y may even conceivably
raise the retaliation costs other members of #2.. .N must expect as well if they undercut
#1's offer to Yl. By increasing the profitability of retaliating against his average under-
cutter, such a tie-in will also increase the probability that #1 will investigate any possible
instance of undercutting.
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also affect the retaliation costs associated with #y's or anyone else's
undercutting #1's offers to the other customers (Y2... M) whom #1 was
originally best-placed to serve. In part, this result reflects the tendency
of such agreements to increase #1's incentive to try to discover and
retaliate against competitive inferiors who undercut his offer to YL and
in part, their tendency to increase his ability to detect such secret price
cuts to Y1 and in some cases to Y2.. .M as well.
Let's examine each of these possibilities in turn. First, even if making
tie-ins available in this situation would not affect #1's ability to identify
undercutting competitive inferiors, its assumed tendency to deteriorate
#y's position would increase #1's incentive to engage in retaliation (1)
by increasing the future returns that any amount of deterrence would
generate and/or (2) by raising the extent to which any given amount of
retaliation would deter future undercutting by #y-that is, by reducing
the amount of (costly) retaliation #1 will have to engage in to secure
any amount of future profits from future undercutting by firms in #y's
relative competitive position.
Thus, to the extent that the deterioration in #y's position induces
#1 to raise his present and future prices to Y1, it will also raise the
future profits he can expect to realize by deterring such competition
from firms in #y's relative competitive position in the future. And to
the extent that the associated increase in #1's present and future prices
to Y1 is smaller than the increase in his competitive advantage over
#y, the availability of tie-ins to all Yl's suppliers will raise the prob-
ability that any amount of retaliation will succeed (through posing a
threat of a similar amount of retaliation to future price cutting) by
lowering the immediate profits #y will be able to realize by undercut-
ting #1's offer to YI. Admittedly, neither of these arguments indicates
that allowing a tie-in to be executed with Y1 in these circumstances
will necessarily increase the effectiveness of marginal acts of retaliation
but since many of the costs of retaliating do not increase with the extent
of such behavior, our analysis does suggest that the type of tie-in with
which we are concerned will increase the probability that #1 will find
retaliation on any scale profitable at all-that is, will increase the
probability that #1 will in fact retaliate. Accordingly, even if a de-
cision that deteriorated #'s position by allowing him and his competi-
tors to enter into tie-ins with Yl could not affect #1's ability to detect
secret price cutting, it would tend to raise the amount of retaliation
costs #y should expect to bear if he engages in such activities. Such an
increase will obviously reduce independently the probability that #y
will try to undercut any given offer #1 makes Y1 and will therefore
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tend to raise the actual margin #1 tries to achieve on this account as
well.
Of course, as I have already suggested, whenever a decision to allow
Yl to enter into tie-ins involving products A and B increases his best-
placed supplier's competitive advantage over some firm #y, it will also
increase #1's ability to detect secret price cutting. Thus, in those few
cases in which the general availability of tie-ins to Yl's prospective
suppliers increases substantially #1's advantage over his closest competi-
tor for Yl's patronage (#2), legalizing such agreements will tend to in-
crease the retaliation costs anyone who cuts prices to Yl should antic-
ipate by increasing #1's ability to infer undercutting by competitive
inferiors from the mere fact that he has lost Yl's patronage, for the
larger #1's competitive advantage over any other competitor, the lower
the probability that a spontaneous change in taste could deprive him
of his best-placed position for dealing with Yl. Obviously, this rela-
tionship will result in the availability of such tie-in's deterring under-
cutting by #2 regardless of the ease with which #1 can identify Yl's
new supplier. And to the extent that this identification is costly, the
retaliation costs #3.. .N should expect to incur will be increased as well
(since the deterioration in #2's position will make #1 suspicious if they
steal Yl from him-that is, will make it less likely that #1 will mistake
undercutting by some member of #3.. .N for a taste shift by Y1 that
left #2 best placed to deal with him).
Admittedly, however, a firm that considers itself to be best placed
with regard to a particular customer will not generally be able to infer
undercutting by competitive inferiors merely from the loss of this
buyer's patronage, for in most cases spontaneous changes in taste are too
likely to be responsible for such a shift. But this fact does not undermine
our conclusion, for the efficiency of the process through which best-
placed sellers discover price cutting will also be improved by a deteriora-
tion in any effective competitor's position.
As I have just noted, sellers will not usually be able to infer under-
cutting from the loss of a former customer. Nor will the type of firm
with which we are dealing usually have direct evidence of such behavior,
for (1) since individual bargains are the norm in the type of situation
with which we are dealing, undercutters need not and will not make
their price concessions openly and (2) since a buyer who has a reputa-
tion for revealing the offers he receives (in the hope of obtaining a still
better offer from his original supplier) will be unlikely to obtain con-
cessions in the future (since the retaliation costs a prospective under-
cutter must expect will increase to the extent that he anticipates that
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his competition will be revealed), the recipient of the price cut will be
unlikely to reveal the terms he has received as well. Accordingly, in the
situations with which we are dealing, best-placed sellers will usually
have to rely on circumstantial evidence to discover undercutting and
identify the firm that is undercutting them. Normally, such sellers will
be able to obtain the circumstantial evidence in question by establishing
through experience probability distribution estimates (1) of the repeat
sales they would expect to make to old customers, (2) of the initial sales
they would expect to make to buyers who have newly entered the
market, and (3) of the initial sales they would expect to make to former
customers of their competitors (whose tastes have changed in their favor)
if no undercutting took place-that is, if they obtained the patronage
of all customers in relation to whom they were in the best competitive
position. Each of these estimates will be uncertain, for although the
seller will realize that he would lose some of his former customers
(through spontaneous changes in taste, etc., that would place him at a
competitive disadvantage) even if no price cutting took place, he will
not be able to predict just how many such changes would occur spon-
taneously during the period in question. However, if his sales drop
sufficiently, the firm will be able to infer the existence of secret price-
cutting by competitive inferiors since he will know that the probability
that he would lose so many customers without such price cutting having
taken place is very low. Naturally, any such firm will also be able to
draw the same kind of inference from information concerning its sales
to new buyers in the market and to former customers of its competitors
or better still from information concerning all such potential cus-
tomers. 08 Of course, in the most general case (in which the seller in
question does not automatically know to whom he has lost particular
customers), he will still have to identify the competitor who has been
engaging in secret price cutting, but often the necessity of doing so will
not make retaliation unprofitable.1 9 In fact, in many cases the seller
will at least be able to determine who is now supplying his former
customers at virtually no additional expense. This will be the case in
many of the situations with which we will be concerned since, as we
have seen, tie-ins often involve branded products and buyers who are
contacted at their place of business by seller's representatives. Accord-
108. For the original, excellent discussion of this subject, see Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44-61 (1964).
109. This is especially true since #1 need not try to identify his customer's new sup-
pliers (i.e., the price cutter) until after he ascertains that it is very possible that some
competitor has been undercutting him.
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ingly, any event that increases the ability of best-placed sellers to infer
the existence of secret price cutting from the type of evidence just de-
scribed will tend to reduce competition by increasing the retaliation
costs #2.. .N will have to reckon with bearing.
Tie-ins that increase the competitive advantage of the best-placed
seller to deal with some customer Y1 over one of his effective competitors
for that buyer's patronage will have precisely this effect. As we have
seen, sellers like #1 will be able to discover undercutting by competitive
inferiors by comparing their actual customer losses with a probability
distribution estimate of the number of losses they would expect to
sustain if no undercutting were done by competitive inferiors. If their
old customers' new suppliers can be costlessly identified, such estimates
and the comparison in question will be made for each of their competi-
tors. If, however, the cost of identifying new suppliers is substantial,
aggregate (for all customers) sales data, sales estimates, and comparisons
will be collected and made respectively. In either case, the relevant
probability distribution can be drawn with the probability of the best-
placed firm's losing his position on a given number of customers on
the vertical axis and the number of customers in question on the
horizontal axis. Assuming as we do that the probability of any given
change in taste will be inversely related to its amplitude, the type of
tie-in with which we are concerned will clearly shift the curves in
question down all along the X-axis by lowering the probability that the
deteriorated firm will be converted into the best-placed firm for the
buyer in question by a spontaneous alteration in the latter's taste. In
order to determine the effect of such a shift, let NB and NAC stand for the
greatest number of customers #1 can lose without his suspicion being
aroused before and after the tie-in is executed; Ns stand for the number
of customers actually stolen; and Pg and PN stand for the probability
that spontaneous changes in taste would deprive #1 of his best-placed
position in relation to any given number of customers before and
after the tie-in is executed. Obviously, the probability that #y in the
first case or #2.. .N in the second will be able to steal any given number
of customers from #1 without the latter's suspicion's being aroused
equals the probability that the number of spontaneous changes in his
position will be less than or equal to No - Ns. Accordingly, before the
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on the other hand, after the tie-in in question, the probability in ques-
tion will be
r-Ns PdN.
We have just seen that tie-ins that deteriorate the relative position of #2
will reduce the probability of any given number of natural defections.
Accordingly, NO > No (since the tie-in will reduce the probability that
any given number of losses could have occurred spontaneously) and
PN > PN. Clearly, then,
B AfNc-Ns PNdN > fNc-,Ns PAdN
for any Ns. Stated another way, the tie-in will reduce the probability
that any given number of the customers for whom a seller is best placed
can be stolen from him without his suspicion being aroused. Accord-
ingly, tie-ins that increase #1's competitive advantage over #2 will tend
to reduce competition by increasing the retaliation costs non-best-placed
competitors will expect to incur if they undercut #1 through raising
#1's ability to infer the existence of price cutting from circumstancial
evidence. It should be emphasized that whenever the cost to #1 of
determining who is now supplying his former customers is sufficiently
high to induce him to use an aggregate distribution, this tendency will
affect the incentive to undercut all members of #2.. .N and not just of
#y and that the decrease in incentive will in any case relate not only
to the particular customer in relation to whom #y's position has been
deteriorated (YI) but to all customers for whom #1 is best placed and #y
is in a position to deal.
In short, whenever the general availability of tie-ins increases #1's
advantage over any effective competitor, a decision allowing such an
agreement to be executed with a particular buyer will increase the
retaliation costs the disadvantaged competitor and perhaps all others
as well will have to expect both by increasing #1's ability to detect
secret price cutting and by raising the probability that #1 will retaliate
against any price cutter he does identify.110 Accordingly, the availability
110. Such tie-ins will not generally increase #1's ability to identify which of his
competitors is actually undercutting him once he has determined that some competitive
inferior has engaged in secret price cutting. In fact, such agreements will normally have
no practical effect on this ability whatsoever, for when the type of sellers with which
I am concerned-viz., sellers who make large individual sales-suspect that they are being
undercut by competitive inferiors, they will usually identify the culprit by determining
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of tie-ins in such circumstances will reduce the long-run profitability of
undercutting by the affected firms even more than it reduces the short-run
returns they can realize by engaging in such activities. To the extent,
then, that a decision allowing tie-ins to be executed with a particular
buyer YI deteriorates any effective though inferior competitor's posi-
tion, it will reduce competition for at least Yl's patronage and perhaps
for Y2. . .M's patronage as well' 1 both directly by lowering the im-
mediate returns the deteriorated firms can earn by undercutting #1
and indirectly by increasing the retaliation costs that firm and perhaps
all other members of #2...N as well will have to reckon with incurring
when considering undercutting #1's offer to any of the buyers in ques-
tion." 2 Of course, as I have already noted, this result need not be con-
fined to situations in which a decision allowing a tie-in to be executed
with a particular buyer increases the competitive advantage of #1 over
some members of #2 .. .N and does not decrease his advantage over any
other. Thus, the above analysis will also apply where such a decision
improves #1's competitive position in dealings with Y1 on balance
who his former customers' new suppliers are. Admittedly, however, in some situations the
cost of obtaining such information may be sufficiently high to induce #1 to choose the
subject of his retaliation by educated guesswork. He may retaliate against the party who
seems most likely to be undercutting, particularly when one competitor seems far more
likely to be undercutting than his colleagues. Although corporate personality may affect
this matter as well, the likelihood that any given firm is the actual undercutter will un-
doubtedly be inversely related to the number of firms better situated to capture the
patronage of #1's lost customers. In general, #1 will not be able to single out one firm
as the actual undercutter unless some competitor is significantly better placed in relation
to these lost customers than any of #1's other rivals. Accordingly, the effect of any tie-in
on #1's ability to identify the actual undercutter will depend on whether it reduces or
increases the distance between the second-best-placed firm (whose actual identity may have
been changed by the tie-in) and his closest rivals for the patronage of the buyers in
question. Hence, to the extent that #1 does rely on such educated guesswork, tie-ins that
deteriorate the positions of #3 ... N will tend to increase #1's ability to identify under-
cutters while agreements that deteriorate #2's position will have a more uncertain effect.
111. In fact, tie-ins that improve the best-placed firm's competitive position on balance
may even reduce the intensity of competition for the patronage of customers for whom
that firm is not best placed by inducing other firms to exit (by lowering the profits they
will make on Yl ... M by undercutting from a position of competitive inferiority) and
thereby removing the competitive pressure they would have otherwise created in rivalry
for the patronage of the other buyers for whom they were effective though inferior
competitors (or for whom they were best placed in a ranking in which competition
between them and their inferiors would have been stronger than its counterpart for
their closest competitor and his inferiors). The exit of such a firm will also increase
competition for those customers for whom he was #1 if #2 ... N would have put more
pressure on him had he not exited than #3 ... N put on the original #2 (the new #1)
after the original #1's exit. Such tie-ins may also increase competition for the patronage
of such customers by inducing the best-placed firm to remain in business when it would
otherwise have exited by increasing the profits it can make in dealing with Y1... M.
112. One qualification is necessary. A tie-in that improves #1's competitive position on
Y1 may actually increase competition for the patronage of Y1 and Y2 ... M as well if
(1) #1 would otherwise have exited and (2) the competitive pressure #2 ... N place on
him is greater than the pressure that #3... N would place on the original #2 if the
original #1 did in fact exit.
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though it decreases his advantage over some competitive inferiors of
given rank.
(2) The General Availability of Tie-ins and the Absolute Advantage
of the Best-Placed Firm Over Any Competitor of Given Rank"'
In this subsection, I will investigate when and why a decision allow-
ing all prospective suppliers of a particular buyer to enter into tie-ins
with him may increase the competitive advantage the best-placed firm
enjoys over one or more of its competitive inferiors in dealings with the
buyer in question (Y)-that is, may increase the difference between
the returns #1 can earn by obtaining Yl's patronage on certain terms
and the profits one or more members of #2... N can realize by supply-
ing Y1 with the products in question (A and B) on terms equally
attractive to the latter. For expositional reasons, it will be useful to
divide the analysis into two parts. In the first, I will examine the
circumstances in which #1's competitive position will be improved by
the availability of tie-ins involving only one good that the sellers in
question produce in non-perfectly competitive markets; in the second,
the circumstances in which #1's position will be improved by the
availability of tying agreements involving at least two goods which some
of the sellers in question produce in non-perfectly competitive markets.
(a) #1's Position and the Availability of Tie-ins to All Prospective
Suppliers of a Particular Buyer where All the Sellers in Question
Produce Only One of the Goods in Question in a Non-Perfectly
Competitive Market"4
Under what circumstances, then, will the availability of tie-ins to
sellers who produce only one of the goods in question in a non-perfectly
competitive market increase the competitive advantage of the #1 firm
for a particular buyer's patronage over one or more if his competitive in-
feriors? As we shall see, the availability of such tie-ins may improve the
competitive position of the best-placed firm to supply (1) the buyer
directly involved in the agreement in question (Y1), (2) the possible
customers of that buyer (Zl... N), or (3) the possible customers of the
firms that either do supply Y1 with B indirectly through the tie-in or
113. "Rank" is used here to refer only to sellers' position in relation to one individual
buyer and not to "their positions in the market as a whole," however that expression may
be understood.
114. I will proceed by analyzing the competitive consequences of tie-ins that increase
#1's advantage over some of his inferiors without redudng his advantage over others.All of the results obtained may also apply in situations in which the availability of tie-ins
does reduce his advantage over some of his inferiors.
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would supply Y1 with B if Y1 were prohibited from entering into any
such agreements involving B.
Let's begin by analyzing when and how the availability of such agree-
ments will improve the competitive position of the firm or firms that
are best placed to supply Y1 with A. Since, as we have seen, profitable
tie-ins operate by enabling their employers to realize higher returns by
supplying Y1 with A and B under the agreement than they could have
earned by supplying this customer with either or both commodities
separately, such agreements can really be said to increase the profitabilty
of selling each by the same amount that it increases the profitability of
selling both. Accordingly, to the extent that for example the firm that
is best placed to sell A to Yl independently can increase its returns
through entering into a tie-in with Yl involving A and B by more
than one of its competitive inferiors on A can increase its returns by
entering into a similar agreement, the availability of such agreements
will improve the competitive position of the best-placed firm to supply
Yl with A.
Although, clearly, there is no reason to suppose that this result will
generally obtain, tie-ins will certainly be more profitable for #1 than
for various members of #2... N on some occasions. As we have seen,
the profitability of individual tie-ins depends at least in the first instance
on their performing one or more of the functions just described. Since
there is obviously no reason why these functions should be equally im-
portant for all the potential employers of the tie-ins, such agreements
need not be equally profitable for #1... N. Thus, since the demand
curve faced by one seller of a given product may be less suitable
for non-marginal cost pricing than its counterpart for suppliers of a
variant of this good, tie-ins that reduce the amount of transaction sur-
plus non-marginal cost pricing destroys by reducing unit sales may be
more profitable for him than for his competitors. Similarly, since the
importance of controlling the quality of complements may vary among
product variants, some members of #1.. .N may find it profitable to use
tie-ins to reduce the cost of such control in situations in which others do
not find it profitable to control the quality of their product's com-
plements at all. Examples could be multiplied, but the conclusion
should by now be obvious: the general availability of tie-ins may change
the relative positions of #1.. .N in their dealings with any given buyer.
Of course, as I have already indicated, there is no reason to suppose
that #1.. .N's ability to employ tie-ins will either always or even gen-
erally improve (either exclusively or on balance) the competitive posi-
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tion" 5 of the firm that is best placed-to deal with the customer in ques-
tion. However, there clearly will be cases in which this result does
obtain.
Of course, the availability of tie-ins may also increase the amount by
which one firm is best placed to serve a particular customer in situations
in which such agreements are not more profitable for the firm that
would be best placed to deal with this buyer in an independent transac-
tion involving the good in question. For example, the profitability of a
tie-in to some firm that would be a competitive inferior in an in-
dependent transaction might exceed the profitability of such an agree-
ment to the firm that would be #1 absent tie-ins by more than twice
the latter's original advantage over the former (in circumstances in
which the remaining firms would be no better placed in relation to the
firm that is #1 with tie-ins than they would have been in relation to the
firm that would have been #1 if tie-ins could not be used)."1 6 Once more,
examples could be multiplied-particularly if we concerned ourselves
with the more general case in which the general use of tie-ins could
reduce competition by shifting the relative positions of established firms
even where they did decrease the absolute disadvantage under which
one or more competitive inferiors were operating. However, these ad-
ditional possibilities do not alter our basic conclusion that although the
availability of tie-ins may sometimes increase the amount by which one
firm is best-placed to deal with a particular customer, this result will not
obtain more often than its opposite.
So far, I have restricted the analysis to the possibility that the general
availability of tie-ins to all competitors for a particular buyer's (Yl's)
patronage may affect the intensity of price-variable input competition
for that buyer's business by changing the relative competitive positions
of the sellers in question. In fact, however, the availability of such
agreements may also affect the intensity of price-variable input competi-
tion (independent of its impact on investment) for the patronage of
other groups of buyers. To begin with, regardless of whether we focus
on the effect of allowing tie-ins to be arranged with Yl on the one
hand or with Y.... N on the other, the availability of such agreements
115. Although #I's position should be unaffected on balance, his advantage over some
of his competitors will almost certainly be reduced if, as I would suppose, the relative
profitability of tie-ins for #1... N is uncorrelated with the relative positions they would
hold absent these agreements.
116. Tie-ins may decrease competition by changing the relative positions of established
competitors even when they do reduce the gap between #1 and one or more of his com-
petitors of given rank. The qualification contained in the text is therefore far too sim-
plistic for the actual purpose at hand.
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may affect the intensity of price-variable input competition for the pa-
tronage of those buyers for whom Y1 or Y... N respectively do or might
compete (ZI.. .N) by changing the relative prices Y1.. .N pay for A and B
and concomitantly (1) Y1.. .N's relative marginal costs, (2) their relative
competitive positions, and (3) the intensity of the price-variable input
competition they wage for Z1... N's patronage. Moreover, to the extent
that a decision to allow X to enter into tie-ins with certain buyers changes
the rate at which X, his competitors on A, his supplier of B, or Y's
untied supplier of B utilize their capacities, it may affect the marginal
or incremental cost to these sellers of supplying other buyers-and con-
comitantly the intensity of the price-variable input competition for the
patronage of such buyers as well. I will now examine each of these pos-
sibilities in turn.
As we have seen, to the extent that it changes Yl's competitive posi-
tion to sell to any of his prospective customers (Z1... N), a decision to
allow Yl's prospective suppliers to enter into tie-ins with him will affect
the intensity of the price-variable input competition for Z1. . .N's
patronage. In most cases, such a decision will tend to generate such an
effect by changing the unit prices Y1 pays for the A and B he purchases
and concomitantly the marginal cost to him of buying and reselling
these goods or of producing some other product with them. To be
specific, such a decision may bring about such a shift in unit prices and
marginal costs in five different and frequently offsetting ways: (1) by
enabling all of Yl's prospective suppliers to increase the attractiveness
of the terms they offer-and presumably inter alia and ceteris paribus to
reduce the unit prices of the goods involved-without reducing the
profitability of obtaining his patronage; (2) by decreasing or increasing
the profits his actual supplier earns on his purchases-and presumably
inter alia and ceteris paribus the unit prices he charges-by raising or
lowering the intensity of the price-variable input competition for his
patronage; (3) by increasing or decreasing the relative amount of lump-
sum prices he pays-and correlatively ceteris paribus by decreasing or
increasing the unit prices he pays; (4) by shifting the locus of the non-
marginal cost pricing to which he is subjected; and/or (5) by making
it profitable for his actual suppliers to discriminate in favor of or
against him or to violate a minimum or maximum price regulation that
relates to the transaction in question. Obviously, however, although the
change in Yl's position produced by these processes will no doubt reduce
the intensity of competition for the patronage of one or more of his
prospective customers on at least some occasions, there is no reason to
expect any general tendency in this direction. In fact, if we shift our
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focus-as we probably should-from the effect of allowing tie-ins to
be arranged with a particular buyer to the impact of allowing tie-ins to
be arranged with all buyers (Y... N) operating in a particular market,
the percentage of cases in which the availability of such agreements
throughout the market in question would reduce the intensity of price-
variable input competition for one of Yl. .. N's potential customers
would probably be quite low, for the first four processes described above
will usually have very similar effects on the absolute marginal costs of
all members of Yl... N who actually enter into tying agreements. For
this reason and for reasons of space as well, in all future discussions of
this subject, I will assume that the availability of tie-ins will affect the
intensity of the price-variable input competition for one or more of
Y's possible customers only if such agreements make it profitable for X
and/or his competitors to discriminate (or to increase the extent to
which he discriminates) in favor of or against Yl or to violate (or to
increase the extent to which he violates) minimum or maximum price
regulations that relate to his transactions. Put another way, I will as-
sume inter alia that when determining the impact of tie-ins on the
market in which Z... N buy from Y1... N, one should focus on the
consequences of allowing Xl... N to enter into such agreements with all
of their prospective customers.
As I have already suggested, the availability of tie-ins (either to all
suppliers of a particular buyer or to all suppliers of all buyers operating
in a particular market) may affect the marginal or incremental costs to
various sellers of supplying one or more other buyers-and con-
comitantly their competitive positions and the intensity of competition
for these buyers' business-by changing the rate at which they utilize
their capacities. Thus, even if the availability of tie-ins to all of Yl's
prospective suppliers would not change the identity of his actual sup-
plier(s)-X and the firm (S) that supplies X with B when he does not
produce this good himself-it might affect X's (and S') ability to com-
pete for other prospective customers by changing the amounts of A
and B purchased by Yl and concomitantly the rates at which he (or they)
utilized his (their) capacity to produce these products. When the avail-
ability of such agreements changes the identity of Yl's ultimate sup-
pliers-either or both by changing the firm that supplies him with A
and/or by changing the firm that supplies him with B, the probability
that a decision allowing tie-ins to be employed will significantly influ-
ence the competitive positions of Yl's new and old suppliers in relation
to other buyers will be far more substantial-though once more there
will be no general tendency for competition to be reduced. In fact, if-
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as undoubtedly makes sense-we shift our focus from the competitive
impact of allowing all suppliers to enter into a tie-in with a particular
buyer to the consequences of allowing them to enter into such agree-
ments with all their prospective customers, the changes in capacity
utilization I have described will probably tend to be offsetting. For this
reason and for reasons of space as well, I will for the most part limit
my future discussion of how the availability of tie-ins may reduce com-
petition for the patronage of particular customers by changing the rates
at which their prospective suppliers utilize their capacities to situations
in which such agreements increase the extent of quality control their
actual employer exercises.
Accordingly, although the general availability of tie-ins involving
only one good their employers produce in non-perfectly competitive
markets is most likely to affect the relative competitive positions of (and
hence the intensity of short and long-run price-variable input competi-
tion among) the prospective suppliers of Yl, a decision allowing such
agreements to be executed with a particular buyer or set of buyers may
also affect the intensity of price-variable input competition for various
other firms' patronage by changing the competitive positions of (1)
Yl's prospective suppliers of A in their dealings with them, (2) of Y1
himself, and/or (3) of the firms that indirectly supply Yl with B through
X under the tie-in or would supply Yl with B directly if tie-ins were
prohibited.
(b) #1's Position and the Availability of Tie-ins to a Buyer's Suppliers
Where At Least Some of the Sellers in Question Produce Both
Goods Involved in Non-Perfectly Competitive Markets
Now that we have analyzed the circumstances in which the position
of some best-placed firm would be improved by a decision to allow all
sellers of one of the goods in question to enter into a tie-in with a
particular buyer, we should be able to determine the respects in which
the analysis will have to be altered where at least some of the sellers in
question produce variants of both goods involved in the tie-in in non-
perfectly competitive markets. As we shall see, although none of the
"results" will be changed, the circumstances in which (and assumptions
under which) the general availability of tie-ins will improve the com-
petitive position of the best-placed firm to serve individual buyers will
be somewhat more complicated.
Before proceeding, however, it will be helpful to clarify the meaning
in this context of the phrase "the impact of the availability of tie-ins on
the competitive advantage of the best-placed firm or firms to supply Yl
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with A and B over any competitive inferior of given rank." If we as-
sume that the firm or firms best placed to supply Y1 with A and B when
tie-ins are available do employ a tie-in for this purpose,1lr the effect of
the availability of such agreements on the competitive advantage of
the firm (or firms) best placed to supply this customer can be deter-
mined by comparing (1) the difference between the joint profits this
firm (or these firms) will earn on a tie-in of any given degree of attrac-
tiveness to the buyer involved and the returns any competitor or com-
petitors of given rank can realize by offering either independently or
through a tie-in one or both of the products in question at terms
equally attractive to the buyer concerned and (2) the difference between
the sum of the profits the firm or firms that are best placed to make
independent offers to Yl on A and B respectively could realize by doing
so and the sum of the returns that their inferiors of corresponding rank
could earn by obtaining Yl's patronage through equally attractive offers.
Whenever (1) exceeds (2), the availability of tie-ins can be said to have
increased the competitive advantage of the firm (or firms) best placed
to supply Yl with A and B over a competitive inferior of given rank-
and for reasons I have already adduced, concomitantly to have de-
creased the overall intensity of the price-variable input competition for
Yl's patronage on these goods.
With the meaning in this context of the concepts with which we will
be dealing clarified, we should be able to proceed with the analysis. Let's
assume at the outset that (1) all producers of one of the products in-
volved produce variants of both of the goods in question; (2) that sellers
of both goods will never find it profitable-either directly or indirectly
-to enter into tie-ins involving only one of their products; (3) that the
competitive rank of each seller for independent sales to Y1 is the same
on both A and B; and (4) that each seller would find it equally profitable
to replace his best independent offers on A and/or B to Y1
with a tie-in involving these products. Clearly, under these assumptions,
the availability of tie-ins will have no effect whatsoever on the competi-
tive advantage that #1 enjoys over any inferior of given rank. Equally
clearly, however, if we drop one or more of these assumptions, this
conclusion will also disappear.
117. Since I am concerned with the possibility that tie-ins may decrease competition
by increasing the competitive advantage of some best-placed firm, I need investigate only
those cases or firms in which this assumption is fulfilled. Unless the firm(s) best placed to
supply Y1 with A and B when tie-ins are available finds it profitable to employ a tie-in for
this purpose, the availability of such agreements can only decrease his or their competitive
advantage over one or more competitive inferiors-i.e., over those inferiors who do find it
profitable to employ such agreements.
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For example, if we maintain assumptions (1)-(3) and relax assump-
tion (4), the availability of tie-ins will increase #1's competitive ad-
vantage over any inferior of given rank for whom such agreements are
less profitable than they are for him and will decrease his competitive
advantage over any such firm for whom such agreements are more
profitable than they are for him (assuming, of course, that the identity of
#1 has not been changed by the availability of tying agreements). Ac-
cordingly, when assumptions (1)-(3) are met, the availability of tie-ins
may very well improve the competitive position of the #1 firm by in-
creasing his competitive advantage over one or more inferiors. Once
more, however, there is no reason to expect any tendency in this
direction where the assumptions in question are in fact fulfilled, for
there is no reason to assume that the profitability of tie-ins will correlate
in any way with the competitive rank of their employer on independent
offers of the goods involved.
Indeed, in certain cases-for example, if assumption (3) as well as
assumption (4) are not fulfilled-the tendency (though admittedly not
the inevitable result) of a decision allowing tie-ins to be used will prob-
ably be in the opposite direction. That is to say, if assumptions (1) and
(2), though not (3) and (4), are fulfilled, the availability of tie-ins will
probably tend to reduce the competitive advantage of the best-placed
firm. This result derives from two facts. First, since the competitive
ranks of any seller on independent transactions involving each of the
products concerned will be far from perfectly correlated with each
other,118 the competitive advantage over any competitive inferior of
given rank of the firm best placed for selling both goods through an in-
effectual tie-in (whose terms duplicate those of the seller's optimal
independent offers) will tend to be smaller than the sum of the competi-
tive advantages of the firms that would be #1 on each good indepen-
dently over competitive inferiors of the rank in question.119 Second,
since the profitability of a tie-in will probably not be correlated with
118. Some positive correlation probably will exist since (1) the efficiency of a firm
(relative to its competitors') in producing one good will probably correlate positively with
its efficiency (relative to these same competitors' efficiency) in producing another good; (2)
the desirability of its geographic location (relative to that of its competitors) for selling
a particular customer one product will probably be highly correlated with the desirability
of its geographic location (relative to that of the same competitors) for selling the same
customer another product; and (3) the relative amount of good will its sales representatives
and managers have in their dealings with a particular buyer on one good will obviously
correlate with its counterpart in dealings with the same buyer on another good
119. This result reflects the law of large numbers-that is, the fact that, for example,
the difference between the sums achieved by rollers of a die will tend to increase less than
proportionately as the number of rolls rises.
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the competitive ranks its employer would have in independent trans-
actions with the buyer in question, the same result will obtain a fortiori
in relation to the competitive advantage of the #1 firm for arranging an
effectual rather than an ineffectual tie-in with the buyer involved. Of
course, individual sellers who have a high rank on one good and a low
rank on another may find that their best course is to make an inde-
pendent offer on their high-ranked variant-that is, such sellers may
find that the amount by which they can increase the profitability of sell-
ing both goods to Yl by employing a tie-in is smaller than the losses
they would have to sustain to make Yl indifferent toward purchasing
their other variant independently. Clearly, however, the availability of
profitable tie-ins to producers of both goods will also deteriorate the
competitive positions of high-ranking sellers who find this course the
more profitable. Accordingly, whether or not the sellers in question em-
ploy tie-ins, to the extent that high-ranking sellers of one product have
no general tendency to be high-ranking on the other, the availability of
such agreements will tend to reduce the competitive advantage that the
firm that is best placed to deal with the buyer concerned has over his
competitors. Admittedly, this fact is perfectly consistent with the avail-
ability of tie-ins improving #1's competitive position in some cases in
which assumption (3) and (4) are not fulfilled: all I have demonstrated
is that no general tendency in this direction can be established and
therefore that under the assumptions we have made, the short-run con-
sequences of tie-ins that involve buyers who are supplied by some firms
that produce both goods involved in non-perfectly competitive markets
do not justify any presumption against their legality.
In fact, this conclusion will also apply even when assumption (2) as
well as (3) is not fulfilled-that is, even when some sellers of both
goods find it profitable to enter into tie-ins involving only one of their
products12 -for in this situation as well the availability of tie-ins will
have no tendency to reduce price-variable input competition by im-
proving #1's competitive position. Indeed, relaxing assumption (2) does
no more than lower the probability that the availability of tie-ins will
intensify competition by making it profitable for firms that produce
products with different ranks to tie their sale to each other. Once more,
however, unless the profitability of such agreements increases with the
rank of the products employed, the availability of tie-ins will have no
120. Presumably this result will obtain on at least some occasions despite the costs that
the sellers will have to incur to negotiate with each other and the possible (unjustified)
damage to the reputations of the variants they produce but do not include in the agree-
ments in question.
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general anti-competitive tendency in these circumstances. There will
still be cases in which a decision allowing such agreements will improve
#1's competitive position-as, for example, when (1) the #1 firms on A
and B respectively are more adept at working together than are their
close competitors in the usual case in which (2) #1's advantage over his
closest competitors has more influence on the intensity of competition
than his advantage over his more distant competitors-but the opposite
result will clearly be more typical.
Even if we relax assumption (1)-that is, even if some sellers produce
only one of the goods involved-our conclusion will not have to be
altered, for obviously for present purposes such firms are not differenti-
able from producers of both goods which do not find it profitable to
try to tie the sale of both their products together-that is, who make
one variant that is so unsatisfactory to Y1 or so costly in comparison with
substitutes that are equally satisfactory to this buyer that the amount by
which tie-ins can increase the profitability of selling both to the buyer
is smaller than the losses that the seller in question would have to sustain
to sell the second to Y1 independently. As before, then, the availability
of tie-ins may reduce the intensity of price-variable input competition
by improving #1's competitive advantage over one of his inferiors, but
they will have no general tendency in this regard. In fact, the avail-
ability of tie-ins may not even deteriorate the position of single-product
firms for such a seller may very well be able to enter into a tie-in with
a high-ranking producer of the other product who may not produce a
variant of the first firm's product at all or who may produce a very low-
ranked version of the product in question.121
Accordingly, regardless of which of our assumptions one makes, there
are no grounds for believing that the availability of tie-ins to a buyer's
potential suppliers will be reasonably likely to reduce the intensity of
the (short-run) price-variable input competition for that buyer's patron-
age-even where at least some of the suppliers in question produce
both of the products involved in non-perfectly competitive markets.
Hence, a decision to prohibit the use or attempted use of such agree-
ments cannot be justified on the ground that they will tend to decrease
the intensity of short-run price-variable input competition unless very
specific and unusual information is obtained concerning their probable
121. This fact will become important when I discuss the effect of allowing tie-ins in-
volving two products that at least some sellers produce in non-perfectly competitive mar-
kets on the height of the barriers to entry into the markets in question.
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impact, whether or not some suppliers produce variants of both goods
involved in non-perfectly competitive markets.
b. The General Availability of Tie-ins and the Intensity of Invest-
ment Competition
A decision allowing tie-ins to be executed with a particular buyer
may reduce the intensity of investment competition either by decreasing
the ability of the established firms in some market to restrict their own
investments in a situation in which additional restrictions would not
generate new entry and/or by reducing the likelihood that some rele-
vant amount of such restrictions will induce a potential entrant to enter
the market in question. I will now investigate each of these possibilities
in turn.
(1) Tie-ins, the Intensity of Investment Competition, and the Ability
of Established Firms To Cooperate in Restricting Their Own In-
vestments
In general, the profitability of any established firm's expanding its
own investments in a market in which it is already operating will be
equal to (1) the returns it would realize on the new investment itself if
its expansion did not provoke retaliation from its established competi-
tors minus (2) the losses it will sustain as a result of whatever retaliation
its expansion does provoke minus (3) the losses it sustains as a result of
its new investment's reducing the demand for its pre-expansion prod-
ucts. Although not very important empirically, the execution of tie-ins
may in some cases reduce the profitability of such expansions and hence
increase the ability of established firms to restrict their own investments
by inducing an established concern to leave the market in question.
(a) The Exit of an Established Firm and the Ability of the Established
Producers to Restrict Their Own Investments
Obviously, the exit of an established firm would not in itself reduce
investment in the long run if other things were equal, for if the exit
did not change any of the original equilibrium's underlying determi-
nants, it would either produce a mere transfer of the assets in question
to another producer or induce some other firm to restore the original
investment equilibrium by entering or expanding its own investment.
However, in practice, such an event will tend to reduce investment by
increasing the extent to which the established firms in the market in
question could restrict their own investments if entry were precluded
by reducing the profits any such firm will expect to realize on an expan-
269
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 80: 195, 1970
sion beyond any given level of industry investment. The departure of
an established concern will tend to produce this result for two reasons.
First, it will tend to raise the retaliation costs an expanding firm must
anticipate. Second, it will tend to increase the losses he must expect to
incur as a result of his new product's reducing the demand he faces for
his old.
The exit of a competitor will tend to increase the retaliation costs
122
an expanding established firm will incur by decreasing the extent to
which its other competitors' retaliation will fall below the level that
would be optimal for that group taken as a whole. Unlike price com-
petition, any act of investment competition will normally affect more
than one seller simultaneously. In particular, it will normally reduce
the demand for more than one of the products previously offered in the
market. Correspondingly, except to the extent that an individual act of
retaliation can induce this or some other expanding firm to locate any
new product or service he should introduce in the future 23 further
away (in product space) from the retaliator than would otherwise have
been profitable, the benefits from an individual's retaliation will be
shared by all those who would have been injured by the deterred future
investment competition-that is, will not accrue solely to the retaliator
itself. Obviously, the generation of such monetary externalities will
tend to reduce the amount of retaliation below what would be optimal
for its possible beneficiaries taken as a group.
The exit of an established firm will tend to reduce this gap in two
ways: first and primarily, by decreasing the amount of such externalities
acts of retaliation generate and second, though only conceivably, by in-
creasing the ability of injured competitors to induce each other to re-
taliate more than would otherwise be in their individual interests. To
see why the departure of an established firm may reduce the amount of
externalities retaliation generates, let's assume-contrary to the con-
clusion reached above-that after the departure of their compatriot, the
remaining firms restored the pre-existing level of industry investment
either by purchasing the assets of the existing firm or by themselves
bringing new assets into the industry in question. Since fewer firms will
be operating in the market post-exit than pre-exit, the restoring units
122. By "retaliation costs," I refer to the losses a seller sustains as a result of his com-
petitors' retaliations against him-e.g., by stealing customers in relation to whom he is
best placed to deal. See p. 221 supra.
128. Since investments by their nature are fixed, the firm that retaliates against in-
vestment competition cannot expect an immediate cessation of the competition in ques-
tion.
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of investment will now impose greater losses on the non-expanding
firms than the same units of investment imposed on their pre-exit coun-
terparts when they were originally made, for assuming that the last units
of investment were not originally brought in by a new entrant, the
market shares of the original non-expanding firms would have been
smaller than those of their post-exit counterparts. And as we have seen,
as each individual firm comes to bear an increasingly large share of the
total costs an investing firm imposes on his competitors, it will also
come to receive a correspondingly larger share of the total benefits its
retaliation generates for the non-expanding firms in question. Since,
then, the internalities produced by retaliation to any attempt to restore
the previous level of investment post-exit will be larger than their
counterparts when the exited investment (or some part of the last
units of investment totalling that size) was originally made or renewed,
the retaliation costs an established firm will face will presumably be
higher post-exit than pre-exit and the pre-exit level of investment will
presumably not be restored by investment competition among the estab-
lished firms-that is, the exit will presumably reduce the amount of in-
vestment competition among the established firms in the market in
question by reducing the amount of external benefits retaliation will gen-
erate.124 As I have already suggested, in practice, this result may be rein-
forced by the tendency of the departure of an established firm to improve
the ability of those remaining to cooperate in deterring competitive in-
vestments through retaliation. Although this possibility is probably not
very important, established firms may in some circumstances try to bind
each other to retaliate more than would otherwise be in their individual
124. Some qualification is necessary. Since retaliation is less likely to deter an estab-
lished firm from renewing his investment than from expanding it, the relevant comparison
may be between the retaliation costs faced by a firm considering expanding its own in-
vestment post-entry and their counterparts for the firm(s) that actually raised industry
investment from its post-exit to its pre-exit level before the departure of the firm in ques-
tion. The argument that such costs will be higher for the former than for the latter rests
on the assumption that fewer firms will be operating post-exit than were operating pre-
exit at the level of industry investment in question or more precisely that the individual
shares of the investing firm's competitors will be higher post-exit than they were for their
pre-exit counterparts. Unfortunately, at least in one case, this assumption will not be
correct-viz., when the last units of investment totalling the size of the exiting firm had
been brought into the industry by a new entrant. This assumption is consistent with the
rest of this analysis (which supposes only that the established firms would take advantage
of any increase in their ability to restrict their investments), since the firm that entered
may have been better placed than any of his contemporary counterparts. However, even
in this case, one would expect industry investment to decline unless potential or kinetic
entry prevented it from doing so, for the fact that the last investments were made by a
new entrant implies that the established firms could and did actually restrict their own
investments pre-entry to the post-exit level and there is obviously no reason to suppose that
the substitution of the last new entrant for the exiting firm will affect their abilities in
this regard.
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interests. Obviously, for the same reasons we have just discussed, the
smaller the group in question, the greater its ability to produce such
retaliation by retaliating against those who refuse to retaliate. In fact,
the same result will also obtain where parallel action does not suffice-
that is, where actual concert is required-for the smaller the group, the
lower the costs of organizing retaliation and the lower the probability
that any such illegal concerted action will be discovered. Accordingly,
the departure of an established firm may also raise expected retaliation
costs by raising the probability that established firms will be able to
cooperate in this manner.
So far, I have shown that the departure of an established firm may
by raising retaliation costs increase the extent to which the remaining
concerns in any market can cooperate in restricting their own invest-
ments. In practice, such an exit will also raise established-firm invest-
ment restrictions by increasing the losses one or more of the remaining
firms will impose on themselves if they expand by reducing the demand
for their original products. Once more, let's investigate this possibility
by comparing the amount of such costs the expanding firms will impose
on themselves post-entry with their counterparts for those firms that
actually did raise industry investment from its post-exit to its pre-exit
level in the past. Obviously, unless these last units of investments were
all made by a firm that was then entering the market, these costs will be
higher post-exit than they were originally, ceteris paribus, for since
fewer firms will be operating at the later date than at the former, the
size of each firm's pre-expansion market will be larger as will the loss to
each from any given expansion. (Indeed, as already noted, even if all
these last investments were originally made by a firm that was entering
the market, our conclusion-that the departure of an established firm
will reduce investment unless further restrictions are precluded by
potential or kinetic entry-will still obtain). 125 Accordingly, the de-
parture of an established firm will always increase the extent to which
the established firms will restrict their own investments by raising the
costs each firm's expansion would impose on itself as well as by increas-
ing the retaliation costs each must expect to incur.
In short, whenever this result is not precluded by potential competi-
tion, the departure of an established firm will lead to a permanent
reduction in investment in the industry in question, other things being
equal. Where the industry's investment was not originally raised from
125. See note 123 supra.
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its post-exit to its pre-exit level by new entry, the departure of. an
established firm will generate this result by reducing the profits each
individual firm can realize by expanding its own investment. And
where these last units of investment were made by new entrants, such
an exit will reduce industry investment by returning the industry to a
lower level of investment beyond which the established firms would
not have expanded themselves but to which they could not return alone
(since dynamic economies of scale tend to make replacing deteriorated
investment more profitable than expanding one's original investment).
Hence any tie-in that induces the exit of an established firm will reduce
the intensity of investment competition whenever such a reduction is
not precluded by potential competition.
(b) Tie-ins and the Exit of an Established Producer
i. Where No Seller Produces Both Goods Involved in Non-Perfectly
Competitive Markets
As I have already suggested, the execution of tie-ins may induce one
or more firms to leave the markets in which they were operating. Thus,
if tie-ins are less profitable to some particular seller than to his competi-
tors, their availability may very well deteriorate his competitive posi-
tion sufficiently to induce him to exit. And if tie-ins are more profitable
to some particular buyer than to his competitors (e.g., if tie-ins induce
his suppliers to grant him discriminatory price concessions), their
availability may conceivably improve his competitive position suffi-
ciently to induce one or more of these competitors to exit. Finally, if
quality-control tie-ins induce the buyer involved to shift his patronage
away from a third-party supplier of one of the products in question,
their execution may conceivably result in his leaving the market in
which he operates. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the avail-
ability of tie-ins may induce the exit of one or more'established pro-
ducers in the situations described.
ii. Where at Least Some Sellers Produce Both Goods Involved in
Non-Perfectly Competitive Markets
As we have just seen, the availability of tie-ins may-also deteriorate
the position of one or more established producers where some firms
produce both goods involved in non-perfectly competitive markets. Con-
ceivably, then, a decision allowing such agreements to be employed may
induce one or more firms to exit. Once more, of course, this result is
not more likely than its opposite. In fazt, even in th6se cases in which
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some firms do not produce both of the products involved, no tendency
in this direction will exist both (1) because the position of single-product
firms may not be injured by the availability of tie-ins since they may
also be able to enter into such agreements either with another one-prod-
uct concern member or with a two-product firm which produces one
low-ranked variant and (2) because the single-product firms whose posi-
tions are reduced may have been less marginal than the two-product
firms whose positions have been correspondingly improved.
(2) Tie-ins, the Intensity of Investment Competition, and the Height
of the Barriers to Entry Faced by Some Effective Potential En-
trant(s)
As I have already suggested, potential competitors will in some cir-
cumstances limit the extent to which the established firms in the market
they threaten restrict the amount of investment in the industry in ques-
tion. In this section, I will investigate the possibility that tie-ins may
sometimes reduce investment competition by raising the barriers to
entry faced by some potential competitor(s).
(a) The Intensity of Investment Competition and the Absolute Height
of the Barriers to Entry Faced by Any Effective Potential Com-
petitor
Although events that increase the barriers to entry faced by an effec-
tive potential competitor are generally held to decrease competition in
some respect, the established doctrine126 misconceives the process
through which such events generate this result, the prerequisites for
effectiveness in a potential competitor, and the precise character of the
resulting reduction in competition. However, since I intend to examine
this problem elsewhere in some detail, I will simply summarize my
conclusions here.
In general, potential competitors affect the intensity of competition
to the extent that they create a risk that entry will take place if the
established firms exercise to their utmost their ability to restrict their
own investments below the level at which they can just earn normal
returns-given their ability to make non-competitive pricing and
variable input decisions. Accordingly, a potential competitor can be
said to be effective to the extent that he seems likely either to induce
the established firms to prevent his entry by increasing their own
126. The established doctrine is based on limit price theory. For an exposition of this
theory, see J. BAIN, BAlanm. To NEw COMrrMON 1-41 (1962).
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investments or to enter himself-that is, to the extent that he raises the
risk of entry at some level of industry investment that the established
firms might otherwise maintain. Hence, the effectiveness of a particular
potential entrant will depend (1) on the ability of the established
firms to restrict their own investments absent the threat of entry,
(2) on the height of the barriers to entry the particular entrant faces,
and (3) on the number of other potential entrants that are better placed
than he.
Obviously, to the extent that a tie-in raises the barriers to entry faced
by any potential entrant, it will reduce his effectiveness-that is, it will
reduce the extent of the risk of entry the established firms will have to
take when restricting their investments over some relevant range. By
so doing, such an agreement will tend to reduce the intensity of invest-
ment competition (and derivatively of price-variable input competition
as well) by inducing the established firms to restrict their investments
and lowering the probability that these restrictions will produce entry:
Significantly, this tendency toward a reduction in competition will not
be restricted to those customers who are offered the tie-ins in question,
for all buyers who might have been interested in the goods that would
have been produced with the unmade investments will suffer from the
elimination of this source of rivalry for their patronage. 27
Moreover, although I have restricted the analysis so far to tie-ins
that deteriorate the positions of some potential entrants without im-
proving the positions of others, our conclusions will also apply when-
ever the barriers facing some potential entrants are lowered and those
facing others are raised-that is, whenever the net effect of the general
availability of tie-ins is to reduce the risk that entry will take place if
the established firms exercise their ability to restrict their own invest-
ments to some relevant extent.
(b) Tie-ins and the Barriers to Entry Faced by Potential Competitors
i. Where No Seller Produces Both Goods Involved in Non-Perfectly
Competitive Markets
As we saw earlier, tie-ins involving particular customers may be more
profitable for some established competitors than for others. The po-
tential competitors of tying sellers are no different from their estab-
lished counterparts in this respect-that is, the possibility of using tie-
ins may also affect the competitive position from which a new entrant
127. As we shall see, however, tie-ins will be as likely to lower as raise the relevant
barriers to entry.
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would have to compete for the patronage of various buyers in the
market in question. Speaking roughly, to the extent that tie-ins appear
likely to be more profitable for a potential entrant than for his estab-
lished competitors, their availability will increase his prospective post-
entry returns relative to theirs-that is, will reduce the barriers to entry
he faces. Similarly, to the extent that tie-ins appear likely to be less
profitable for a potential entrant than for his established competitors,
their availability will increase the barriers to entry he faces. Either
result is possible and-for reasons I have already suggested-neither
seems more probable. Certainly, however, on at least some occasions,
tie-ins will be less profitable on balance for one or more effective po-
tential entrants into some tying sellers' market than for their estab-
lished competitors-that is, the availability of tie-ins to all prospective
suppliers of one or more buyers will at least sometimes raise the bar-
riers to entry faced by some effective potential entrant into the tying
sellers' market by increasing the (negative) difference between the
former and latter's prospective post-entry returns.
In fact, the general use of tie-ins may also raise the barriers to entry
faced by potential entrants into other markets as well. Thus, the avail-
ability of tie-ins that permit price discrimination in favor of certain
buyers may very well deteriorate the prospective position of those po-
tential entrants who would not benefit from such discrimination if they
actually entered the market-that is, the general use of tie-ins may very
well raise the barriers to entry faced by some of the potential competi-
tors of the buyers involved in the tie-ins in question by increasing the
prospective gap between their and these buyers' prospective post-entry
returns.
In fact, the general use of tie-ins may also raise the barriers to entry
faced by potential entrants into other markets as well. Thus, the avail-
ability of tie-ins that permit price discrimination in favor of certain
buyers may very well deteriorate the prospective position of those
potential entrants who would not benfit from such discrimination if
they actually entered the market-that is, the general use of tie-ins may
very well raise the barriers to entry faced by some of the potential com-
petitors of the buyers involved in the tie-ins in question by increasing
the prospective gap between their and these buyers' prospective post-
entry returns.
Indeed, the availability of tie-ins may also raise the barriers faced
by prospective entrants into markets in which neither party involved in
the agreement in question sells. Thus, a tie-in that increases the extent
to which sellers control the quality of the complements their customers
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use together with their product will deteriorate the position of potential
entrants to the market in which these complements are produced and/or
distributed to the extent that these firms are better placed to produce
and/or distribute unsatisfactory than satisfactory complements-that
is, even when the tying seller merely arranges for the distribution of
the complement in question to the buyer involved (does not really
produce and/or distribute this good in an economically meaningful
sense), his tie-in may very well raise the barriers to entry faced by po-
tential entrants into the market in which this good is produced and/or
distributed. Hence, although this possibility is undoubtedly not very
important empirically, a decision to allow a buyer to enter into tie-ins
may sometimes raise the barriers to entry faced by potential competitors
of third parties as well as of the firms actually participating in the
agreements in question.
ii. Where at Least Some Sellers Produce Both Goods Involved in Non-
Perfectly Competitive Markets
The argument that allowing firms to tie two goods they produce in
non-perfectly competitive markets will raise the barriers to entry into
the markets in question rests on two propositions-viz., (1) that the
barriers to entry faced by an individual firm contemplating entry into
the two markets will exceed the sum of the barriers faced by two firms
contemplating entry into each of those markets separately and (2) that
the availability of tie-ins will deteriorate substantially the relative post-
entry position of firms that enter into one market where some of their
established competitors produce both of the goods involved in non-
perfectly competitive markets. If both these propositions were correct,
the availability of tie-ins in the situation described would tend to raise
the barriers to entry into the markets in question. In fact, however, al-
though the first is probably correct, the tendency of tie-ins in the situ-
ation in question to deteriorate the prospective position of one-product
potential entrants is undoubtedly far less significant than many have
claimed.
For several reasons, it is probably more difficult for one firm to enter
into two tied markets than for two firms to enter into one, other things
being equal. First, if the second of the two above propositions is correct,
the risk costs for the two-market entrant will probably exceed the sum
of such costs his one-market counterparts must incur, since his success in
each market will depend on his success in the other.128 Second, dis-
128. The importance of this argument will be reduced to the extent that no estab-
lished firm is highly ranked on both products.
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economies of scale, either of financing or of organizing a sufficiently
large managerial team, will tend to place the two-market entrant in a
worse position than his single-market counterparts if other things are
equal. Some of these additional costs can be reduced if two firms can
engage in a joint venture on the products involved, but no doubt-even
in such a case-some will remain. However, as I have already suggested,
the availability of tie-ins to some producers who make variants of both
products involved will not normally deteriorate the position of single-
product producers to any significant degree, whether or not they are
new entrants to the market in question, for such firms will probably be
able to arrange equally profitable tie-ins either with an established or
newly entered single-product producer of the other good involved or
with a two-product producer whose variant of one good is not attractive
to the buyer in question. Of course, if no single-product producer of a
suitable variant of the second porduct is available, the established
producers may be able to cooperate to drive the new entrant out by
refusing to enter into tie-ins with him despite the fact that such agree-
ments would otherwise be individually profitable but clearly such a
course would be illegal in itself and would have an equally likely
analogue if tie-ins were forbidden-viz., a collective refusal to deal on
the other product with a customer who purchased the first from a new
entrant. Admittedly, such joint tie-ins may tend to be slightly less
profitable than their single-firm counterparts since the two sellers must
also incur the negotiation costs of striking a bargain between themselves.
However, such differences are likely to be comparatively small-partic-
ularly where two-product producers have different departments pro-
ducing each of the products in question, for the compensation that
department heads receive will often depend (for very good reasons) on
their accounting profits and bargaining will therefore take place within
a single firm as well.
Accordingly, although the availability of tie-ins to firms that produce
both goods in question in non-perfectly competitive markets may have
some slight tendency to raise the barriers to entry into those industries,
the tendency is undoubtedly too slight to justify declaring all such
agreements illegal in the circumstances in question.
2. The Competitive Impact of Allowing Tie-ins to Be Executed with a
Particular Buyer: A Particular Analysis of the Various Functional
Types of Tying Agreements
Now that I have completed this general analysis of the ways in
which tie-ins may affect competition, I should be able to determine
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whether and in what circumstances each of the four functional types of
tie-ins we described earlier will be likely to reduce competition in some
relevant respect. Before proceeding, however, it may be useful to reit-
erate the assumptions I will continue to make and to delineate the
general structure of the analysis itself.
In particular, in the text that follows, I will continue to assume that
the laws regulating tie-ins do not authorize the antitrust enforcement
agencies to offset the competitive advantages of any particular producer
by denying him and granting his competitors the right to employ tying
agreements that are not more profitable for him than for them-that is,
I will continue to analyze the competitive impact of a particular tie-in
by looking at the way the availability of such agreements to the actual
tying seller and to all his competitors affect the intensity of competition
in the market concerned. 12 9 Using this assumption, I will proceed to
analyze the possible effects of the four functional types of tie-ins on
competition in the markets in which the goods in question (A and B)
are either sold to the buyer involved (Y1) or resold (perhaps in changed
form) by this firm to his own customer (Zl. .. N).130 In each case, I will
attempt to determine the likelihood that the conditions under which
tie-ins may reduce competition will be fulfilled. Let's begin, then, by
reviewing the conditions in question.
In the previous sections, I showed that the use or attempted use of
tie-ins by all or some of the prospective suppliers of a particular buyer
129. Presumably, if this assumption were not made, most tie-ins involving best-placed
firms would be illegal since a decision to prevent such a firm from employing tie-ins
would in most cases reduce the competitive advantage of the firm that was best placed to
deal with the customer in question.
130. Tie-ins may also affect the intensity of competition in whatever other independent
markets exist further up and down the production-distribution system in question. Thus,
a tie-in that affects the marginal costs and hence competitive positions of the buyers they
involve (Yl... N) may also affect the offers these buyers in turn make their customers
(Zl... N). When Z1... N are not themeselves final consumers, such a change in the
offers they receive may obviously affect the intensity of competition among them as well.
In fact, a tie-in that increases competition among Y1... N by changing the offers they
receive may reduce competition among Z1 ... N by changing the offers Y1... N make in
turn and vice versa. However, since the analysis of the impact of any tie-in on the
intensity of competition among Z1... N will not differ in any respect from its counter-
part for Y1 ... N, I have decided not to consider this possibility in the text. For similar
reasons, I have also omitted any consideration of the competitive impact of tie-ins further
up the production line. Any tie-in that affects the competitive positions of Xl... N may
also change the relative positions of their suppliers Wi... N. For example, if a tie-in
induces some member of X1... N (Xi) to exit, it may also induce that firm's suppliers
(Wi) to leave the market in which he operates. At the least, a decline in Xi's fortunes
would tend to affect Wi's competitive position (marginal cost) when dealing with his
marginal customers by changing the rate at which he utilizes his capacity. Competition
among W1... N may also be affected when a quality-control tie-in changes the product
variant (Bi) that Y uses in situations in which Bi's producer distributes to Y through an
intermediate. Once more, however, none of the analysis needed to investigate these pos-
sibilities differs from its counterparts for the markets in which Y buys and sells. Ac-
cordingly, I will ignore these possible ramifications of tie-ins in the text as well.
279
The Yale Law Journal
may reduce competition in the markets in which Yl buys A and/or B
(1) by improving the position of the best-placed firm 31 to deal with
Y1, Y2... YN (on A and/or B)13 2 or (2) by raising the barriers to entry
faced by one or more effective entrants into the markets in question. As
we saw, tying agreements can (but will not always or even generally)
improve #1's position (a) to sell A and B to Y1 when such agreements
are more profitable for some established sellers of the goods in question
than for others who are also in a position to employ them 3 3 or (b) to
sell B to Y1... N when they increase the extent to which a seller controls
the quality of the complements (B) his customer uses by inducing the
latter to shift his patronage from one third-party (ultimate) supplier of
B to another. Similarly, tie-ins may raise the barriers to entry faced by
potentential entrants into the markets in which Y1 buys A and B both
(a) when such agreements are more profitable for the established firms
who are in a position to employ them than for one or more potential
counterparts and (b) when potential entrants into a market that deals
in a complement controlled by a tying agreement are better-placed to
produce the unsatisfactory than the satisfactory variety. Accordingly,
when I investigate whether and when any functional type of tie-in may
reduce competition in the markets in which Yl and his competitors
buy A and B, I will focus (1) on the likelihood that such agreements
will be more profitable either (a) for some of the established sellers in
a position to use them than others and/or (b) for the established sellers
in general than for one or more of their effective potential competitors
and (2) on the likelihood that they will induce Yl to change some com-
plement he employs when at least some established and/or potential
competitors were better-placed to produce the product the tie-in dis-
suades him from using.
For obvious reasons, however, the analysis of the competitive impact
of tie-ins in the markets in which Y1 sells will take a different tack. Once
more, tie-ins may reduce the competitiveness of the markets in question
131. The seller actually involved in the tie-in under investigation may not be best
placed to deal with Y on the goods in question. He may very well have obtained Y's
patronage by undercutting a competitive superior.
132. In the text that follows, I will no longer employ the terms "tying" and "tied"
products since their use is inextricably bound up with the leverage theory of such agree-
ments. As we have seen, the efficacy of tie-ins depends equally on both products. Similarly,
their competitive impact takes place in the joint market they create for both products.
133. Tie-ins cannot reduce competition by changing the actual and potential estab-
lished tying sellers' relative positions when selling a product to a particular customer
when these sellers do not in fact distribute this good in an economically meaningful
sense-.g., they would simply pay a third-party distributor his normal fee for delivering
B to Y (though he and they might still in this case receive more than B's normal price
from Y).
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in some relevant respect either by improving #1's competitive posi-
tion vis-h-vis his established competitors and/or by raising the bar-
riers to entry faced by their effective potential entrants. Here, however,
#1's competitive position will only be affected to the extent that the
tie-in either changes the relative marginal costs of the buyers in-
volved through altering the unit prices they must pay for the products
or services in question and/or encourages some such buyers to remain
in the market concerned by making it profitable for their suppliers to
discriminate in their favor'-24 (or more generally by increasing the
general attractiveness of the terms they receive)," 5 The conditions
under which tie-ins will raise the barriers to entry facing various poten-
tial competitors of Y1 will also be changed in a very similar manner,
for tie-ins will produce this effect only when the availability of such
agreements is more likely to result in discrimination in favor of Yl and
his established competitors than in favor of their potential competitors,
once entered. Accordingly, when I investigate whether and when each
functional type of tie-in may reduce competition in the markets in
which Yl resells A and B, I will focus on the likelihood that such an
agreement would (1) change the relative marginal costs of the established
sellers operating in these markets, (2) induce a firm that was best placed
with regard to some customers to remain in the market by improving
the general attractiveness of the terms at which he buys A and B, and/or
(8) raise barriers to entry by improving the terms Y1 and his established
competitors receive from X relative to their prospective counterparts
for new entrants to the market in question.
In what follows, I will assume that each tie-in is a functionally
pure type. In particular, I will asume (1) that so-called non-marginal
cost price-shifting tie-ins will not induce their employers to engage
in price discrimination by reducing the associated PRB costs, (2)
that quality-control tie-ins will perform no other function than re-
ducing the costs a seller must incur to control to some relevant extent
the quality of the complements his customer uses together with his
product, and (3) that meter-pricing tie-ins will not affect the extent to
134. The decision of some firm to remain in the market might reduce competition for
some buyers' patronage if the remaining firm was #1 for this customer and his advantage
over the rest of the field on this buyer exceeded #2's advantage over those correspondingly
below him in rank.
135. Although tie-ins may conceivably affect competition by inducing a buyer to exit
by making it profitable for a firm to discriminate against the particular buyer in question,
this result is even more unlikely than the other we are discussing since sellers will rarely
find it profitable to drive their own customers out of business (though admittedly, in some
cases, the short-run profits such discrimination yields may be more valuable than the
long-run returns it destroys).
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Which a seller controls the quality of the complements his customers
employ. Obviously, since these conditions will not be fulfilled in prac-
tice, our various analyses may have to be combined when dealing with
real-world tie-ins.
a. The General Availability of Meter-Pricing Tie-ins and Competition
Let's begin, then, by analyzing the probability that meter-pricing tie-
ins will reduce competition in some relevant respect in the markets in
which Y1 buys and sells the goods involved. Assuming that the type of
tie-ins in question do not in fact increase the extent of quality con-
trol, such agreements will reduce competition in the markets in which
YJ buys A and B only if (1) (a) they increase the profitability of supply-
ing Y1 more for some established competitors than for others and (b)
the associated shifts in relative profitability lead to an improvement in
the position of the best-placed firm to serve the buyer in question and/or
if (2) (a) they are more profitable for the established firms in general
than for one or more of their potential competitors who (b) are effective
forces in the markets in question. Since, as we shall see, neither of these
results is probable, pure meter-pricing tie-ins are unlikely to reduce the
intensity of competition on A and/or B.
For condition (1) (a) to be met, either (i) alternative metering devices
must be less suitable for some of the product variants in question than
for others for reasons that do not affect the absolute efficiency of meter-
pricing tie-ins-that is, either tie-ins must increase the profitability of
metering the use of some variants by more than they increase the
profitability of metering the use of others-and/or (ii) meter pricing
through the most advantageous means other than tie-ins (and perhaps
through tie-ins as well) must be unprofitable for some of the variants in
question without being equally unprofitable for all others. Since the
problems associated with collecting endproduct royalties (obtaining
honest sales reports) will usually be specific to the customer rather
than to the product variant in question, (i) will be fulfilled only when
endproduct royalties are less profitable than actual meters and some
product variants can be more cheaply fitted with a meter than others. 36
Similarly, since the factors that determine the general profitability of
meter pricing-viz., the extent of the buyer's uncertainty about his own
demand for the service in question, the difference between the seller's
136. When more than one type of meter exists, there may be a trade-off between the
cost of the meter itself, its installation and servicing costs, and its susceptibility to tam-
pering.
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and buyer's risk positions and risk aversion, the amount of seller ig-
norance and buyer pessimism, and the likelihood that the buyer will
resell the services of the machine-will also relate more to the customer
in question than to the specific product variant he is sold, condition
(ii) is also unlikely to be fulfilled. Accordingly, although meter-pricing
tie-ins may sometimes increase the profitability of supplying Y1 more
for some established competitors than for others, this result is unlikely
to obtain in the vast majority of cases.
Indeed, as I have already suggested, even when condition (1) (a) is
fulfilled, there is no reason to suspect that competition for Yl's patron-
age will be decreased on this account-that is, that condition (1) (b)
will be fulfilled as well. In fact, all such shifts in relative profitability
that tie-ins effect will be as likely to increase the intensity of the com-
petition for Yl's patronage as to decrease it, for there is obviously no
reason to expect that the firm that would be best placed to deal with a
particular customer absent tie-ins will also gain more than his competi-
tors from employing such agreements in his dealings with the buyer
in question.
Similarly, since a tie-in involving any particular customer will be
(a) as likely to be more profitable as less profitable for potential com-
petitors than for the original established sellers where the latter produce
only one of the goods involved in a non-perfectly competitive market
and (b) only insignificantly less likely to be more profitable as less
profitable for potential competitors than for the original established
firms where at least some of the latter produce both of the goods in-
volved in non-perfectly competitive markets, condition (2) will be ful-
filled only to the extent that potential competitors would on balance
tend to sell post-entry to customers for whom meter-pricing tie-ins were
less advantageous than average-a most unlikely result at best. 3 7
Accordingly, although pure meter-pricing tie-ins may sometimes
reduce the intensity of competition in the market in which Y1 buys,
this result is highly unlikely to obtain. Certainly, without further in-
formation concerning the various conditions I have described, we could
not say that the probable effect of such an agreement would be to reduce
competition in the market in which Y1 buys A and B.
Indeed, although such a result is somewhat more probable, meter-
pricing tie-ins are also unlikely to violate the antitrust laws by reducing
137. This result might obtain, for example, if after their entry the present potential
competitors would be more likely to sell to customers who could be trusted more than
most to report their sales accurately under an endproduct royalty scheme.
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the intensity of some relevant aspect of competition in the markets in
which Y resells A and B.135 As I have already noted, tie-ins are unlikely
to induce an established buyer to exit by discriminating against him
(since sellers will rarely find it profitable to drive their own customers
out of business). Accordingly, such agreements will reduce competition
only (1) (a) if they drive some buyer out of business by deteriorating
his position in relation to one or more customers by inducing the tying
sellers in question to increase the extent to which they discriminate in
favor of one or more of his competitors who would otherwise have left
the market in question when (b) the firms whose exit the tie-in thus
induced contributed more to the intensity of the relevant aspect of
competition 139 than the firms the tie-ins induced to remain, and/or (2)
(a) if they change various buyers' relative marginal costs in ways which
(b) improve the competitive position of one or more of those firms
(Y1 ... N) that are best placed to deal with some member of Z1... N. As
we shall see, although both these results are possible, neither is partic-
ularly likely.
First, although the discrimination usually associated with meter-
pricing tie-ins' 40 may in fact enable some non-intensive users to stay in a
market which they would otherwise have to leave, the probability that
their remaining would deteriorate competition by inducing the exit of
other, more important competitors is quite clearly very small.141 And
138. In the text, unless otherwise stated, I will attribute any price discrimination that
may be associated with a meter-pricing tie-in to the agreement in question. In fact, how-
ever, in many cases, the elimination of the tie-in would not reduce the associated discrimi-
nation but would merely result in the substitution of another less profitable though equally
discriminatory type of metering device. However, since such an alternative arrangement
would also be regulated by the antitrust laws-viz., by the Robinson-Patman Act-and
would (with one exception) be judged by the same standards that the statutes make ap-
plicable to tie-ins, I can ignore this possibility without sacrificing much of consequence.
In fact, the only difference I can perceive in this context between the Robinson-Patman
Act and § 3 relates to the possibility that a metering arrangement involving a tie-in that
reduces competition in the market in which Y sells B by changing his marginal costs rela-
tive to those of his competitors might also have been made in good faith to meet the
equally low offer of a competitor. Although presumably this fact would exempt the ar-
rangement in question from the coverage of the Robinson-Patnam Act, it would appear
to have no such impact under a literal interpretation of § 3. Accordingly, in these cir-
cumstances, the arrangement's legality might in fact turn on whether the elimination
of the tie-in (and substitution of another metering system) would increase competition by
reducing the extent of the discrimination effectuated.
139. Cf. p. 220 supra.
140. I would expect, however, that such discrimination cannot really be attributed
to the tie-in-i.e., that such buyers could convince their suppliers to discriminate in their
favor in a lump-sum transaction as well by threatening quite realistically to leave the
market if they did not receive concessions.
141. On our definition (which corresponds to normal usage), a firm's remaining in a
market would be said to reduce competition for the patronage of those customers (a) in
relation to whom the seller in question was best placed when (b) his competitive position
as #1 is superior to its counterpart for the firm that would be #1 if he were eliminated.
The problem associated with this possibility is analogous to the problem posed by an
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second, although meter-pricing tie-ins will normally be associated with
economic price discrimination-that is, will normally involve buyers
whose average lump-sum plus unit price payments exceed their sup-
pliers' average incremental costs by different amounts-most such agree-
ments will not change these buyers' relative marginal costs, for the unit
price of B will normally be the same for all buyers involved in meter-
pricing tie-ins and the agreements in question will therefore raise all
such customers' marginal costs by the same amount unless different
buyers use the machine in question with different frequencies to pro-
duce the same amount of product. Indeed, for reasons I have already
suggested, even when Y1 and his competitors do use A in varying
proportions,'142 the tie-ins in question will be as likely to deteriorate as
improve the position of those firms among Y1... N who are best placed
to deal with the various members of Z1. . .N. Accordingly, although
meter-pricing tie-ins may sometimes reduce established firm competi-
tion in the markets in which Y buys and/or sells A and B or the prod-
ucts he produces with them, this result will certainly not obtain very
often.
But what of the effect of such agreements on the height of the barriers
to entry faced by Yl's potential competitors? Once more, although
meter-pricing tie-ins could conceivably deteriorate the relative prospec-
tive post-entry positions of one or more potential entrants (P) into the
event that reduces competition by increasing (reducing) the attractiveness of the best-placed
seller's product by more (less) than it increases (reduces) his costs-i.e., that increases #1's
competitive advantage without affecting the efficiency of his competitors. In practice, such
cases will be made even more troublesome (if you assume that judges operate under
different contextual normative constraints from legislators) by the fact that the associated
increase in the actual margin of the best-placed firms will tend to exceed the increase in
his efficiency (the increase in his competitive advantage) for reasons we have already ex-
plored.
142. For a discussion of a case in which different employers of a machine used it in
different proportions to their output, see Professor Baxter's discussion of a case involving
shrimp peeling machines in his article on Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 289-90 (1966). According to this ac-
count, since different shrimp canners had access to shrimps of different sizes, the number
of times the canners having access to small shrimp used the shrimp-peeling machine in
question to produce a given weight of canned shrimp exceeded its counterpart for canners
of large shrimp. Clearly, in this situation the discrimination associated with the non-
marginal cost pricing of the machine's use will raise the former group's marginal costs
more than the latter's, if the nominal terms of their agreements are the same. However,
as my analysis has shown, the shift in relative positions associated with these divergent
changes in marginal costs (per weight of peeled shrimp) is just as likely to increase as
decrease the intensity of competition for individual buyers. In particular, the discrimina-
tion in question would be likely to intensify competition for those customers for whom
the small-shrimp canners were originally better placed (so long as their original competitive
advantage exceeded half the difference between the amount by which the discrimination
raised their marginal costs and the amount by which it raised the large-shrimp canners'
marginal costs) and would be likely to reduce competition for the patronage of those
buyers in relation to whom the large-shrimp canners were originally better placed.
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market in which Y1 acts as a seller by increasing the actual amount of
discrimination practiced in favor of firms against whom P must compete,
this result is not likely to obtain very often and will not obtain more
frequently than its opposite. Clearly, then, unless very specific and un-
usual information is obtained suggesting that one or more of the sets of
conditions we have described is likely to be fulfilled, such agreements
should not be held to violate the American antitrust laws.
b. The General Availability of Pure Quality-Control Tie-ins and Com-
petition
As we have seen, quality-control tie-ins operate in the first instance
by reducing the costs their employer must incur to control to some
relevant extent the quality of the complements (B) his customers use
together with one or more of his products (A). In this section I will
investigate the likelihood that tie-ins that perform this (and only this)
function will reduce competition in some relevant respect-more
particularly will reduce seller competition in the markets in which Y1
and his competitors purchase A on the one hand and its complement B
on the other. In order to simplify the exposition, I will assume the
most general case in which X and his competitors produce variants of
A themselves but do not produce or distribute variants of the comple-
ment B in any economically meaningful sense.
Let's begin, then, by analyzing the likelihood that and circumstances
in which quality-control tie-ins will reduce the intensity of competition
in the market in which Y1 purchases A and B (1) by decreasing the ex-
tent of established firm competition among producers of A and/or (2)
by raising the barriers to entry faced by some effective potential entrant
to their market. Let's take the second possibility first.
Under some circumstances quality-control tie-ins could conceivably
raise the barriers to entry faced by some relevant potential competitor
P by deteriorating P's prospective post-entry competitive position in
relation to one or more buyers operating in the market in question-
that is, by reducing his competitive advantage in relations with cus-
tomers for whom he would otherwise have been #1 (and thereby
lowering the profits he can anticipate making in dealings with these
buyers) and/or by increasing the competitive disadvantage at which
he would operate in relations with other customers for whom he would
not in any case have been best placed (and thereby lowering the
returns he can expect to make by stealing one or more of these customers
from his competitive superiors). And, as we have seen, to the extent
that tie-ins did generate such a deterioration, they would reduce the
competitiveness of investment in the market in question (and deriva-
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tively the intensity of price-variable input competition as well) by an
amount determined by the ability of its established firms to restrict
their own investments below the level at which entry would otherwise
have been forthcoming. As we shall see, however, in practice quality-
control tie-ins are unlikely to deteriorate the prospective position of
any prospective entrant P. In general, quality-control tie-ins will not
be able to deteriorate the competitive position of some potential en-
trant P in dealings with any buyer Y1 unless (1) such agreements in-
crease the profitability of quality control more for the established
firms than for the potential entrants in question and/or (2) quality
control through the most attractive alternative means would have been
unprofitable for P without being equally unprofitable for his established
counterparts. Clearly, quality-control tie-ins are unlikely to deteriorate
(or improve for that matter) the prospective position of potential en-
trants on the first of these two accounts, for both the cost of specifying
quality and inspecting the complements actually used (i.e., of control-
ling complement quality without using tie-ins) and the cost of arranging
for the delivery of suitable complements (i.e., of controlling complement
quality through tie-ins) will usually be the same for all potential sup-
pliers of any given buyer. Admittedly, however, in a limited number of
cases, such agreements may deteriorate P's position for the second rea-
son stated above, for there will certainly be some situations in which a
potential competitor will be contemplating entry with a product
variant (1) which reduces the need for controlling the quality of
complements to such an extent that (2) such control (though not so
unprofitable for others) would be significantly unprofitable for him if
tie-ins could not (and perhaps even if they could) be used for this pur-
pose.143 With this exception, however, the availability of quality-control
tie-ins will not raise the barriers to entry faced by potential entrants
by deteriorating their prospective positions in dealings with customers
from whom they might otherwise have expected to obtain some profits.
And even when this exception applies, such agreements will be as
likely to reduce the relevant barriers to entry as to increase them,
since in general complement quality control is as likely to be more
important for potential entrants as it is to be less important. Clearly,
then, quality-control tie-ins will not generally violate the American
143. The effect of any quality-control tie-in that raises the barriers to entry some firm
P faces by deteriorating its positon to deal with Y1 will not be confined to Yl alone but
will relate (1) to all those customers for whose patronage P would have effectively com-
peted post-entry and/or (2) to all those customers whose positions would have been af-
fected by the established firms' additional entry-preventing investments to the extent
that such expansion rather than entry would have resulted, had tie-ins not been available.
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antitrust laws by raising the barriers to entry faced by potential en-
trants into the market in which Y1 buys A or its substitutes under the
assumptions we have made. In fact, for reasons I have already discussed,
this conclusion will also apply where X and/or some of his competitors
produce B in a non-perfectly competitive market as well.
For similar reasons, such agreements will also not be likely to violate
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts by reducing the intensity of
competition among the original established producers of A. Thus, since
tie-ins will usually increase the profitability of controlling the quality
of complements by the same amount for all established firms-for the
same reasons that they will tend to increase the profitability of such
control by the same amount for established and potential competitors,
their availability will change the relative positions of the established
competitors for any particular buyer's patronage only to the extent that
such control would otherwise be more unprofitable for some than for
others. Although, as we have seen, this result will obtain in some cases-
since B's quality may affect the performance of some variants of A more
than of others, competition once more is as likely to be increased by
the associated shifts in positions as it is to be decreased. Accordingly,
although quality-control tie-ins may sometimes reduce the intensity of
competition in the market in which X sells A, such agreements will not
normally or even frequently produce this effect.144
But what of the impact of such tie-ins on the intensity of competition
among the established producers of B? As we have seen, to the extent
that quality-control tie-ins actually increase the extent to which com-
plement quality is regulated, they may affect the intensity of competi-
tion on B both by deteriorating the positions of one or more potential
entrants to that market and by changing the relative positions of the
144. In the text, I have ignored one other way that quality-control tie-ins could con-
ceivably affect the intensity of competition for the patronage of one or more of A's
potential buyers--viz., by increasing the amount of quality control actually exercised.
As we have seen, Y's using inferior complements together with A may very well deteriorate
X's position in dealing with some of A's other potential purchasers either (1) because the
value of A to them is in fact decreased by Y's use of an unsatisfactory complement-as
in the Ho-Jo's example-or (2) because they mistakenly attribute to A Y's dissatisfaction
with this product in circumstances in which its poor performance for Y was actually
caused by his using an unsatisfactory complement B. Indeed, Y's ignorance of the conse-
quences of his using such an inferior variant of B may result in a deterioration in X's
future position in dealing with him as well. To the extent the X's use of quality-control
tie-ins increases the actual extent to which he does control the quality of the complements
his customers use, their availability will improve his position in dealing with the cus-
tomers just described. Any such advantage will be more or less offset to the extent that
X's competitors' use of tie-ins increases the extent to which they control their customers'
complements as well. For present purposes, however, I need only note that the associated
shifts in positions might decrease the intensity of competition for the patronage of one
or more buyers of A, though there is no reason to suppose that the net effect of this
process will be anti-competitive.
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established competitors for various buyers' patronage. Thus, when po-
tential entrants are better placed to produce unacceptable than ac-
ceptable variants of B, quality-control tie-ins that increase the extent
of actual control may reduce the intensity of investment competition
(and derivatively of price-variable input competition as well) by raising
the effective barriers to entry. Of course, when potential entrants are
better placed to produce acceptable variants of B, the opposite result
will tend to obtain. Obviously, in practice, one outcome is as likely as
the other. Accordingly, no anti-competitive tendency can be ascribed
to quality-control tie-ins on this account either.
Admittedly, quality-control tie-ins might still reduce competition by
changing the positions of the established producers of B in dealings with
particular buyers. Thus, to the extent that tie-ins of this type actually
increase complement quality control, they may change the competi-
tive positions of various firms in dealings with particular buyers both in
the short run and in the long run: in the short run, by changing the
average incremental costs the original and new supplier of the con-
trolled customer would have to incur to supply marginal customers by
decreasing and increasing respectively the rates at which they are using
their capacities, and in the long run, by inducing the supplier who lost
sales as a result of the tie-in to exit and/or by inducing the supplier
who gained sales to remain in the market in question. There is no rea-
son to expect, however, that the net consequence of such shifts will be a
diminution of the competition for the patronage of any given buyer of
B or in the market for B in general. Once more, then, although quality-
control tie-ins may reduce competition among the established sellers of
B and its variants, this result will not obtain with any significant fre-
quency.
Thus, quality-control tie-ins definitely do not have any general anti-
competitive tendencies. Clearly, then, unless very specific and unusual
information is obtained suggesting that one or more of the sets of
conditions under which this type of tie-in will tend to reduce competi-
tion seem likely to be fulfilled, such agreements should not be held to
violate the American antitrust laws.
c. The General Availability of Package-Pricing Tie-ins145 and Com-
petition
As we have seen, package-pricing tie-ins can enable a seller to increase
the profitability of price discrimination or price regulation violations
145. Since package-pricing tie-ins that buyers are more likely to arrange will never
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or to reduce the costs he must incur to prevent or allow buyer arbitrage
in general. Fortunately, to gain an understanding of the possible and
probable competitive impact of such agreements, I need only refer to
the previous analysis of meter-pricing tie-ins.
Let's begin, then, by investigating the likelihood that package-pricing
tie-ins will decrease the competitiveness of the market in which Y1 buys
A and B. As we have seen, such agreements could produce this result
either by shifting the relative positions of the established firms or by
deteriorating the prospective positions of some potential entrants. Once
more, both results are possible and neither is likely.
The reasons for this conclusion are also unchanged. First, such agree-
ments are unlikely to be more profitable for some established firms
than for others or for the established firms in general than for some
potential entrant,1 46 whether or not some established firms produce
both goods involved in non-perfectly competitive markets. And second,
any change in positions that does result from the execution of such tie-
ins will be as likely to intensify as decrease competition in the markets
concerned.
Of course, to the extent that such tie-ins increase the extent to which
their employers engage in price discrimination or price regulation
violations, they may still affect the intensity of competition in the
markets in which Y1 sells A and B by changing his marginal costs and
relative position or by deteriorating or improving the prospective posi-
tions of one or more potential entrants to the markets in question, but
clearly any such shift that does take place will be as likely to increase as
reduce competition for the relevant parties' patronage.
Accordingly, except in very unusual circumstances, package-pricing
tie-ins will not violate the terms of the American antitrust laws.
d. The General Availability of Non-Marginal-Cost Price-Shifting Tie-
ins and Competition47
As we have seen, non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins are probably
the most complicated of all such agreements. Fortunately, however, I
reduce seller competition, I will confine the textual analysis to seller-oriented package-
pricing tie-ins.
146. Since (a) discrimination without tie-ins will tend to be equally profitable or-
more relevantly-equally unprofitable for the sellers of all variants of some product, (b)
the information costs associated with more straightforward discrimination and the extent
of the offsets from package pricing will relate more to the buyer in question than to the
seller and his product, and (c) the actual amount of arbitrage on A that would otherwise
result will also be influenced more by the buyer's location than by the physical charac-
teristics of the variant of A involved.
147. In order to simplify the exposition, I will assume the most general case in which
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can continue to analyze their possible and probable competitive impact
in precisely the same way as I analyzed their functional analogues
above. Our conclusion will also be unchanged-viz., although such
agreements may sometimes reduce the intensity of the competition for
the patronage of one or more buyers in various markets, this result will
be neither usual nor more likely than its opposite.
Let's proceed, then, by analyzing the circumstances in which such tie-
ins will tend to reduce competition (1) in the market in which Y1 buys
A, (2) in the market in which B is sold by Yl's possible ultimate sup-
pliers, and (3) in the market in which Y1 and his competitors resell A
and B to their customers Zi... N. Like the other types of tie-ins we
have already investigated, non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins may
reduce established firm competition for Yl's patronage on A if they are
more profitable for some of the established firms than for others. How-
ever, in practice, the associated shifts in positions will rarely be signif-
icant' 48 and will generally be as likely to intensify as decrease the
competition for Yl's patronage on A. For similar reasons, such tie-ins
are also unlikely to reduce competition in the market in which Y1 buys
A by raising the disadvantage under which prospective entrants would
operate. Particularly since the profitability of this type of tie-in depends
in part on the tied-product market's being highly competitive. Of
course, in individual cases, tie-ins of this type may still reduce the in-
tensity of competition for the patronage of some buyers of A or its
variants-or indeed for the patronage of some buyers of B or its
variants as well-by altering the extents to which their possible ultimate
suppliers are utilizing their capacities, 149 but once more such results are
neither probable nor more likely than their opposites. Accordingly,
except in very special and unusual circumstances, non-marginal-cost
price-shifting tie-ins will not violate the antitrust laws by reducing the
intensity of competition in the markets in which Yl and his competitors
purchase A and B.
X produces A himself but does not produce or distribute the complement B in any eco-
nomically meaningful sense.
148. The most important determinant of such tie-in's profitability-the shape of Y's
demand curve for A or its variants-will probably depend more on his particular situation
than on their special characteristics.
149. In general, this type of tie-in will increase the rate at which sellers of A utilize
their capacities in the short-run at least (by reducing the unit price of A and its variants
and increasing their unit sales) and will decrease the rate at which sellers of B utilize their
capacties in the short-run at least (by raising the unit price of B and its variants anddecreasing their unit sales). Such increases or decreases will change the relative positions
of different firms in dealing with particular customers to the extent that (1) the size
of the increases in question vary within each set of the producers concerned and/or (2)
the slope of these producers' marginal cost curves differ over the ranges in question.
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One additional possibility remains to be investigated-viz., the pos-
sibility that non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins may affect the in-
tensity of competition in the markets in which Y1 and his competitors
resell A and B and their variants to their customers ZL. . .N. As we
have seen, such tie-ins will change the marginal cost of these products
to Y1 and his competitors-more specifically will reduce the marginal
cost of A to them and increase the marginal cost of B. Obviously, to
the extent that the magnitude of these changes differs among Y1 and
his competitors-and/or to the, extent that Y1... N employ these goods
as inputs but in different proportions to their final output, the execu-
tion of the tie-ins in question will alter their competitive positions in the
markets in which they resell the products concerned. In practice, of
course, such differences will usually be small and will generally be as
likely to intensify as decrease competition in the market in which Y1
operates as a seller. Thus, non-marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins have
no general anti-competitive tendencies.
IV. Conclusion
Now that I have completed the investigation of the possible and
probable competitive impact of the various functional types of tying
agreements, I can compare the results of my analysis with the con-
clusions reached by the Court. By now, it should be obvious that the
economic and legal conclusions generated by my analysis differ in every
respect from those asserted by the Court. According to the Court, all
tie-ins that involve sellers who enjoy a competitive advantage on one
of the products concerned will inevitably violate the American anti-
trust laws by reducing the intensity of competition in the market for
the other product involved through improving their employers' posi-
tions in the market for the so-called tied product. On the other hand,
if I am correct, (1) tie-ins-or, more precisely, the availability of such
agreements to all competitors for a particular buyer's patronage-will
improve their actual employers' competitive positions only slightly more
often than not; (2) the likelihood that allowing any set of competitors
to employ tie-ins will have an anti-competitive impact will be largely
independent both of whether the seller in question would have a com-
petitive advantage on one of the products involved if no such agreement
could be employed 50 and of whether the actual tie-in arranged with the
150. This conclusion assumes-as we have done all along-that the American antitrust
laws do not authorize the courts to offset the otherwise legal advantages of some firms
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buyer involved did individually improve this employer's position (as it
always will if it is profitable); 151 (3) the competitive effect of tying agree-
ments will take place in the joint market of both products involved and
not in the so-called "tied product market" in isolation; and (4) the
availability of tie-ins to the competitors for a particular buyer's pa-
tronage will only rarely have an anti-competitive impact-that is, will
only rarely violate the American antitrust laws. According to my anal-
ysis, then, unless very specific evidence is adduced demonstrating the
existence of one of the sets of unusual circumstances in which com-
petition is likely to be reduced by the use of tie-ins, such agreements
should be declared legal under the American antirust laws regardless
of their functional type.152
by denying them and granting their competitors the right to employ tie-ins when such
agreements are no more profitable for the former than for the latter.
151. As we have seen, this conclusion does not depend on the assumption delineated
in note 150 supra-i.e., even if the law authorized the courts to apply the competitive
impact test to an individual tie-in rather than to the availability of tie-ins to all com-
petitors for a particular buyer's patronage, one could derive no conclusions from the
fact that a particular tie-in was profitable. Cf. p. 242 supra.
152. This conclusion is even more universal than Professor Bowman's in his pioneering
attack on the Court's leverage theory. See Bowman, Tying Agreements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). In Appendix C, infra, I will analyze Professor Bowman's
qualification as well as the position taken by one other school of judicial critics.
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APPENDIX A
FULL-REQUIREMENTS TIE-INS AND RISK COSTS
For several reasons, business owners will tend to prefer more certain
returns to less certain returns, other things being equal. First, stock-
holders' net money incomes will often be increased less by any given
rise in their corporation's earnings above the expected level than they
will be decreased when their company's profits fall the same amount
below the expected level since (1) to the extent that marginal profits
are distributed, they will tend to be subjected to increasingly high in-
dividual income tax rates and (2) to the extent that they are retained,
they will tend either or both to replace decreasingly expensive loans1
and/or to permit decreasingly profitable expenditures'-i.e., they will
tend to produce decreasing amounts of capital gains (which may them-
selves be subjected to a progressive tax rate). Second, to the extent that
the additional satisfaction that individuals receive from successive units
of net money income tends to decline as their net money income in-
creases, stockholders' satisfactions will tend to be increased less by a
given rise in their corporation's earnings above the expected level than
they will be decreased by an indentical fall even if a given increase or
decrease in their company's profits affects their net money incomes by
equal amounts. Finally, even if a given increase or decrease in profits
affects their satisfactions to an equal extent, uncertainty will still reduce
their expected satisfaction by making it more difficult for them to plan
their expenditures or alternatively by making it necessary for them to
arrange their portfolios to reduce the uncertainty in question. In gen-
eral, then, uncertain returns will be worth less to a business owner than
certain returns. Accordingly, businessmen will normally be willing to
accept a guaranteed return which is less than the weighted average
return contained in their probability distribution estimate of their
prospective profits. The difference between this expected weighted
average return and the certain return which the businessman finds
equivalent (the so-called certainty equivalent return) reflects the risk
costs he must bear as a result of his uncertainty.
Obviously, any seller (or buyer) who is considering arranging a tie-in
will be interested in the agreement's impact on the risk costs he must
bear and since the seller will have to compensate his customer for the
risk costs he bears as a result of this transaction, he will be equally in-
terested in the effect of the tie-in on his customer's risk costs. Clearly,
then (ceteris paribus) the profitability of a particular tie-in will depend
on-indeed will be directly related to- its impact on the participants'
risk costs.
1. I assume that the rate of interest a corporation has to pay will be directly related
to its debt/equity ratio.
2. I assume inter alia that a corporation will normally face a declining marginal effi-
ciency of investment curve. Where profits fall considerably below their expected total, the
firm may even have to borrow to meet its non-expansionary expenditures.
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Since the value of additional profits to a firm's owners will tend to
decline as profits rise, the risk costs entailed in any probable profit
distribution will tend to increase with the variance (the sum of the
squared deviations from the mean) of the distribution in question and
not just with its mean deviation.3 Accordingly, in order to determine
the effect of a tie-in on the sum of the buyer's and seller's risk costs and
hence on its initiator's profits, we will have to discover its impact on
the variance of the probability distribution of the expected overall
profits of each of the parties in question.
In the following pages, I will analyze this impact on the plausible
assumptions (1) that the tie-in's effect on the variance of the probability
distribution of the sum of X's expected profits on A and B-henceforth
II (A+B)X.--will be directly related to its impact on the variance of the
probability distribution of X's overall expected profits-l-Zx--and
(2) that the agreement's effect on the variance of II (A+B)y will also be
directly related to its impact on I,.y-i.e., I will assume that both X
and Y expect their profits on products other than A and B to be non-
negatively related to their profits on these two goods. Obviously,
given these assumptions, I can investigate the impact of the tie-in on X's
and Y's overall risk costs by examining its effect on the variances of
II (A+B)-x and II (A+B)Y respectively. 4
3. An example may help clarify this point. Thus, although the risk costs associated with
a probable profit distribution with 100 possible outcomes in which there is a 10% chance
of realizing both $200 more than expected (mean expected return) and $200 less than ex-
pected will ceteris paribus be higher than their counterparts for a distribution in which
there is a 20% chance of realizing both $100 more than expected and $100 less than ex-
pected (since the loss of utility to stockholders caused by $200 lost profits would exceed
the gain from $200 "unexpected" profits by more than twice the amount by which the
lost utility from $100 lost profits would exceed the gain in utility from $100 unexpected
profits-i.e., since the value of additional profits to a firm's owners will tend to decline
as profits rise), the mean deviation of the two distributions would be identical. The dif-
ference in costs would, however, be reflected in the variance of the two distributions since
the sum of squared negative deviations associated with the first outcome would be equal
to 20(200)2 = 800,000 while its counterpart for the second would be equal to 40(100)2
= 40 (10000) = 400,000. It should be noted that the use of the simple variance also
presupposes that the value of marginal profits decline at a constant rate as total profits
rise. However, this assumption is dearly not essential to our analysis.
4. It should be emphasized that the effect of the tie-in on the risks X and Y bear
in connection with their uncertainty about Y's demands for A and B respectively does
not depend on its impact on the variance of the probability distribution of the parties'
expected gains from trading with each other rather than with someone else. Thus, the
fact that the expansion of X's and Y's dealings to include product B will create an
additional source of uncertainty for Y as far as his returns from his dealings with X
are concerned-the size of the losses he will sustain by buying B from X for more
than its normal price rather than from some other suppherS-is of no importance.
(My analysis of this problem in Part I failed to take this fact into consideration. My
error can also be expressed in these terms: Part I, I attributed to the tie-in the
tendency of deviations from the mean of 11BY to offset deviations from the mean of
ItoHAY where DDx.y and DD.,°Y were positively correlated. In fact, however, since Y
would deal in A and B independent of the tie-in, the associated reduction in Y's risk
costs cannot be attributed to the tying agreement--except, as we shall see, to the extent
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We should now be in a position to analyze the effect of the tie-in on
X's and Y's individual and total risk costs. As we have seen, the tie-in
will operate by increasing the unit price Y pays for B and reducing the
unit price he pays for A. By so doing, the agreement will reduce the
variance of E1 BY and increase the variance of HAY while it decreases the
variance of IIAx and increase the variance of HBx.1 As we shall see, the
net effect of these changes will depend in a somewhat uncertain way (1)
on the relationship between the demands in question, (2) on X's and Y's
relative uncertainty about them, and (3) on the relative size of the mar-
ginal profits Y (and X) enjoy on A and B respectively.
that the tie-in makes the offsets in question more perfect.) What is imporant is the
tendency of the tie-in to reduce the extent of Y's uncertainty about his returns on B
by raising the price he must pay for the product.
5. In general, the higher the price of the product in question, the smaller the range
and variance of the probability distribution of the expected profits of the buyer and
the larger the range and variance of the probability distribution of the expected profits
of the seller. Diagram I has been devised to illustrate this relationship. (My assumption that
PB = MCBx is immaterial: it has been made solely to emphasize the point that X
need not even produce the tied product for the tie-in to be profitable). In Diagram I,
DDROL and DDBRyO E represent Y's (lowest and highest) full-requirements demands for
A and B respectively. If we assume that Y incurs no risk costs and pays no lump-sum
fee, his profits on B (note: not his profits from buying B under the tie-in from X
rather than from some other buyer at its normal price) will equal the area between his
actual full-requirements demand curve for B and the price he pays for this product.
T
In Diagram I, PB indicates the normal price of B and P. indicates B's higher price








distribution of Y's profits on B from ACDF to ABEF-i.e., by BCDE. Similarly, since it
will increase the returns he earns on Ys marginal purchases it will increase the range
(and variance) of the probability distribution of X's expected profits on B from zero
to EBHG.
Diagram II shows that the tie-in will have exactiy the opposite effect on the ranges and
variances of fAX and flAy-viz., will increase the range of Ifly by BCDE and decrease
the range of fAX by BGHE minus CIJD. (In Diagram II, the area between the relevant
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Let's begin, then, by analyzing the effect of the tie-in on Y's risk costs.
On my assumptions, this impact will depend on the agreement's conse-
quences for the variance of II (A+B)--i-e., on the weighted sum of the
squared deviations from Y's average expected return from A and B to-
gether. Ceteris paribus, to the extent that the tie-in reduces (increases)
the squared deviation entailed in any possible outcome-i.e., in any
possible actual combination of DDxAy and DDXBc, it will reduce (in-
crease) Y's risk costs. Probable profit distribution II (A+B)Y will contain
some cases in which DDxY and DDX'y and concomitantly Y's pur-
chases of A and B will deviate in the same direction from their average
expected value and other cases in which these deviations will be in the
opposite direction. It will be convenient to analyze these two different
types of cases separately since the factors that influence the impact of
the tie-in on the squared deviation entailed in any given outcome will
depend on whether Y's purchases of A and B deviate in the same or in
opposite directions from their expected values in the situation in
question.
When the deviation in DDxAY and DDRxB have the same sign, the
direction in which the tie-in will affect the contribution of any given
outcome to II (A+B) ' variance will depend solely on the relative size
demand curves and the prices in question represent profits Y would earn under the
circumstances in question from selling X's variant of A.) It should also be noted that
the effect of the tie-in on the range and variance of the distribution of the sum of
X's and Y's profits on A and B respectively cannot be predicted without making specific
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of the percentages by which Y's associated purchases of A and B deviate
from their average expected value. In particular, the tie-in will decrease
the absolute and hence squared deviation entailed in the outcome in
question if and only if %B is somewhat higher than %A-" It should be
6. In order to simplify the analysis, I will assume throughout this section that the
fluctuations in the demands with which we are concerned will not affect Y's (or X's) aver-
age mark-up on the products in question. (This result would obtain, for example, if
MCAX were horizontal and equal to AVCAX over the relevant range and none of the prices
involved were changed by the demand fluctuations in question.) Given this assumption,
the squared deviation from expected 1 1 (A+B)Y independent of the tie-in will be equal to
(MAy - DA + MBY - D,)2 when MAY and MBy represent Y's original margins on A and
B respectively and DA and DB represent the original deviations in Y's purchase of A and B
in the situation in question. If we assume as well that the tie-in does not affect the size
no
of DA and DB--e., that average expected DDX~y and DDxBY have respectively the same
slopes as the particular DDXAY and DRO curves envisaged in the outcome in question,
the squared deviation for this particular outcome under the tie-in will be equal to
(MAy + AMAY) DA + (MBY - AMBY) D. where AMA equals the change in the price of
A under the tie-in and AMBy represents the change in the price of B. (It should be noted
that AMBy will never exceed MBy since Y would simply purchase no B if it did-i.e., since
Y would have a negative margin on B under the tie-in if it did. Hence, the second term
above will always have the same sign as DB.) Accordingly, the tie-in will increase the
squared deviation entailed in any outcome in set i and hence ceteris paribus reduce Y's
risk cost if (MAY - DA + MBY -DB + AMAYDA - AMByDB) 2 - (MAYDA + MByDB)2 is
negative; decrease these costs if it is positive; and leave them unchanged if it is zero. We
have assumed that DA and D. have the same sign. If DA and DB are both negative, the
first two terms in the above expression, as well as the expression as a whole, will also be
negative and the first expression will be less than the second only if (AMADA - AMnyD2 )
is positive. If DA and DB are positive, the first two terms as well as the expression as a
whole will also be positive and the first expression will therefore be less than the second
only if (AMADA -AMByDB) is negative. Thus, if DA and D. are negative, AMAy.
DA - AMBy- D, must be greater than zero. Since both of these terms are themselves
negative, this result can obtain only if IAMByDBI > lAMAyDAI. Similarly, if DA and D. are
positive, AMAYDA - AMBY - DB must be negative. Since both of these terms are themselves
positive, this result can also obtain only if [AMBY - DC3 > IAMAY - DAI. Thus, the tie-in
will reduce the squared deviation entailed in any outcome in which DA and D B have the
same sign if and only if IAMBy - DB> IAMAy - DA[. For this condition, we can obviously
substitute the condition that AMBY" SBE - I AMBY- SBE.%B must exceed
DA IM~ - B I SBE. %Imutecd
AMAy" SA - -1 = [AMAY" SA-" %All where SBB and SA represent the expected
sales of A and B respectively. Now we know that-in the usual case in which the related
contractual costs would not make it unprofitable for X to charge Y lump-sum fees in an
independent agreement on A - (1) AMAy - SA minus (2) the loss Y would have sustained
by purchasing the extra A he purchases under the tie-in at A's untied unit price
[(I) - (2) = (BS + ) on A] plus (3) the amount by which the tie-in reduces X's optimal
lump-sum fee (by increasing the efficiency of non-marginal cost pricing) must equal
(4) AMBY * S BE minus (5) the buyer surplus Y would have expected to realize at B's
untied unit price on the purchases of B he no longer will make under the tying agreement
[(4) + (5) = (BS -) on B] plus (6) the added risk, information-gathering, negotiating,
and contracting costs the tie-in imposed on Y plus or minus (7) the amount by which the
tie-in decreases or increases the returns Y will expect to realize by promoting A, B, and/or
the products in which they are used. From this information, we should be able to obtain
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emphasized that this finding does not imply that the tie-in will reduce
the contribution of all cases included in set i if %A exceeds %B more of-
ten than not since the average size of the reduction in variance produced
where %A exceeds %B need not equal its counterpart where this rela-
tionship is reversed. In fact, if other things-namely, the size of the orig-
inal deviation (v) and the change produced (k)-are equal (i.e., do not
depend on whether %A exceeds %B), the tie-in will increase the contri-
bution of each case in which %B exceeds %A to the variance of 1I (A+B)y
more than it reduces the contribution of each case in which %A exceeds
%o.7 Hence, in such a situation %A would have to exceed %B more than
half the time where the two deviations have the same sign for the tie-in
to reduce the contribution of all cases in set i to the variance of II (A+B)Y- 8
In general, the actual percentage of cases in which %Amust exceed%B
for the tie-in to decrease the contribution of set i to the variance of
II t will be directly related (1) to the ratio of the difference be-
tween the percentage deviations where % exceeds% to the difference
that exists where %Bexceeds %A 9 and (2) to the ratios Of %Aand%B
where the former exceeds the latter to their counterparts where %B ex-
some data concerning the relative sizes of IAMBy. $BE I[and IAMAy- SABI. Thus we
have already noted that-particularly where X's tie-in is highly advantageous-(3) will
tend to exceed (6) plus or minus (7). On the other hand, since in the situations with Which
Ss - S +
we are concerned - over the relevant range of DD. will usually exceed
BS + BS -
over the relevant range of DDXBy, the absolute slope of the latter wiU probably exceed
its counterpart for the former, and (2) will therefore tend to be less than (5).. Hence,
although (1) Will probably tend to be larger than (4) in the situations on which we are
focusing, the difference will usually be quite small-i.e., AMA t SA, Will probably be
slightly larger than AM~y - S.E. Hence, lAMBy • SBE w %B[ Will probably exceed
IAMAy - SAE - 7A.-i.e., the tie-in will probably reduce the contribution of the
outcomes in set i to the variance of Y's probability distribution if and only if %B is
larger than %Afor the case in question.
7. Thus, if you let v be the absolute deviation that the outcome in question would
entail independent of the tie-in and k the change in this deviation produced by the tying
no
agreement (which will equal the reduction in deviation where DDxAY and DD X°y
deviate in the same direction), the tie-in would increase the variance of 11 (A+B)Y by
(v + k)2 - V2 = 2kv + k2 where %B exceeded %A but would decrease the variance of
l( (A+ )Y by only v2 - (v - k)2 (i.e., by 2k2 less) where %A exceeded %B"
8. The determinants of the exact percentage of cases in which %A must exceed %3
(in such a situation) for the tie-in to reduce the contribution of all cases in set i to the
variance of II (A+B)Y are analyzed in notes 9 and 10 infra.
9. The greater the difference between %, and %A where %, exceeds %A, the greater
the amount by which the tie-in will increase the deviation associated with the outcomes
in question. Similarly, the greater the difference between %A and %, where %A exceeds
%B, the greater the amount by which the tie-in will reduce the deviation associated with
the outcome in question. Hence, the greater the ratio described in the text, the greater
the ratio of the average increase in deviation where %A exceeds %3 to the average de-
crease in deviation where %B exceeds %A and hence the higher the percentage of cases
in which %B must exceed %A for the tie-in to reduce the contribution of set i to the
variance of i (A+B)Y"
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ceeds %A-.1 0 In practice, the effect of the second set of relationships will
depend upon the relative size of Y's original average expected gross (of
fixed costs) profits on A and B,11 for since (1) %A will tend to be slightly
10. The larger %A and %B where %, exceeds %A, the larger the original deviation in
all such cases and hence the greater the amount by which any given increase in this devia-
tion will raise the contribution of the cases in question to the variance of IT (A+B--i.e.,
the larger v and hence the larger 2kv + k2. Similarly, the smaller %A and %B where %A
exceeds %B, the smaller the original deviation in all cases and hence the smaller the
amount by which any given increase in this deviation will raise the contribution of the
cases in question to the variance of I (A+B)Y-i.e., the smaller v and hence the smaller
2kv + k2. Accordingly, the larger the ratios of %A and %B where %A exceeds %B to
their counterparts where %B exceeds %A' the higher the percentage of cases in which 7'
must exceed %B for the tie-in to reduce the contribution of set i to the variance of
H (A+B)Y* If we make the massively simplifying assumption that all cases in which 7'
exceeds %B are alike and that all cases in which %B exceeds %, are also alike, these rela-
tionships can be demonstrated in the following way: Let (1) vB equal the original deviation
where %B exceeds %A and vA equal its counterpart where %A exceeds B; (2) kB and
kA have analogous meanings; and (3) %A.B stand for the percentage deviation from Y's
average expected purchases of A when 7B exceeds %A; (4) a stand for the number of
cases in which %B exceeds %A; and (5) (a + 0) stand for the number of cases in which
%A exceeds %B. The net effect of the tie-in on the variance of I (A+B)Y will therefore
be equal to (2 vBkB + kB2) a - (2 vAkA - kA2 ) (a + 0). The percentage of cases in which
%A must exceed %B for the tie-in to have no effect on the contribution of set i to the
variance of II (A+B)Y will be that percentage at which the above sum equals zero. There-
fore, to find the determinants of this critical percentage-- , we must set the above
2a +A
sum equal to zero and solve. However, since is directly related to -, we can solve
for this ratio instead. 2a+ 0 a
2vk, + kB2 - 2v.k A -+ kA2 2V~k B -+ kB2
- --+k+k -1, which is directly related to
2
vAkA - kA2  2 vAkA - kA2
2VB k + k(2v + kB)
. Hence, the required percentage will be directly related to
AMy - DA.B - AMBY • DB.BJ 2 MAY * DA.B + 2 MBY • DB.B + AMADA. B - AMBDB.B
AMA - D AA - AM 3 DBA I 2 MAy - DA.A + 2M3 y - DnBA - AMADA.A + AMBD)B.A
AMB S BE
If I substitute - for AMA; R AMA for M~y; T. AMB for MBy; and consolidate
SAE
terms, the above expression will become
%OA.B%/B.Bj (2R + 1) %A.+(2T- ) %B.1
I %A.A - %B.AI (2 R - 1) %A.A + (2T + 1) %B.
The relationships just discussed all follow from this result.
11. I.e., on the relative size of R-- - - and T =
AMA AMB - SBEISAE AM B - sBE
M13Y MBY -SBE R. MA.SE
-MB - - Hence, - -AMB AM 3 -" BE T M 3 1 .
5 BE
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higher than average where it exceeds %B and significantly lower than av-
erage when it is exceeded by 0B while (2) these relationships will tend to
be reversed for %B (given that average %A is significantly higher than
average %1), %A.4/%A.B will tend to approximate the inverse of
%1s.A/%B.B. 12 However, in almost all cases, the first relationship will
tend to increase the required percentage, for the fact that %A will on
the average exceed %B (since A is a differentiated product while B is
not) makes it probable that the difference between the two will be
larger where %A exceeds %B than where this relationship is reversed.
Accordingly, the percentage of cases in which %B must exceed %A for
the tie-in to reduce the contribution of set i to Y's risk costs will usually
be significantly above 50%. Unfortunately, taken in conjunction with
the greater uncertainty of DDxAY, this conclusion implies that the tie-in
will almost always increase the contribution of set i to the variance of
11 (A+33)Y for since average %A will be larger than average %, %A will
probably exceed %B more often than not.
Of course, some of the outcomes Y envisages may not be included in
set i-i.e., Y may believe that deviations from his expected purchases of
A and B may be in opposite directions, that some of his possible out-
comes may fall into some set j rather than set i. Since the deviations
from Y's average expected profits will always offset each other in all
such cases, the net deviation associated with any outcome in set j will
always be equal to the difference between the absolute deviations from
Y's expected profits on A and B respectively. For the same reasons that
we have just advanced in connection with set i-viz., the fact that a
given increase in the deviation entailed in any outcome will raise the
variance of II (A+B)y by more than an equal decrease in deviation,
other things being equal, the tie-in will tend to increase the contribu-
tion of set j to the variance in question unless it decreases the deviation
entailed in more than half of that set's constituent outcomes.
Once more, however, there is no reason to believe that the tie-in will
reduce the deviation entailed in more than half the outcomes in set j.
In general, the tie-in will raise the deviation associated with any out-
come in which DDxAY and DD1Xm are inversely related whenever (1)
MAyDA[ (the absolute deviation from Y's expected profits on A) exceeds
IMnyDB I (the absolute deviation from Y's expected profits on B)13 or
(2)[ MAYD4 is less than MByDB[ but by an amount which is less than
half the sum of I AMA DAI and IAMn DBI, while it will reduce the devia-
tion in question only if IMA-YDA is less than IMBYDBI by an amount
12. %A.A and %7,B represent %A when %A exceeds and is exceeded by %3
respectively. %3.A and %B.B in the next sentence have analogous referents.
13. If the original deviation from Y's expected profits on A exceeds its counterpart
for B, the tie-in's tendency (1) to increase Y's margin on A and hence the deviation from
his expected profits on A and (2) to decrease Y's margin on B and hence the deviation
from his expected profits on B will always increase the difference between these two
offsetting deviations.
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which is more than half the sum of IAMADAI and JAMBDBI. 14 Regret-
tably, at this point, little more can be said without specifying the
distributions in question. However, although it is impossible to deter-
mine a priori the relative sizes of IMAYDAI and MBYDBI, there may be
some reason to suspect that in many cases the former will not exceed
the latter sufficiently often for the tie-in to reduce significantly the
contribution of the cases in set j to the variance of IH (A+BY. 15
In short, although generalization is difficult, it seems likely that in
most cases, the tie-in will increase Y's risk by raising the contribution
of set i to the variance of II (A+B)y by more than it decreases (or in
addition to increasing)16 the contribution of set j to the variance in
question.17
14. Where the original deviation from Y's expected profits on A is less than its
counterpart for B, the tie-in's tendency to increase the deviation from Y's average ex-
pected profits on A and reduce the deviation from Y's average expected profits on B
will decrease the difference between these two deviations (the net deviation) unless the
changes introduced by the tie-in are so large that the post tie-in deviation on A exceeds
its counterpart for B by more than the pre-tie-in deviation on A was exceeded by its
counterpart for B-i.e., unless the sum of the absolute changes introduced by the tie-in
are more than twice the original difference between deviation A and deviation B.
DA
15. MAyD A MAT. SA - , which equals the product of Y's expected profits
I 1=1 SAEI
on A net of fixed costs (such as the lump-sum fee he pays X) and %A while I MByDB [
equals the product of Y's expected profits on B gross of fixed costs and %B" As we have
already noted, there is reason to believe that %A will usually exceed %B where full
requirements tie-ins are involved, but our analysis provides us with little information
about the relative size of Y's average expected profits (gross of fixed costs) on A and B
respectively. The fact that Y will tend to earn a higher share of the profits he and his
supplier earn on B than on A (since he buys B from a competitor and A from X, who
will normally have some competitive advantage in his dealings with him on this product)
does not justify any conclusions since (1) this difference may be reflected in the lump-sum
fee he pays X for A and not in the ratio of his gross profits (net of fixed costs) to thejoint returns in question and (2) we have no information about the size of the profits
X and Y realize on Y's purchase and sale of A in comparison with those they realize on
Y's purchase and sale of B. However, some conclusions are suggested by the fact that X
will probably have to take away from Y an absolutely large amount of surplus on B
(after giving him approximately the same amount of surplus on A) if the gains from
this shift in the focus of X's non-marginal cost pricing are to exceed the other costs
associated with the tying agreement, for the amount of surplus he expects to withdraw
from Y on B must be less than Y's expected profits on this product ifY is to continue
selling B under the agreement. In short Y's expected gross profits on B will probably
have to be substantial for full requirements tie-ins to be profitable. Obviously, no such
requirement applies to Y's expected profits on A. Hence, although I do not wish to
make too much of this argument, despite the fact that %A will normally exceed 7,
there are certainly no grounds for believing that I MAY - SAE - %A[ will usually ex-
ceed I MBy - SBE % 3 sufficiently often (viz., substantially more than 50% of the
time) for the tie-in to reduce significantly the contribution of the cases in set j to the
variance of Il (A+B)Y-
16. The effect of the tie-in on the contribution of set i to the variance of n (A+B)Y will
be directly related to the ratio of %A to %B as well as to the ratio of Y's average expected
profits on A to his average expected profits on B.
17. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish a priori any relationship between the
effect of the tie-in on Y's risk costs and the correlation between DDXAy and DDXBy
since the way in which the tie-in will affect the contribution of set j to the variance of
11 (A+B)Y will depend on the relative size of Y's pre-tie-in average expected gross profits
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The tie-in will affect X's risk costs in similar ways to those just dis-
cussed. Once more, it will be convenient to divide all outcomes (i.e., all
combinations of DDxAy and DDxr) envisaged by X into two cate-
gories: those in which the two demands deviate in the same direction
(those belonging to set i) and those in which they deviate in the opposite
direction (those belonging to set j).
Let's begin then with all cases in which DDxAY and DDxBy deviate in
the same direction. The direction in which the tie-in will affect the
contribution of any given outcome to the variance of II(A+B)X will
depend solely on the relative size of the percentages by which Y's pur-
chases of A and B in this outcome deviate from their average expected
value. Thus, the tie-in will reduce the absolute deviation from X's
average expected profits entailed in the outcome in question if and only
if % is greater than, equal to, or no more than slightly less than %(B.Is
Since DD xy will usually be far more uncertain than DD.Xmy (given
that A is differentiated and B is not), average %A will normally exceed
average %B, and %A will therefore usually exceed %B in significantly
more than half the cases in question.
Now, in general, the tie-in will have to reduce the deviation involved
in only about half the outcomes in set i to reduce the contribution of its
constituent cases to the variance of II (A+B)X, for although a given
increase in deviation will still raise this variance by more than an equal
on A and B respectively. Of course, when the ratio of Y's expected gross profits on A to
his expected gross profits on B is almost as small as average % B/%A' the extent to which
the tie-in increases Y's risk costs will probably be inversely related to the negative correla-
tion between the demands in question.
On the other hand, the extent to which the tie-in increases Y's risk costs will in all
likelihood increase with the ratio and difference between %A and %,. In general, the
greater the difference between average %A and average %,' the greater the average ratio
of the difference between these two percentages where %A exceeds %33 to the difference
between them where %1 exceeds %A. And, as we have seen, the larger the ratio of these
differences, the greater the extent to which the tie-in will increase the contribution of set
i to the variance of 11 (A+B)Y' ceteris paribus. Similarly, the greater the ratio of average
71 to average %,3, the larger IMAyDAI = IMAY -SAE -%AI in comparison with
IM1YDIII = IM1Y " $BD " %BI and hence, the greater the extent to which the tie-in will
increase (the smaller the extent to which it will decrease) the contribution of set j to the
variance of II(A+B)Y"
18. The tie-in will decrease X's margin on A and increase his margin on B. Hence, it
will change the deviation entailed in any outcome from IMAXD A + MBXDBI to IMAXDA
+fMBXDBU - AMADA + AMBDBI. Since DA and D, have the same sign, this change will
amount to a decrease in the associated deviation only if IAMDAI > IAMBDBI-i.e., only
if IAMB • SB- q>JAM,, - SBE- which (since JAMA• SAEI is slightly larger
than IAMB •$BE) will occur if and only if I = %A is not more than slightly less than
I =
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decrease will lower it (assuming the original deviation to be the same),
the average decrease produced by the tie-in will in most cases tend to be
larger than the average increase it generates since %A will on the
average exceed %B by more than OB on the average exceeds %A
inasmuch as mean %A is greater than mean %B. Accordingly, the type
of tie-in I am now discussing will in general reduce the contribution to
X's risk costs made by those envisaged outcomes in which DDxKAy and
DDx&Y deviate in the same direction.
The tie-in will also reduce the contribution to X's risk costs of all cases
that belong to set j. As we have seen, full requirements tie-ins will reduce
the deviation from X's average expected profits on A and increase
the deviation from his average expected profits on B. These changes
will reduce the deviation involved in any given case if (1) the origi-
nal deviation from X's expected profits on A (IMAxDAI = IMAXSA-u%AI)
exceeds its counterpart for B (IMBxDBJ = IMBxSBE %B ) by more than
one half the sum of changes the tie-in introduces-j AMADAI + JMBDBJ.
In practice, both these conditions will almost always be met. First,
JMASAE%A will almost always exceed IMBSBEBl, for since (1) X
will normally either buy B from others or produce it in an extremely
competitive market while he will typically have a considerable com-
petitive advantage when selling A to Y, his average expected gross
profits on his original expected sales of B to Y (MBXSBE) will tend
to be non-existent or very small while their counterparts for A (MAxSAE)
will tend to be quite substantial and since (2) product A will tend to be
far more differentiated than product B, %A will usually be far in excess
of %YB. Second, since %A will be larger than %B in its own right, in the
vast majority of cases, JMAxDA - MBxDBJ will a fortiori tend to exceed
1/ (IAMADA + IMBDBI).19 Accordingly, the tie-in will reduce the devia-
tion entailed by the vast majority of outcomes contained in set j.20
19. In order to simplify our exposition, let's assume that absent the tie-in, X would not
earn any profits by selling B to Y (because, for example, he does not produce or normally
market this good himself). In this case, we must show that IlAXDA - MBXDBI >
MAX AMB • SBE
V (IAMADA + IAMBDBI). If we let Q = - and substitute for AMA, this
AMA SAD
requirement resolves into a requirement that Q. %A > 1/ (%A + %3) or that (2Q - 1)7 A
> %,. Since Q will always exceed one (since otherwise X would be selling A under
the tie-in for less than its marginal cost), this condition will always be met where %A ex-
ceeds %B and, as we have seen, this condition will almost always be satisfied in the cir-
cumstances with which we will be concerned.
20. The percentage by which the tie-in reduces any given deviation will increase the
closer the associated ratio of %B/%A to (Q - 1). To see why, let's determine the condi-
tions under which the original deviation will be completely eliminated by the tie-in-i.e.,
MAX AMB * SBE
in which IMAXDAI = 1AMADAI + JAMBDBI. Since Q = - and AMA -
AMA SAn
the above equation resolves into (Q)%A = %A + %, or (Q - 1 )%A = %B" Hence, under
the tie-in, any outcome in j in which (Q - 1) = %B/%A will contribute nothing to X's
risk costs. Obviously, for any percentage reduction, the savings to X will increase the
larger the original deviation.
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However, despite the fact that a given decrease in the deviation
associated with a particular outcome will tend to reduce X's risk costs
by less than they will be raised by an identical increase, the percentage
of cases in j whose deviations the tie-in will have to reduce in order to
reduce the contribution of set j to the variance of II (A+B)Y will be at
most only slightly greater than 50%, for the average decrease in devia-
tion caused by the tie-in will normally exceed the average increase.
21
Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the tie-in will reduce substan-
tially the contribution to X's risk costs of those outcomes in set j.
In short, it seems likely that the tie-in will always reduce the variance
of II (A+B)X. In general, the greater the negative correlation between
DDxAY and DDXr--i.e., the higher the percentage of cases in set j 22.-
21. Where k < v, the decrease will equal k. k will be less than v whenever IMAXDA >
IAMADAI + JAM33DBI - i.e., whenever (Q) %A > %A + %Bor (Q - 1) %A > %B'
Since %A will on the average be far higher than %,, this result will frequently obtain.
When it does, the absolute reduction in the associated deviation will be equal to the
product of X's average expected gross profits on B under the tie-in and the sum of the
absolute percentage deviations associated with the outcome in question-i.e., k = IAMADAI
+ IAMfBDnI = IAM]3 - - %A1 + JAMB - sBE %,I The average reduction in such
cases will probably be quite substantial. On the other hand, where k > 2v, the increase in
deviation will be equal to (k - v) - (v) = k - 2v = IAMADAI + IAMBDBI - 21MAXDAI =
JAMB S• E %AI + IAMB sB • %BI - 12 Q - AMB - S • %A = IAM -SBEI
(%B - [2 Q - 1] %A)- As we have seen, this result will obtain only if (2Q - 1) %A < %B"
As unlikely as this result is-given the greater average size of %A' it is even more unlikely
that (2Q - 1) %A will be sufficiently below %, for the associated increase to be substantial.
Of course, decreases may also result where k is more than v but less than 2v-i.e., where
(Q - 1) %A < %3 < (2Q - 1) %" Once more, the change in deviation will be to 2v - k =
v - (k - v), but given the average size of %B and %A' the difference between %, and
(2Q - 1) %A will probably be larger here than before. Hence, even in these cases, the
average decrease will tend to exceed the average increase produced. Thus, there seems to
be good reason to believe that the average decrease in deviation produced by the tie-in
where DD"KAY and DDxnr deviate in opposite directions will exceed the average increase
the agreement generates in such circumstances.
22. This conclusion will follow if (but not only if) (1) the percentage of cases in setj whose deviations the tie-in reduces exceeds the percentage whose deviations it must re-
duce to lower the contribution to set j to the variance of II (A+B)Y by more than its coun-
terpart for set i exceeds the required percentage for the result in question and (2)
the average reduction in deviation tends to be higher in set j than in set i. Both conditions
seem likely to be fulfilled. The first merely reflects the fact that %, is more likely to exceed%, than it is to exceed (2Q - 1) %A where Q > 1 and average %A exceeds average %B"
The second is somewhat more difficult to establish. As we have seen, each reduction in
deviation in set i will be equal to IAMADAI - IAMRDBI = IAMB - SBEI (%A - %B)- On
the other hand, the size of any reduction in j will depend inter alia on whether k exceeds
v. If k < v, the reduction will be equal to k = IAMADAI + IAMBDuI or (AMB - S3)
(%A + %,), which will obviously be greater than the average reduction in i for each
%, and %B On the other hand, where v < k < 2v, the size of the associated reduction
will be equal to v - Ik - vJ = 2v - k = 2MAD 4 - IAMBSBEI (%A + %B) = 2QIAMB •
SBE" %AI - IAMfBSBEI (%A + %B) = IAMB" SBEI ([2Q - 11 %A - %0), which (since
Q > 1) will also exceed the size of the average reduction in i for each %A and %B.
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and the more uncertain DDxAy in comparison with DON , the greater
the extent to which the tie-in will reduce X's risk costs. 28
Obviously, it is extremely difficult to generalize about the overall
effects of a tie-in on the sum of X's and Y's risk costs. On the one hand,
full requirements tie-ins involving one product the seller does not pro-
duce himself or produces only in a very competitive market will prob-
ably tend to decrease the sum of X's and Y's variances, for although they
will normally raise the contribution of set i to Y's variance by more than
they decrease its contribution to X's, 24 they will often (at least where
the positive correlation between the two demands is not too high and
Y's expected gross profits on A do not approximate their counterparts
on B) reduce the sum of X's and Y's variances by reducing the contri-
bution of set j to X's variance by substantially more than they increase
(or in addition to decreasing) its contribution to Y's variance. On the
other hand, in the type of situation with which we are concerned, a
given increase in the variance of II (A+B)Y will probably raise Y's costs
by more than the same decrease in the variance of II (A+B)x will lower
X's.25
In short, this embarrassingly involved (though massively oversimpli-
fied) analysis generates very few general conclusions about the effect of
the tie-in on the sum of X's and Y's risk costs or indeed about the
determinants of the impact in question.26 Certainly, however, we are
23. As we have seen, the greater average %A in comparison with average 7, the
greater the ratio of the difference between these two percentages when %A exceeds %,
to its counterpart when this relationship is reversed, and the greater this ratio, the greater
the extent to which the tie-in will reduce the contribution of set i to the variance of
II (A+B)Y Similarly, the greater average %A relative to average %B' the greater %
%B(ceteris paribus) and the greater this ratio, the greater the extent to which the tie-in will
reduce the contribution of set j to the variance of 11 (A+B)X"
24. This conclusion is suggested by two facts: (1) the tie-in will increase the contribu-
tion of set i to the variance of X and Y unless it reduces the contribution of more than
50% of its constituent cases to the variance in question (in particular, the amount by
which the tie-in increases [decreases] the contribution of set i to either variance will in-
crease linearly with the positive [negative] difference between some percentage above 50%
and the per cent of cases whose deviation the tie-in reduces) and (2) for any given outcome
in set i, the tie-in will increase the deviation for one party and decrease the deviation for
the other (or leave both unchanged). The result will be unambiguous where IMAY SAE %A1
is less than IMBY SBE %BI by an amount which is more than half IAMADA] + IAMDBI-
a result which will often prevail when Y has little bargaining power on A. The importance
of this result will obviously increase with the negative correlation between DDXAY and
DDRO
XBY.
25. Hence, even if the tie-in reduced the contribution of set j to the sum of X's and Y's
variances, its effect on the sum of their risk costs might still be open to question. Ac-
cordingly, no general relationship can be established between the correlation of DDMAY
and DD.0y and the profitability of the tie-in.
26. Thus, no general relationship can be established between the profitability of the
tie-in (in particular, between the tie-in's effect on the sum of X's and Y's risk costs) and
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justified in proceedings on the assumption that full-requirements tie-ins
will not usually (and may not ever) increase the sum of their partici-
pants' risk costs sufficiently to render disadvantageous agreements that
would otherwise be substantially profitable.
the relative uncertainty of DD 'KY and DDxO since the greater %A minus or
t7I.[/R' the larger the amount by which the tie-in will increase the variance of II(A+B)Y
and the larger the amount by which it wiU decrease the variance of II (A+B)X"
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APPENDIX B
TIE-INS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
(Unfairness to Competitors)
In the text, I indicated that at times the Supreme Court seems to
have based its conclusion that tie-ins are illegal on the assumption that
such agreements always give their employers an unfair advantage over
their competitors-i.e., on the assumption that such agreements inevita-
bly improve their employers' competitive positions in dealing with the
buyers involved without improving their social efficiency correspond-
ingly.1 Although I do not think that the American anti-trust laws war-
rant the application of such an unfair competition test, it may be
instructive to determine whether the various types of tie-ins we have
described do in fact give their employers such an unfair competitive
advantage-i.e., do in fact (1) improve their employers' positions (2)
without improving correspondingly their social efficiency. Fortunately,
the answer can be extracted fairly easily from our previous analysis.
In brief, my conclusion will be (1) that the availability of tying
agreements to all of the competitors for a particular buyer's patronage
on a given general product will not normally improve the competitive
position of the firm that actually does induce the buyer in question to
accept its tying agreement and (2) that any such improvement that does
result may very well be attributable to a concomitant improvement in
that seller's relative social efficiency. Let's examine each of these con-
tentions in turn.
In the text, I argued that the effect of a tie-in on any of its potential
employers' positions will not depend on the position he would have had
if no firm had been able to employ tying agreements. Admittedly, this
fact will not eliminate all connections between the relative profitability
of a tie-in2 to a particular seller and the likelihood that he will actually
make a sale to the buyer in question-i.e., does not prove that the
availability of tie-ins to all potential suppliers of a particular customer
will have no tendency to improve the competitive position of the firm
that actually does enter into a tying agreement with the buyer in ques-
tion-for (1) the probability that any given seller will actually be able
to arrange a tying agreement with any given buyer will increase as his
competitive position for offering a tie-in to this buyer improves and (2)
the competitive position that such a seller will have for offering such an
agreement will improve as its relative profitability for him increases.
Clearly, however, the fact that the relative profitability of using tie-ins
and of making untied sales are not positively correlated does imply that
such agreements will not normally improve-indeed will have only the
1. Cf. note 7, p. 198 supra.
2. By "the relative profitability of a tie-in," I refer to the amount by which the seller
could increase his profits by making a tied rather than an untied sale relative to its coun-
terpart for the other suppliers operating in the market in question.
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slightest tendency to improve-their employers' competitive positions
to deal with those customers whom they actually obtain-i.e., that the
availability of tie-ins to all competitors for a particular buyer's patron-
age will not normally improve the position of the firm that actually does
make the sale in question (that does enter into a tying agreement with
the buyer in question).3
Moreover, to the extent that a tying agreement does improve its
employer's competitive position to deal with the customer concerned,
this improvement may very well be attributable to a concomitant im-
provement in his relative social efficiency. As we have seen, the profit-
ability of each type of tie-in depends at least in part on its performing
socially useful tasks. In fact, the profitability of pure quality-control
tie-ins depends almost entirely on their ability to increase their em-
ployers' social efficiency (1) by reducing the amount of resources they
have to expend to control quality and/or (2) by increasing the extent
to which they actually do control complement quality-i.e., by reducing
the amount of personally and socially costly mistakes their customers
make in complement selection or (as in the Ho-Jo's example) by im-
proving the allocation of resources through increasing the ability of
buyers to predict the quality of the products or services they purchase.
It should be emphasized that quality-control tie-ins are not unique in
this respect. Thus, the profitability of meter-pricing tie-ins will also
depend to a very considerable (though admittedly somewhat lesser) ex-
tent on their increasing their employers' social efficiency (a) by reducing
the amount of resources they expend in a socially non-productive man-
ner to meter use intensity (where absent such an agreement an actual
meter would be installed or more representatives would be sent to check
sales reports than would be sent to prevent violations of the tying agree-
ment); (b) by reducing the total risk costs borne by various members of
the society by transferring more of the related risks to a party better able
to bear them (where absent such an agreement payments would have
been less responsive to actual use); and/or perhaps (c) by reducing the
amount of resources the seller expends in a socially non-productive man-
ner in order to prevent buyer arbitrage. Similarly, package-pricing tie-
ins will operate at least in part by increasing their employers' social effi-
ciency (a) by reducing the amount of resources such sellers would
otherwise expend in a socially non-productive way to obtain the addi-
tional information necessary to practice ordinary price discrimination
and/or (b) by reducing the amount of resources they expend to prevent
buyer arbitrage. And at least to the extent that (a) the associated reduc-
tion in the sum of the seller's and buyer's risk costs plus (b) the asso-
3. Clearly, whatever one thinks of our legal conclusion that the competitive impact
test should be applied not to the individual tie-in in question but to the availability of
tie-ins to all competitors for this buyer's patronage, one must agree that an unfair com-
petition test would have to be applied in this way since a series of equally profitable tie-ins
whose profitability did not reflect their social efficiency would change neither their em-
ployers' social productivity nor their competitive positions-i.e., since the unfair advantages
produced by all members of such a series would simply offset each other.
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ciated reduction in the amount of resources the seller expends to prevent
buyer arbitrage exceeds (c) the amount of resources the seller expends to
enforce the buyer's full-requirement's promise, the profitability of non-
marginal-cost price-shifting tie-ins will depend as well on their increas-
ing their employers' social efficiency. Presumably, then, on the average,
(1) almost all of any concomitant improvement in the competitive
position of a firm employing a quality-control tie-in will be matched by
a comparable improvement in its relative social efficiency; (2) a sub-
stantial part of any concomitant improvement in the competitive posi-
tion of a firm employing a meter or package-pricing tie-in will be
matched by an associated improvement in that seller's relative social
efficiency; and (3) at least some of any concomitant improvement in the
competitive position of any seller employing a non-marginal-cost price-
shifting tie-in will be matched by an associated improvement in his rela-
tive social efficiency.4
Obviously, results will differ among individual tie-ins of any func-
tional type as well as among the various types of tie-ins just described
but clearly the Court's universal assumption that the improvements in
competitive position produced by tie-ins are unfair-i.e., are not asso-
ciated with comparable improvements in relative social efficiency-is
no more justified than its assumption that making such agreements
available to all competitors for a particular buyer's patronage will
always improve the competitive position of the firm that actually does
enter into a tie-in with the buyer in question.5 On both grounds then,
one must reject the Court's conclusion that all tie-ins (involving sellers
who have a competitive advantage on one of the products involved)
would be illegal under the type of unfair competition test just described.
4. It should be noted that where (1) the competitors for Y's patronage tend to produce
both A and B and (2) different firms would be best-placed to make independent sales of
A and B to Y, the gains in social efficiency reported in the text will tend to be somewhat
offset by the tendency of tying agreements to reduce the probability that Y will actually
be supplied with both goods by the firm that is best-placed on each to gain his patronage.
5. This fact might very well be crucial for the legality of such agreements if the com-
petitive impact test were qualified to permit tie-ins (or other activities for that matter)
(1) that reduced competition by increasing efficiency or (2) that reduced competition by
less than they increased efficiency-i.e., that increased consumer surplus while reducing
competition. Cf. p. 249 supra.
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APPENDIX C
COMPETITIVE IMPACT, BUYER REAL INCOME,
AND SELLER PROFITS
Although the Supreme Court's leverage theory continues to be ac-
cepted by the vast majority of judicial commentators,, a few analysts
have criticized the Court's conclusion that all tie-ins (that involve sellers
who possess a competitive advantage on one of the goods in question)
are anti-competitive. In this appendix, I will analyze two of the sug-
gestions such critics have made.
The first of these can be easily articulated and easily criticized. At
least impliedly,2 several critics have suggested that the legality (and
hence, presumably, the competitive impact) of any given tie-in depends
on whether the buyer involved opposed the arrangement of the agree-
ment in question-i.e., on whether the individual agreement in ques-
tion (rather than the availability of such agreements in general)
reduced the participating buyer's buyer surplus. In fact, however, even
if we assumed ad arguendo that these critics' focus on the impact of an
individual tie-in is correct, their conclusion would have to be qualified.
By definition, any individual tie-in that decreases competition will
increase the profits (or seller surplus) #1 could make by just beating his
competitors' offers, but this fact does not justify the conclusion that a
decision allowing such an agreement to be executed will necessarily
decrease buyer surplus, for as we have seen,3 many tie-ins of each func-
tional type will increase significantly the transaction surplus and/or
decrease significantly the pricing costs expected to be generated on
the sales in question. Accordingly, although no tie-in can reduce the
real income the customer in question would have otherwise obtained
(though perhaps not from the same supplier) without decreasing com-
petition (since absent such a concomitant decrease, the availability
of a tie-in to the supplier in question would not make it profitable
for the remaining suppliers to offer less attractive terms), an individual
tying agreement may decrease competition without reducing (indeed
while increasing) the buyer's real income. Obviously, the same qualifi-
cation would also be necessary if I shifted my focus to the competitive
impact of allowing tie-ins to be executed by all prospective suppliers of
a particular buyer, for once more although the availability of tie-ins
cannot reduce the buyer's real income without decreasing competition
(since absent such a decrease, the availability of tie-ins would not make
it profitable for the suppliers in question to offer less attractive indepen-
dent terms on the goods involved), a decision allowing the buyer con-
1. See, e.g., Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1318, 1887 (1964).
2. I say "impliedly," because most such suggestions have been made in relation to the
parallel practice of reciprocity. See, e.g., Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity,
Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433, 437 (1963).
3. See Appendix B passim.
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cerned to participate in such an agreement with any of his suppliers
might decrease competition without reducing his real income by rais-
ing transaction surplus or reducing pricing costs at least as much as it
increased seller surplus.
The second suggestion I will consider is based on a far more sophisti-
cated and intelligent analysis. Nevertheless, it is also fundamentally
misguided. In his path-breaking article,4 Professor Bowman seems to
have concluded that so far as he could tell one type and only one type
of tying agreement should be held illegal because of its anti-competitive
impact on tied-product competition-viz., non-marginal-cost price-
shifting tie-ins involving complementary goods used in variable pro-
portions (henceforth complementarity tie-ins). At various points in his
article, he justified this conclusion in three different ways-in particular
by arguing that all such tying agreements but only such tying agree-
ments as a class will always (1) reduce the output of the tied product B
for use with A below its non-tie-in level;5 (2) enable their employer to
earn higher profits in dealings with the customer in question than he
could earn if he employed independent offers and his competitors were
allowed to use tying agreements; 6 and (3) produce a result which is
indistinguishable from the result that would have obtained had the
seller in question had a monopoly of the tied-product B as well by rais-
ing the profits a monopolist can realize from dealing with the customer
in question.7 Professor Bowman seems to be focusing on the competitive
impact of the individual tie-in actually executed but as we shall see,
regardless of how he is interpreted in this respect, each of these conten-
tions is incorrect and none would-in any case-justify Professor
Bowman's economic/legal inference. Let's proceed, then by examining
each in turn.
Professor Bowman's attempt to justify his conclusion that only com-
plementarity tie-ins as a class always reduce competition by arguing that
all such tie-ins and only such tie-ins as a class always reduce B's output
is incorrect, regardless of which focus he is interpreted to be taking, for
even if the availability or individual use of only this type of tie-in al-
4. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and The Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19 (1957).
5. "When product complementarity is involved .... output of B for use with product
A is less than any output of product B for such use which would exist by manipulation
of the price or output of product A when product B is competitive." Id. 25.
6. Thus, according to Processor Bowman: "Leverage did not exist in the [meter pricing]
case because the same result could have been obtained by metering the first product with
no control over the second. . . (I)n the complementarity case, control over B is essential
to securing revenue which could not be realized from A alone." Id. 27.
"The distinction between . . . (the complementarity example and the foregoing
'metering' example resolves itself into this question: does the monopoly over the tied
product, or part of it, add any profit over what could be achieved by manipulating
the price of the tying product, in absence of control over the tied product." Id. at 25,
n.18.
Admittedly, at least as construed, these quotations are inconsistent with Professor
Bowman's earlier listing of circumstances in which tie-ins "might give rise to an increased
return." Id. 21.
7. "The [complementarity] tie-in . . . yields the equivalent of monopoly by a single
seller over both A and B." Id.
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ways would produce this effect, this fact would imply nothing about
competitive impact-i.e., would imply nothing about the way in which
the availability of tie-ins to the actual supplier of the buyer in question
or to him and his competitors would affect the returns the best-placed
firm(s)8 to supply this buyer (or any other buyer for that matter) could
have earned had he obtained the patronage of the customer in question
on terms that matched the attractiveness of the offer that buyer actually
accepted. A decision to allow all of Y's suppliers to offer him a "com-
plementarity" tie-in that would reduce B's unit output would clearly
not reduce the intensity of competition for Y's patronage on A and B-
for example-if such an agreement would be equally profitable for
each of X's actual and potential competitors for Y's patronage, for the
availability of such tie-ins in such circumstances would not (1) improve
the competitive position of the firm that was best-placed to deal with
the particular buyer involved; (2) raise for independent reasons the
retaliation costs any undercutting competitive inferior would have to
anticipate; and/or (3) raise the barriers to entry faced by any potential
entrant to the market in question. Obviously, the same conclusion
would also obtain if I shifted my focus to the competitive impact of
a decision to allow the seller actually involved to offer Y such a tying
agreement. Accordingly, even if the availability or individual use of
only complementarity tie-ins would always reduce B's unit output,
Professor Bowman's conclusion would not be justified regardless of
the focus he is interpreted to be taking. In fact, although it is true
that of the various functional types of tie-ins we described only individ-
ual non-marginal cost price-shifting tie-ins will always reduce the unit
output of one of the products involved (while increasing the unit output
of the other),9 the availability of such agreements to all Y's potential
suppliers need not have such an impact since in some cases the universal
tendency of all such individual tie-ins to raise B's unit price may be off-
set by a tendency on the part of such agreements in general to make
both products' prices more attractive by preserving transaction surplus
without increasing profits.
Professor Bowman's second justification for his conclusion-viz., that
only complementarity tie-ins will always increase their employer's prof-
its-must also be dismissed regardless of the focus he is interpreted to
be taking. Thus, if I assume him to be focusing on the competitive
impact of the individual tie-in actually executed, his contention would
be both incorrect and irrelevant since (1) as we have seen, each individ-
8. The plural will be necessary when the best-placed firm for arranging a tie-in with Y
finds it profitable to purchase elsewhere the B he includes in the agreement in question. In
such a case, the relevant profit comparison will be between (1) the sum of the returns #1
would have earned on the tie-in in question and the profits the firm that supplied him
with B would have made on these sales and (2) the sum of the profits that the firms who
would have been best-placed to make independent sales of A and B to Y would have
realized at the terms in question.
9. Obviously, individual specimens of other types of tie-ins may also have this effect.
Thus, tie-ins that increase the extent of discrimination against a particular buyer on some
product will presumably decrease his purchases of this product.
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ual tie-in that is executed-and not just "complementarity" tie-ins-
will presumably increase its employer's expected returns in comparison
with those he could anticipate realizing on independent offers if his
competitors could employ tying agreements themselves'0 and (2) the
competitive impact of an individual tie-in will depend in any case not
only on its profitability to its employer but also on the competitive
position that the seller in question would have had if he had been pre-
vented from employing such an agreement with the buyer involved.
Indeed, even if I assume Professor Bowman to be focusing on the com-
petitive impact of allowing all suppliers of the buyer in question to
offer him tying agreements, his second contention would be both incor-
rect and irrelevant, since (1) the impact of the availability of tying
agreements on the profits that the actual employer of the agreement in
question realizes will depend not (a) on whether the individual agree-
ment is more profitable for him than independent pricing but (b) on
whether it is more profitable for him than its counterparts are for his
colleagues, and since (2) the competitive impact of the availability of
tying agreements will depend not only on (a) whether it increases its
actual employer's profits (i.e., improves his competitive position) but
also on (b) what his competitive position would have been in indepen-
dent dealings for the patronage of the buyer in question.
Professor Bowman's third rationale-viz., that only complementarity
tie-ins as a class will always raise the returns of the monopolistic firms
that employ them-differs from its predecessors only in its false assump-
tion that this type of tie-in is employed only by monopolists. However,
although Professor Bowman's conclusion is therefore unjustified re-
gardless of the focus he is assumed to be taking, two questions remain:
(1) whether the availability of tie-ins will increase an employer X's
returns-i.e., "the returns that the best-placed potential supplier(s) of
A and B to Y will be able to earn (at least in the short run before invest-
ment adjusts) by obtaining Y's patronage on terms that give Y the same
amount of real income he actually obtained"-whenever X is a mo-
nopolist and the individual tying agreement is profitable to him" and
(2) whether such an increase-when it results-should be considered to
manifest a decrease in competition.
The answer to the first question cannot be unconditional, for al-
though a tie-in that is profitable to a monopolist would enable him to
increase his returns if he could be constrained in his pricing only by
producers of goods that were substitutes for his product in the sense
that they fulfilled the same needs as his good-i.e., by producers who
by definition did not exist in his case, in practice such a monopolist will
be constrained by "competition" from producers of non-substitutes in
the above sense-i.e., from producers (say Q) of those goods which this
10. Thus, meter-pricing tie-ins will be used instead of an actual meter only if they
are a more profitable metering device--e.g., if the cost of administering and enforcing
such a tie-in is less than the cost of buying, installing, and inspecting a meter.
11. Obviously, the tie-ins in question might be different functional types.
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buyer would purchase (to fulfill different needs) if he did not buy A.
Accordingly, the availability of tie-ins to all producers-and not just to
conventional competitors-will enable a monopolist like X to increase
his returns only if he finds it more profitable to arrange a tie-in with Y
than Q. This result can and should be made consistent with our textual
analysis by interpreting "competitors" as used there to refer to pro-
ducers of all economic substitutes rather than just to producers of goods
that fulfill roughly the same needs.
The answer to the second question should therefore be clear:1.2
whenever the availability of tie-ins in general does enable a monopolist
to increase his profits by increasing his advantage over his established
competitors (in this broader sense), the agreement in question will in
fact violate the American anti-trust laws' competitive impact test.
12. It should be noted that every such increase in (short-run) profits will not denote
a decrease in price-variable input competition, for such an increase could also result-for
example-from a supplier's raising a price that was originally lower than the price that
would maximize his profits.
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